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D ear Reader:
Part o f the excitem ent o f studying Latin Am erica and  the Caribbean is the rapidity o f change 
that characterizes these regions. In  the C aribbean, two events are particularly noteworthy: C uba’s 
radical reevaluation o f its econom y and  the plebiscite on political status held  in Puerto  Rico on 
N ovem ber 14.
T hat plebiscite left the issue o f Puerto  Rico’s status in limbo. A lthough the pro-statehood party 
was governing the island, tha t option received only 46.2% o f the vote, com pared with 48.4% for 
com m onw ealth and  4.4% for independence. It should com e as no surprise, therefore, tha t calls 
for an o th er plebiscite are already being heard . The articles in this issue, written with the 1993 
plebiscite in m ind, should serve as a solid in troduction  to and  provide in teresting com parisons 
for the next round.
In  o rd er to capture the com plexity o f both the Cuban and  Puerto Rican cases, Hemisphere has 
published this special double issue (Sum m er/Fall 1993) for the price o f one. We have gathered  
some of the finest ta len t from  both  islands to provide in-depth analysis o f these events.
Please note tha t this double issue accounts for only one issue in your subscription. For exam ple, if 
your subscription period  begins with this issue, you will still be en titled  to receive two m ore issues 
after this one.
We are delighted  to bring you this bonus issue.
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Sincerely,

Hemisphere
A M A G A Z I N E  O F  L A T I N  A M E R I C A N  A N D  C A R I B B E A N  AFF AI RS  
Summer!Fall 1993 Volume Five 'Number Three Seven Dollars
EDITORIAL STAFF
Editor: A nthony P. Maingot 
Deputy Editor: Richard Tardanico 
Managing Editor: Marilyn A. Moore 
Associate Editors: Eduardo A. Gamarra, 
Mark B. Rosenberg 
Assistant Editor: Sofia A. Lopez 
Bibliographer: Marian Goslinga 
Editorial Assistant: Rene Ramos 
Circulation Manager: Raquel Jurado 
Copy Editor: Michael B. Joslyn 
Production Assistants: Cristina Finlay, 
Alka Lachhwani, Teresita Marill
CONTRIBUTING EDITORS
Raul Moncarz 
Lisandro Perez 
Luis P. Salas 
Kevin A. Yelvington
Jan e t M. Chernela 
Elena de Jongh 
Damian J. Fernandez 
Dennis J. Gayle
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Don Bohning 
Ettore Botta 
Wolf GrabendorfF 
Alistair Hennessy 
Harry Hoetink 
Franklin W. Knight 
Vaughan Lewis 
Larissa A. Lomnitz 
Abraham  F. Lowenthal 
Andres O ppenheim er 
Robert A. Pastor 
Anthony J. Payne
Guido Pennano 
Alejandro Portes 
Sally Price 
David Ronfeldt 
Selwyn Ryan 
Steven E. Sanderson 
Saskia Sassen 
Andres Serbm 
Carol A. Smith 
Yolande Van Eeuwen 
A rturo Villar 
Juan  Yaiies
Hemisphere (ISSN 08983038) is published three 
times a year (Fall, W inter/Spring, and Summer) 
by the Latin American and  Caribbean C enter of 
Florida In ternational University. Copyright © 1993 
by the Latin American and  Caribbean Center, Flor­
ida In ternational University. All rights reserved.
Hemisphere is dedicated to provoking debate on  the 
problems, initiatives, and  achievements o f Latin 
America and  the Caribbean. Responsibility for the 
views expressed lies solely with the authors.
EDITORIAL, CIRCULATION, AND ADVERTISING 
OFFICES: Latin American and Caribbean Center, 
Florida In ternational University, University Park, 
Miami, Florida 33199. Tel.: (305) 348-2894. Fax: 
(305) 348-3593. Please address m anuscripts and 
editorial correspondence to the M anaging Editor.
SUBSCRIPTIONS: US, USVI, PR, and Canada:
$20 a  year; $36 for two years. Elsewhere: $27 a year; 
$50 for two years. Please make check o r money 
o rder (US currency only) payable to Hemisphere. 
C redit card orders (MC/VISA only) are also 
acceptable.
This docum ent was produced at a cost o f $9,372.11 
o r $4.69 per copy.
COMMENTARY
Voices from Within: Cuba Must Change
A  Historic Message from  the Cuban Conference o f Bishops 
Cuban Responses to the Bishops by Lazaro Barredo,
Cintio Vitier, Luis Baez Delgado, and Members o f the 
Grupo de Meditacion y Solidaridad Oscar Arnulfo Romero
“Dollarization”: Castro’s Latest Economic Miracle? 
by Sergio Diaz-Briquets
REPORTS
Creolite, Negritude, and Metropolis by Richard D. E. Burton 
El Salvador: The Electoral Test by Madalene T. O ’Donnell 
Ecuador: Is Modernization Enough? by D onna Lee Van Cott 
Women Judges in Central America by Tirza Rivera-Cira
FAXFILE 
FEATURES
Cuba
Quid Pro Quo with Cuba by Anthony P. Maingot 
The Social Safety Net Unravels by Carmelo Mesa-Lago 
Seized Properties vs. Embargo Losses by Archibald R. M. Ritter 
Crisis Challenges Social Researchers by Francisco Leon
Puerto Rico
Negotiated Autonomy by Juan  M. Garcia Passalacqua 
The Chance to Decolonize by M anuel Rodriguez-Orellana 
The Plebiscite: A Time to Change by Baltasar Corrada del Rio 
Mutual Respect: Congress Must Act by Marco Antonio Rigau
REVIEW FORUM
A New Course in Foreign Affairs? by Joseph S. Tulchin
PUBLICATIONS UPDATE
The US, Cuba, and Puerto Rico by M arian Goslinga
2
5
8
10
13
16
18
20
22
26
31
36
38
42
44
47
50
54
c o i l
Voices from Within: Cuba Must Change
A Historic Message from the Cuban Conference of Bishops
n the history of humankind, 
there has never been a lack of 
voices shouting, “Charity no! 
Justice!” But Jesus Christ told 
us that “if your justice is no bet­
ter than that of the Pharisees, 
you will no t enter into the King­
dom of Heaven, and t h a t . . .  if we 
do not have mercy, what awaits us 
is a trial without mercy.”
Justice and Charity
The struggle for justice is not a 
struggle in which one can remain 
neutral because that would be like 
taking the side of injustice. . . . But 
justice ends where charity begins, 
or better yet, charity precedes and 
forms part of justice because justice 
is incomplete without love. “An eye 
for an eye, and a tooth for a too th” 
represents justice without love. . . .
Love Overcomes Hatred
Hatred is not a constructive force. 
“W hen I despair,” Gandhi said, “I 
rem em ber that throughout history, 
truth and love have always won 
out.” . . . From Marti, whose think­
ing had biblical underpinnings, 
come these phrases: “Sad is the fa­
therland (patria) which has hatred 
as support”; “love is the best law.”
The Mission of the Church
We, pastors of the Church, are not 
politicians. This does limit us, but 
it also enables us to base our speech 
on the riches the Lord bestowed
Editor’s Note: Edited excerpts from the 
pastoral message of the Cuban arch­
bishops of Havana and Santiago, and 
nine bishops and auxiliary bishops else­
where in Cuba, September 8, 1993.
upon us: the Word of God . . . and 
the millenium of the Church.
It also enables us to speak about 
the only topic that pertains to us: 
the C hurch’s contribution to the 
welfare of all. . . .
We speak as Cubans 
to all Cubans, because 
we understand that 
Cuba’s difficulties 
must be solved by all 
Cubans together.
To Whom We Address 
This Message
We speak to a l l . . . to the politi­
cians . . . and to those who, inside 
or outside Cuba, aspire to enjoy an 
active participation in the nation’s 
political life. We speak as Cubans to 
all Cubans, because we understand 
that Cuba’s difficulties must be 
solved by all Cubans together.
Our Relations with Other 
Countries
In the history of this century . . .  we 
have had the sad experience of for­
eign intervention in our national 
affairs. . . . Facing difficulties be­
queathed to us by previous gov­
ernments, we sought a solution to 
those problems from those who had 
not created them  and who, because 
they were far from our geographic 
location and removed from our cul­
tural traditions, were ignorant of 
our condition. Political and mili­
tary alliances were made, trade 
partners were changed, and so on.
It is not surprising, therefore, 
that some of our current obstacles 
arise from this close dependence, 
which led us to imitate structures 
and behavior models. From that 
[dependence] came the repercus­
sions of the collapse of true social­
ism in Eastern Europe.
At the time, trapped in the mid­
dle of the “bloc politics” of recent 
decades, we have endured the US 
embargo, trade restrictions, isola­
tion, threats, etc.
We know that we live in an inter­
dependent world and that no coun­
try is sufficient unto itself. Along 
with all the nations of the region, 
we hope for Latin American inte­
gration . . . because poor countries 
ought to unite in order to over­
come their negative dependence 
on rich countries.
But the solution to our prob­
lems should not come only from 
overseas [in the form of] foreign 
solidarity, foreign investment, for­
eign tourism, money from those 
who live abroad, etc. . . .
In the face of this situation, 
many seem to ease their suffering 
by moving abroad whenever pos­
sible. If they cannot leave, they 
fanatically idolize everything 
that is foreign, or simply evade 
reality by going into a kind of 
inner exile.
Today it is acknowledged that 
those Cubans who can help eco­
nomically are precisely those we 
turned into foreigners. Would it 
not be better to admit that they 
also have the legitimate right and 
duty to contribute solutions be­
cause they are Cubans?
How can we turn to them  and 
ask for their help if we d o n ’t first 
create a climate of reconciliation 
am ong all the children of the same 
people?
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Everything Can Be Solved 
among Cubans
It is up to us as Cubans to solve the 
problems that exist within our own 
country. We must ask ourselves seri­
ously: Why is it that so many Cu­
bans want to leave—and do leave— 
their homeland? . . . Why do pro­
fessionals, workers, artists, priests, 
athletes, military people, activists, 
or ordinary people take advantage 
of any temporary trip . . .  to remain 
abroad? . . . Marti said that “a man 
away from his fatherland is like a 
tree in the sea,” and that “there is 
something of the shipwrecked ves­
sel in every foreign house.”
Why, finally, d on ’t we try to solve 
our problems, together with all 
o ther Cubans, from our national 
perspective, without someone pre­
suming to defend our interests or 
arbitrate our differences . . . with 
solutions that sometimes make 
us believe that the only ones who 
lose are Cuban nationals? “If your 
brother is in need and you close 
your heart to him, God’s love is not 
in you” (1 Jn. 3:17).
No one should close his heart to 
the present situation in our hom e­
land, or close his eyes to the sad re­
ality that Cuba is in need. Things 
are not going well. This topic is 
discussed on the street am ong the 
people themselves. There is discon­
tent, uncertainty, and despair in 
the population.
In the economic field, the short­
age of basic material needs has 
reached a point of extreme gravity. 
The beautiful and fertile soil of our 
island, the “Pearl of the Antilles,” is 
no longer M other Earth. She is now 
exhausted and incapable of feed­
ing her children. . . .
We, the bishops of Cuba, reject 
any type of measure that, in the
guise of punishing the Cuban gov­
ernm ent, increases the difficulties 
that affect our people. We rejected 
this, at one time, in connection 
with the US embargo, and m ore re­
cently, in connection with the so- 
called Torricelli law.
Today it is 
acknowledged that 
those Cubans who 
can help economically 
are precisely those we 
turned into foreigners. 
Would it not be better 
to admit that they 
also have the 
legitimate right and 
duty to contribute 
solutions because they 
are Cubans?
We also carried out historic ne­
gotiations directly with the US ad­
ministration, aimed at ending the 
embargo, at least as it related to 
medicine. By those actions, we 
sought to encourage positive steps 
to solve the problems between the 
governments of the US and Cuba.
Conditions fora Solution
It is not within our purview to out­
line the path to be followed by our 
nation’s economy, but we do call 
for a tranquil and sincere debate 
on the economy and its direction,
with the participation of all Cubans. 
Rather than temporary emergency 
measures, it becomes imperative to 
develop a sharply outlined eco­
nomic plan, capable of inspiring 
and mobilizing the energies of all 
the people. . . .
Deterioration of the 
Moral Climate
A nother aspect we must consider is 
the deterioration of the moral cli­
mate in our hom eland. . . . The 
authorities are often disconcerted 
by the increase in delinquency: rob­
bery, assaults, . . . prostitution and 
violence. . . .
The high rates of alcoholism and 
suicide reveal, am ong other fac­
tors, the onset of depression and 
escape from reality. . . .
Values of Our Culture
Fundam ental values of Cuban cul­
ture are being lost, [particularly] 
family values. . . . Prem ature mar­
riage is a sign of reduced social bal­
ance. . . . More than half of those 
who marry separate a short time 
later, and there are many fatherless 
children. . . . The death rate of 
babies through abortion . . .  is 
astonishing. . . .
Political Aspects
It seems to us that, along with cer­
tain economic changes that are al­
ready under way, our national spirit 
would be uplifted by the elimina­
tion of certain riling policies. . . .
* The exclusive and om nipresent 
nature of official ideology that 
identifies otherwise distinct 
concepts as being coterminous, 
such as “m otherland and social­
ism,” “state and governm ent,”
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Commentary
“authority and power,” “legality 
and morality,” “Cuban and revo­
lutionary.”
■ The limitations imposed . . .  on 
freedom  itself. . . .
■ The excessive control of the or­
gans of state security, which some­
times enters even the private lives 
of individuals. . . .
■ The high num ber of prisoners in­
carcerated for acts that in some 
cases should be decriminalized 
and in others should be recon­
sidered.
■ Discrimination due to philo­
sophical ideas, politics, or relig­
ious beliefs. . . .
We, the bishops of Cuba, aware 
that we are living in a transcen­
dental period of history, have con­
ducted our sacred ministry with the 
tact and delicacy that the situation 
required. . . . However, a healthy 
realism leads us to interpose our­
selves. This might not please some, 
but it may lead us to the root of the
We think that to reject 
dialogue is to lose the 
right to express one’s 
own opinion. To 
accept dialogue is 
to contribute to an 
understanding among 
all Cubans.
problems, and in that way alleviate 
the condition of our people. . . .
Seeking New Paths
We bishops, like all our people, 
have followed closely the intro­
duction of some changes in the 
nation’s economic structure. . . .
Given the present living conditions 
of the Cuban people . . .  it appears 
that if there are no real changes 
in the economic, political, and so­
cial sectors, the achievements at­
tained after years of sacrifice could 
come to nought. . . .
Dialogue: The Best Path
We would like to say something 
about dialogue, better yet, about 
the compromise achieved through 
dialogue. . . . The Holy Father John  
Paul II tells us that “complex prob­
lems are better solved through dia­
logue...rather than through strug­
gles to destroy the adversary. . . . ”
We must recognize that there 
are different viewpoints in Cuba 
concerning the country’s situation 
and the possible solutions. . . .  It is 
evident that the paths that lead to 
reconciliation and peace—such as 
dialogue—have undeniable popu­
lar support and beyond that, enjoy 
sympathy and prestige am ong the 
people.
Dialogue among Cubans
The Cuban people . . . desire a 
frank, friendly, and free dialogue, 
where everyone expresses his 
feelings openly and cordially.
A dialogue not aimed at settling 
scores . . . silencing the opponent, 
or reclaiming the past, but at per­
mitting us to interact.
In Cuba there is a single party, 
a single press, a single radio, and 
a single television. But the dia­
logue we refer to must take into 
account the diversity of media 
and people. . . .
We realize there are many inside 
and outside Cuba who reject dia­
logue because their accumulated 
resentm ent is g re a t. . . but we 
think that to reject dialogue is to 
lose the right to express one’s own 
opinion. To accept dialogue is to 
contribute to an understanding 
am ong all Cubans that will lead to 
a peaceful and dignified future. ■
(Translated by Hemisphere staff)
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Cuban Responses to the Bishops
An U nfounded 
Provocation against 
the Revolution
by Lazaro Barredo
Trabajadores, Septem ber 20, 1993
People who have never shared the 
patriotism and national identity of 
many devout Catholics, and who 
have always suffered trivial ordeals 
closer to the US than to the Cuban 
nation, are now trying to set them ­
selves up, in a sibylline m anner, as 
the protagonists in an alleged 
change in the apparent values of 
charity and solidarity.
It is too great a coincidence for 
these people, who claim to be en­
lightened and to constitute the na­
tion’s critical conscience but who 
have historically been accomplices 
of all the nation’s enemies, to be 
advocating from their pulpits, as 
Catholic leaders, the euphemism 
known as a “call” to love, reconcili­
ation, dialogue, and an allegedly 
ideal past. Such words are very at­
tractive to those who are busy trying 
to make the Cuban revolution dis­
appear from the face of the earth.
The US intelligence services 
could not have been given a 
greater bonus. . . . What goal is 
being pursued by contrasting that 
so-called love of God to love for the 
fatherland? A return to the decade 
of the sixties and deliberately ignor­
ing the postulates of the Gospel? 
Contrasting G od’s principles with 
the principles of the revolution?
Editor’s Note: Each declaration is based 
on edited excerpts of original statements 
gathered and translated by the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service.
Cuba, and the hierarchy knows this 
full well, is not closed to dialogue 
with the Cuban community abroad, 
and in fact, entertains such a dia­
logue with many political and busi­
ness sectors that differ with some 
of our ideas but have no ties to the 
CIA or to the policy of blockade 
and aggression against our coun­
try. With whom do they wish us to
It is the treachery of 
Cain. It is the knife 
rammed in the back at 
the most difficult, most 
decisive, and heroic 
moment in the history 
of Cuba. It is to join  
the imperialist idea of 
seeing Cuba immersed 
in blood.
engage in dialogue? With the ter­
rorist organizations that, under vari­
ous facades and encouraged and 
supported by the most reactionary 
forces in American society, operate 
with total impunity and constantly 
violate God’s com m andm ents with­
in that very community itself and 
against the Cuban people, includ­
ing all believers? . . .
The Catholic hierarchy’s strictly 
political incursion into the na­
tional reality gives one much food 
for thought. A report published in 
the past by Time magazine regard­
ing a conspiracy by the Catholic
hierarchy of Poland and the CIA to 
destroy socialism in Poland cannot 
be overlooked. In Poland, however, 
the Catholic Church had played a 
historic role in the struggle against 
foreign dom ination during the 
long process of national liberation, 
a role very different from the role 
played in our country by the Catho­
lic hierarchies. . . .
The Church hierarchy is not 
isolated from the outside world; 
it knows full well that, despite the 
extremely strong economic crisis 
the nation is going through, there 
is no other country in Latin Amer­
ica that exhibits greater political 
stability and social justice, the re­
sult of the heroism and support of 
a revolutionary population.
The hierarchy forgets that it was 
a tool of that policy when its mem­
bers were the intermediaries of the 
US State D epartm ent in getting
15,000 children out of Cuba with­
out their parents in the so-called 
“Peter Pan” program  between 1960 
and 1962. In any case, why point a 
finger at Cuba, which has one of 
the smallest emigrations to the US 
in comparison with o ther Latin 
American countries, when it is a 
fact that the US attracts the most 
immigrants because of the colossal 
economic resources that it has 
amassed through looting the world.
The step taken by the bishops 
in their so-called call to love is re­
ally a deliberate and unfounded 
provocation against the revolution. 
It is an attem pt to underm ine the 
needed unity and morale of our 
people. . . .  It is the treachery of 
Cain. It is the knife ram m ed in the 
back at the most difficult, most de­
cisive, and heroic m om ent in the 
history of Cuba. It is to jo in  the im­
perialist idea of seeing Cuba im­
mersed in blood. ■
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Commentary
Survival First, 
then Dialogue
by Cintio Vitier
Granma, Septem ber 22, 1993
Although in the message the bish­
ops insist they are no t politicians 
and that the Church cannot have a 
political platform, in fact—and this 
is unobjectionable in itself—they 
make a political analysis and pro­
pose a political solution: a national 
dialogue. The bishops’ docum ent 
does no t at all m ention depend­
ency on the US, but only the new 
dependency that, according to the 
bishops, led us to copying struc­
tures and behavioral models from 
Eastern Europe. Once the first de­
pendency is obviated, all relation­
ships with the second seem to be 
lost, and it is of course im proper to 
differentiate their respective cir­
cumstances and features or admit 
the absolute sovereignty we have 
attained. Is it right to presuppose 
lack of love in social works, such as 
literacy drives, education, and free 
medial attention for all, among 
many others, that are without par­
allel in Latin America?
All of us know there is an in­
creasing emigration from poor to 
wealthy countries. The Church ap­
parently did not share this concern 
over the revolutionary emigration 
in the past century. A large num ber 
of Cubans, even those having the 
opportunity to stay abroad, return 
to Cuba to continue to experience 
all kinds of duress and difficulties 
in their homeland.
I wonder why the bishops’ 
message longs for “that republic, 
corrupt to the very marrow, neo­
colonial, and unfair, in an invita­
tion to a dialogue.” Regarding the 
“right of diversity,” which the bish­
ops advocate in their message, has 
the Church historically exercised 
this right? Was diversity practiced 
in the Spain of Franco, who was de­
clared favorite son of the Church?
The Catholic Church kept “an 
enigmatic silence” during the popu­
lar dem onstrations to support the
Pastors for Peace (who in the US 
declared a hunger strike to protest 
the blockade against C uba).
The right for diversity must be 
preserved, but the right to survival 
as an independent nation must be 
preserved first. A country harassed 
to incredible extremes just cannot 
afford to have an irresponsible di­
versity and a theoretically perfect 
dialogue, just as the US did not 
have diversity and dialogue for 
more than 40 years after attaining 
independence, m uch less when the 
US faced the Nazi threat and closed 
ranks with the Soviet Union. ■
Questioning the 
Bishops
by Luis Baez Delgado
Juventud Rebelde, September 26, 1993
In the name of what justice, or 
what love, can they ask us for rec­
onciliation, dialogue, brotherhood 
with, not that o ther great mass of 
Cubans—whom, let it be said in 
passing, we did not turn into for­
eigners—but with traitors, m ur­
derers, and mercenaries?
The right for diversity 
must be preserved, but 
the right to survival as 
an independent nation 
must be preserved first.
The maneuver by the conference 
of Catholic bishops of Cuba is a be­
trayal because they betrayed the 
faith, and betrayed their Catholic 
brothers, in whose name they have 
spoken without prior consultation. 
They have negated their Catholic 
brothers in an attem pt to use 
them; and, thanks to the position 
they hold as bishops, they are re­
ducing their Catholic brothers to 
simple instruments of their pre­
m editated treachery.
The bishops have betrayed the 
people because the people of Cuba 
do not today need shows put on by 
annexationists of the spirit or quit­
ters by vocation; they need, rather, 
upright conduct by persons of firm 
and steadfast character, forged by 
sacrifice for the sake of progress 
sharing the Cuban people’s pres­
ent reality and fate.
O ur position is clear: we follow 
the invincible com m ander of the 
solitary star. We are in favor of the 
independence of the fatherland. 
We are upright people. ■
Dialogue: For Whom? 
With Whom?
Members of the Grupo de Meditation 
y Solidaridad Oscar Amulfo Romero
Granma, Septem ber 28, 1993
Cuba is a nation in the process of 
building, just 90 miles from a 
declared enemy, and it is facing 
the current setbacks because of 
changes in the world situation: the 
collapse of the socialist bloc and 
the renewal of the blockade as a 
means of drowning the hopes of a 
society of equality and social justice.
The bishops’ message claims to 
be addressed to the politicians in­
side and outside Cuba who aspire 
to real participation in the national 
political life. In this connection, we 
wonder if the politicians referred 
to could possibly be the gentlem en 
from Alpha 66, the L Commandos, 
and the [Cuban-American Na­
tional] Foundation?
It appears the bishops forgot a 
few considerations, such as the fact 
that, in Cuba, it is the population 
that maintains dialogue. The bish­
ops stress that Cuba’s current eco­
nomic measures are necessary 
because of the difficulties we are 
going through. Yet they also stress 
that the measures are neither detri­
mental to the masses nor based on 
a neoliberal model, but are instead 
based on a search for a Cuban so­
lution. ■
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Commentary
“ Dollarization” : Castro’s Latest Economic Miracle?
by Sergio Diaz-Briquets
I
n what may be considered a 
major gamble to buttress the 
crumbling Cuban economy, 
Fidel Castro announced on 
July 26, 1993, that Cubans will 
be perm itted to legally hold 
foreign currency for the first time 
in more than 30 years, and that 
more Cuban-Americans will be 
allowed to visit the island. The in­
tent of these policies is to increase 
Cuba’s foreign exchange receipts 
and thus the country’s ability to 
im port vital necessities. Castro’s 
hopes hinge in his assumption that 
Cuban-Americans will behave like 
emigrants from many other coun­
tries and rem it substantial amounts 
of foreign currency to their rela­
tives in Cuba. The expectation is 
that Cuba will receive a dollar wind­
fall comparable to that benefiting 
other countries (like Mexico, the 
Dominican Republic, and El Salva­
dor) . In an ironic twist bred by this 
time of dire need, Castro expects 
the despised Cuban-American com­
munity—the worms of yore—to 
help save the revolution!
With a rapidly deteriorating 
economic situation made more 
poignant by the daily press reports 
depicting it, there can be no doubt 
that a worried emigre community 
will react just as Castro has antici­
pated. Havana, however, may be 
more optimistic than warranted 
regarding the expected dollar wind­
fall. The volume of emigrant remit­
tances is driven by a complex web 
of determ inants, of which family 
obligations is but a single element. 
Additional im portant determ inants
Sergio Diaz-Briquets is vice president of 
Casals and Associates, a consulting 
firm in Washington, DC.
are the current or future fulfill­
ments of economic and social 
expectations on the part of the 
emigrants, how long the emigrants 
have been abroad, and their in­
come levels in the host country.
Havana may be 
more optimistic than 
warranted regarding 
the expected dollar 
windfall. The volume 
of emigrant 
remittances is driven 
by a complex web of 
determinants, of which 
family obligations is 
but a single element.
The latter variable is generally 
the principal determ inant of the 
volume of remittances. High-in- 
come emigrants with more dispos­
able income can send more money 
than emigrants earning low sala­
ries. A further im portant variable is 
the chronological occurrence of 
the migration: the am ount of remit­
tances tends to be inversely associ­
ated with how long the emigrants 
have been abroad. This is a logical 
outcom e since the need for remit­
tances declines as family members 
jo in  their relatives abroad, and as 
em igrant households gradually 
shift their allegiances and obliga­
tions away from the home to the 
host country. In the case of Cuban 
emigrants, this constellation of fac­
tors will tend to dam pen the vol­
ume of remittances. By and large, 
the family ties to Cuba of Cuban- 
Americans who have been in the 
US for the longest time—and who, 
therefore, have the highest in­
come—have been eroded by the 
passage of several decades. In most 
instances, immediate families have 
been reunited in the US (via the 
1960s airlift, the Mariel sealift, etc.). 
While this is not typical of recent 
emigrants—including many from 
the Mariel period and later—these 
recent arrivals are not as well pre­
pared to succeed economically as 
those who preceded them.
With less to offer in terms of 
education and job  skills, the more 
recent migrants reaching US shores 
have had to contend with the diffi­
cult economic conditions facing 
South Florida. The 1990s recession 
and immigration from many other 
Latin American countries led to in­
tense labor m arket competition. As 
a result, many recent Cuban arri­
vals have been permanently rele­
gated to m inimum wage jobs. Even 
if they desired, these immigrants 
lack the capacity to send substan­
tial amounts of dollars to their rela­
tives in Cuba.
Two crucial considerations—the 
social and economic expectations 
of the emigrants themselves—seem 
to have been ignored by officials in 
Havana in their hopeful calcula­
tion of the flood of anticipated 
remittances. Cuban emigration dif­
fers from that of o ther Caribbean 
and Latin American countries in 
one im portant respect: until now, 
the concept of returning has been 
a distant possibility. Cuban emi­
grants have either chosen to sever
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their links to Cuba perm anently or 
had the government choose for 
them  with its tightly controlled 
return migration policy. In the 
Latin American context, this is a 
unique feature of Cuban emigra­
tion (shared by emigration from 
many o ther form er European 
and Asian totalitarian countries) 
with major implications for remit­
tance flows.
Countless historical and contem ­
porary studies suggest that nearly a 
third of all immigrants either re­
turn to their countries of birth, or 
expect to do so eventually. They do 
so for a variety of reasons. Many re­
turn because they cannot adapt to 
living conditions in destination 
countries, or simply because things 
have not gone as well in the desti­
nation country as they expected. 
O ther migrants plan to retire in 
their home countries, or at least 
spend extended periods of time 
there to satisfy their cultural and 
social longings. Emigrants from
Mexico and many other countries, 
for example, are notorious for mak­
ing considerable investments in 
what, by local standards, are con­
sidered to be luxurious dwellings, 
or to allocate im portant sums for 
the purchase of land (much of 
which is left idle). Some of these 
remittances are also used to start or 
sustain small family-run businesses.
The intent of these remittance 
investments is to ease the eventual 
perm anent or temporary return 
to the hom e country. Some mi­
grants use these investments as 
conspicuous consum ption to 
dem onstrate to nonm igrants the 
success they have attained abroad. 
In many countries these invest­
ments account for a very substan­
tial am ount of the remittances sent 
by migrants to their hom e coun­
tries. The emigration policies of 
the Cuban socialist government 
(and the system’s foreclosing of 
the possibility of return) are inimi­
cal to remittance investment.
On the basis of these considera­
tions, it appears the high hopes 
placed by Cuba’s socialist authori­
ties on m igrants’ remittances to 
help save the revolution are some­
what misplaced. While it can be 
safely anticipated that the emigre 
community will send an increasing 
am ount of dollars to help their 
relatives in the besieged island, 
the am ount will probably fall far 
short of Castro’s wishes. This latest 
economic miracle concocted in 
Havana—fraught with political 
danger—is likely to be eventually 
downgraded, just as the role of bio­
technology, yesterday’s economic 
miracle, is currently minimized. 
Castro, however, will continue to 
daydream and is certain to come 
up with o ther purported miracle 
cures for the ailing Cuban econ­
omy. O f course, should there be a 
change in the political-economic 
system, Cuba could receive the full 
benefits of the considerable re­
sources of the Cuban diaspora. ■
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Creolite, Negritude, and Metropolis
by Richard D. E. Burton
I
n November 1992 the Mar­
tinican novelist Patrick 
Chamoiseau was awarded 
France’s most prestigious 
literary prize—the Prix Gon- 
court—for his novel Texaco, 
which had been published in Paris 
two months earlier. In October of 
that year St. Lucian poet and dram ­
atist Derek Walcott had received 
the Nobel Prize for Literature, 
while in November Spain’s premier 
literary prize—the Cervantes—had 
been awarded to the reclusive 89- 
year-old Cuban poet, Dulce Maria 
Loynaz. The year 1992 was, in every 
way, a remarkable literary “treble” 
for the Caribbean.
Patrick Chamoiseau was born 
in Fort-de-France in 1953. Texaco 
was his third novel, following on 
Chronique des sept miseres (Galli- 
mard, 1986) and Solibo Magnifique 
(Gallimard, 1988). He is also the 
author of a play, Manman Dio 
contre la Fee Carabosse (Editions 
Caribeennes, 1981); a collection 
of Creole folk stories for children, 
Au temps de Vantan (Hatier, 1988); 
and an autobiobraphical essay on 
his childhood in Fort-de-France, 
Antan d ’enfance (Hatier, 1990). His 
“nonliterary” works include an es­
say on his native country entitled 
Martinique (Editions Hoa-Qui,
1989) and a study of French West 
Indian literature, Lettres creoles (Ha­
tier, 1991), written in conjunction 
with fellow novelist and country­
man, Raphael Confiant.
Finally, Chamoiseau is co-author 
with Confiant and Creole linguist 
Jean Bernabe of the m uch debated
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manifesto Eloge de la Creolite (Galli­
mard, 1989). The Eloge develops a 
theory of (French) West Indian 
identity based on linguistic and cul­
tural, ra ther than racial, criteria. 
Unlike the hitherto dom inant 
concept of negritude (but in com­
mon with the counter-theory of 
Antillanite elaborated by Edouard 
Glissant), it reduces emphasis on 
the retention of African cultural
Creole culture and 
the Creole language 
that sustains it are 
fatally vulnerable 
when confronted by 
the modem world.
forms in the Caribbean and stresses 
the creation, out of a multiplicity 
of cultural materials (European, 
African, Amerindian, Indian, Chi­
nese, Lebanese), of an original and 
heterogenous culture that the au­
thors have nam ed Creolite. In this 
conception, anyone who speaks 
Creole, whatever his or her racial 
identity, “qualifies” as West Indian. 
Morever, Creolite maintains that 
West Indian culture is no more a 
set of African “survivals” than it is a 
mimetic copy of a European proto­
type. Rather, it stands as a wholly 
original and necessarily complex 
cultural creation: a mosaic rather 
than a single substance. As the 
Eloge puts it, “the very basis of our
identity is complexity.” If negri- 
tude’s figure of West Indian iden­
tity is a single tree rooted in the 
landscape, that of Creolite is a m an­
grove swamp: proliferating without 
beginning or end, having neither a 
single root nor an ultimate goal, 
forever in flux and containing 
within its myriad recesses a flora 
and fauna of infinite complexity 
and diversity. Creolite, in the words 
of the Eloge, is a mangrove of poten­
tialities (une mangrove de virtualites).
Exploration and Defense
Chamoiseau’s novels are all explo­
rations of the Creoleness of Mar­
tinique and resistance of that 
Creoleness against the multiple 
pressures of political, cultural, and, 
increasingly, linguistic assimilation 
by France and Frenchness. His first 
novel Chronique des sept miseres traces 
the rise and fall of the central mar­
ket in Fort-de-France through the 
history of a group of m arket por­
ters— djobeurs. The porters are even­
tually made redundant, and their 
lives destroyed, by the regulation of 
the market and its gradual displace­
m ent by French-style supermarkets. 
His novel Solibo Magnifique relates 
the story of a Creole storyteller 
who is found mysteriously dead in 
the center of Fort-de-France on the 
last night of carnival. It transpires 
that he has somehow choked to 
death on his own (Creole) words, 
throttled by the very brilliance of 
his storytelling prowess.
In both novels, Creole culture 
and the Creole language that sus­
tains it are shown to be not only im­
mensely rich in their diversity and 
resourcefulness, but also fatally vul­
nerable when confronted by the 
m odern world in the form of im­
ported French goods, culture, and,
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particularly, language. The novels 
are narrated in a highly original 
style, which switches between stan­
dard French and Creole and, in be­
tween, creates its own distinctive 
amalgam of French and Creole that 
local critics of Chamoiseau—who 
is far from being universally ac­
claimed in his native Martinique— 
sarcastically call “franfais-banane.” 
Poised in the interlectal space be­
tween French and Creole that has 
gradually opened up since Marti­
nique was made a departm ent of 
France in 1946, Chamoiseau’s ecri- 
ture is perhaps the first that fully ex­
ploits the heteroglossic diversity 
and tensions of contemporary 
Martinique.
Texaco
Texaco continues this exploration 
of the strengths and weaknesses of 
Creolite, though its frame of histor­
ical and cultural reference is far 
broader than that of the earlier 
novels. In its more than 400 pages, 
it attempts nothing less than a his­
tory—or, rather, a series of histo­
ries—of the dom inated majority of 
Martinique from the slave epoch 
up to the present day. It focuses on 
the manifold tactics of opposition 
whereby that majority contrived to 
create a viable culture within the in­
terstices of the very economic, po­
litical, and cultural system that 
oppresses them. For Chamoiseau, 
the true heroes of Creolite are not 
the maroons who fled the planta­
tion for the momes (hills) to create, 
or ra ther recreate, a would-be “Afri­
can” culture in isolation. Rather, 
they are those slaves who, rem ain­
ing on the plantation, succeeded 
by dint of resourcefulness, duplic­
ity, and creative mimicry in forging 
a distinctive culture of their own
within the param eters of planta­
tion life. To a considerable degree, 
they managed to m anipulate the 
system of oppression to their own 
advantage in the m anner pre­
scribed by the well-known Creole 
proverb debrouya pa peche. it’s no 
sin to play the system—i.e. to turn 
one’s weakness into a (highly am­
bivalent) source of strength.
A Martinican woman in front of the statue 
of Josephine Beuharnais, the first empress 
of France
Creole culture is oppositional, 
improvisational, and mimetic in a 
creative, rather than a senile, fash­
ion. Thus its capacity to create, un­
der the very eye of the planter, the 
overseer of their later avatars, an 
intermediary space in which it was 
possible not merely to survive but 
even, within limits, to thrive. Texaco 
shows this oppositional culture at 
work, first on the slave plantation, 
and then—and herein lies its prin­
cipal claim to originality—on the 
very site of French or beke (white 
Creole) power, the city: first St. 
Pierre and then, after that city’s
destruction by volcanic eruption in 
1902, the island’s present capital 
and Chamoiseau’s own birthplace, 
Fort-de-France. In this way, Texaco 
redresses what one might call the 
rural bias of previous literature 
from Martinique, a trend most 
evident, perhaps, in the novels of 
Edouard Glissant. The focus of 
Chamoiseau’s work is neither on 
the plantation nor the momes but 
on the city, the locus par excel­
lence of assimilationism that, para­
doxically, is also revealed as that 
area of life on Martinique where 
the oppositional practices of 
Creolite achieve their fullest ex­
pression. Ironically it is at the very 
core of the system of dom ination 
that the dom inated enjoy the 
greatest freedom.
Through the eyes and words of 
an apparently ageless Martinican 
woman, Marie-Sophie Laborieux, 
Texaco recounts some three centu­
ries of oppositional history. This 
history is divided into a series of 
phases titled by the type of con­
struction material most popularly 
used to build dwelling places at the 
time: an “age of huts and shelters” 
for the earliest periods of French 
colonization (1635-80) when Carib 
influences were still strong; an “age 
of straw” (from the use of cane- 
leaves for roofing), running from 
the peak of the slave epoch through 
1902; an “age of packing cases” 
from the destruction of St. Pierre 
to departmentalization in 1946; an 
“age of asbestos cem ent” from 1946 
to 1964; and finally, a “concrete 
age,” which brings the story up to 
the present.
The novel’s title refers to an 
existing quarter of contemporary 
Fort-de-France built on a site once 
occupied by Texaco’s petroleum  
tanks. It is a quarter whose history,
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from its origins as a shantytown in 
the 1950s to its eventual “domesti­
cation” or “stabilization” (“durcifeca- 
tion") in the 1980s, occupies the 
main bulk of Chamoiseau’s epony­
mous novel. Squeezed on a narrow 
coastal site between the boys’ and 
the girls’ lycees—an interstitial, rath­
er than a peripheral, dom ain—Tex­
aco embodies the improvisatory 
genius of Creolite at its best: it is 
not a trivial detail that Chamoiseau, 
taking his lead from an influential 
study by fellow countryman and ur­
banist Serge Letchimy, describes 
the quarter as une ville-mangrove. 
Texaco is both part of, and apart 
from, the established city of Fort-de- 
France: that fortress of Frenchness 
referred to in the novel as L ’En-ville. 
Texaco’s inhabitants ultimately de­
pend on the city for such employ­
m ent as they can find and, above 
all, for social security payments.
The life that residents evolve, and 
especially the physical setting they 
painstakingly fashion for it, is at 
every point opposed to the recti­
linear patterns of the assimilated 
capital: Texaco is to LEn-villeas 
romantic or baroque is to (pseudo-) 
classical, as momes or mangrove to 
plantation, as Creole to French, as 
parochial authenticity to an alien­
ated and alienating modernity and 
universalism.
In a series of interrelated epi­
sodes, Chamoiseau recounts the 
determ ination and inventiveness 
with which the inhabitants of Tex­
aco defend their haven of Creolite 
against attempts by the local mairie, 
sometimes backed by police and 
paramilitary forces from France, to 
remove or, at the very least, to regu­
late and reform  it: Texaco is not cal­
culated to endear the author to 
Aime Cesaire, mayor of Fort-de- 
France, or to supporters of his Parti 
Progressiste Martiniquais!
Finally, though, Texaco does 
succumb, not to the bulldozer or 
the eviction order, but to the more 
insidious standardization of uni­
form concrete dwellings. Though 
they are being progressively sup­
planted, the old ad hoc structures, 
made of this and that, possess an
indefinable identity in their ram­
shackle disorderliness, in which 
Chamoiseau locates the essence 
of Creolite. By the time of Marie- 
Sophie’s death in 1989, Texaco has, 
in large part assimilated into LEn- 
ville. Its “mangrove of potentialities” 
is drained of life as it inexorably 
succumbs to death by “concre- 
tization” (“betonisation"). Like 
Chronique de sept miseres and Solibo 
Magnifique before it, Texaco both 
celebrates the diversity of Creolite 
and shows its losing battle against 
the death-bringing homogeneities 
of what Edouard Glissant—one of 
the dedicatees of the novel—calls 
the “Same” (“le Meme”). By the end 
of the novel, the particular is well 
on the way towards absorption in 
the pseudo-universal, and French­
ness all but reigns supreme.
Chamoiseau’s 
celebration of the 
popular culture of 
the periphery 
(Martinique) has 
found its warmest 
supporters amongst 
intellectual elites of 
the center (Paris).
Like Chamoiseau’s first two 
novels, Texaco might be described 
as an ethnographic novel in which 
the author, or “marqueur de paroles,” 
as Chamoiseau prefers to style 
himself, transcribes (in standard 
French or something close to it) 
what has been said to him (nor­
mally in Creole) by a host of in­
formants whom, tape recorder in 
hand, he has interviewed over a 
num ber of years prior to embark­
ing on the actual redaction of his 
text: the novel is written largely in 
standard French, but the alert 
reader will sense beneath the or­
dered structures of its syntax some­
thing of the rhythms and patterns 
of the Creole speech on which it is 
based. Merely to evoke the novel’s 
overt themes gives but a poor idea 
of its extraordinary opulence and 
density: the natural, cultural, and 
linguistic life it sustains is as com­
plex and indefinable as the m an­
grove swamp it celebrates.
The Center-Periphery Politics 
of Criticism
The novel has perhaps been more 
enthusiastically received in France 
than in Martinique, where its de­
fense and illustration of an unfa­
vored quarter has been seen by 
some, perhaps correctly, as be­
tokening a certain nostalgie de la 
boue or, at the very least, a certain 
romanticism. Furtherm ore, its use 
of a creolized French, though less 
marked than in the earlier novels, 
is criticized both by supporters of 
Francophonie and by die-hard 
defenders of “p u re” basilectal 
Creole as a concession to, and le­
gitimation of, the “bastardized” me­
lange of French and Creole that is 
now the standard medium of daily 
exchange in assimilated and, in­
creasingly, de-creolized Martinique. 
Here, perhaps, is the final paradox 
of Chamoiseau’s achievement in 
winning the Prix Goncourt. His 
celebration of the popular culture 
of the periphery (Martinique) has 
found its warmest supporters 
amongst intellectual elites of the 
center (Paris), which thereby in­
sidiously assimilates the “Different” 
into the “Same” by its very enthusi­
asm, praising the author for having 
“enriched” the French language 
and French literature through his 
generous transfusions of Creole 
and Creolite.
It may be, therefore, that 
Chamoiseau’s success will result 
in its own neutralization or “recu­
peration” by the universal (or 
pseudo-universal) that is its great­
est enemy. Chamoiseau’s future 
novels, along with those of his close 
associate Raphael Confiant, will 
show how far this fear is justified. ■
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El Salvador: The Electoral Test
by Madalene T. O ’Donnell
he campaign for the 1994 
elections has begun in El 
Salvador. These elections 
will be the first held since 
the end of the 12-year 
civil war, and while many 
Salvadorans are trying to put hatred 
behind them  and consolidate the 
gains made toward peace, others 
are whipping up campaign fever.
As the level of campaign rheto­
ric rises, the peace process is en ter­
ing a critical phase. Reforms set 
in m otion with the signing of the 
peace accords in January 1992 are 
only now touching key institutions 
such as the arm ed forces and the 
courts. A report released by a UN- 
sponsored “T ruth Commission” in 
March 1993 brought many of these 
issues to a head.
The Truth Commission
“We d idn’t carry out a struggle 
for 20 years in order to run for 
public office. We did it to trans­
form the country,” claims Joaquin 
Villalobos, one of the most charis­
matic leaders of the Frente Fara- 
bundo Marti para la Liberacion 
Nacional (FMLN)—once El Salva­
d o r’s guerrilla army and now a 
newly legalized political party that 
will run candidates in the coming 
elections. Villalobos, however, has 
been banned from seeking public 
office for 10 years.
O n March 15, 1993, a truth com­
mission established by the Salva­
doran peace accords, and headed 
by three foreign dignitaries, held
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Villalobos and five o ther FMLN 
leaders responsible for the assassi­
nation of 11 rural mayors during 
the war and recom m ended the 
10-year ban. In addition to the six 
FMLN leaders, 40 Salvadoran mili­
tary officers were banned from pub­
lic office for their involvement in 
hum an rights violations. Villalobos 
has indicated that he will accept 
the ban if others do and if the gov­
ernm ent implements some of the 
repo rt’s stiff recom m endations for 
the judicial system. Meanwhile, the 
conservative Partido de Concilia­
tion  Nacional has announced as its 
presidential candidate one of the 
40 military officers banned by the 
report, Gen. Juan Rafael Bustillo.
The legitimacy of the 
coming elections will 
be largely determined 
by the extent to which 
all sides can work 
together in the time 
that remains to 
promote massive 
voter participation.
The T ruth Commission was 
charged with reviewing the most 
egregious acts of violence com­
m itted during the war. In most 
cases, it uncovered little new infor­
mation but confirmed what many 
Salvadorans had always believed: 
that the armed forces were re­
sponsible for the great majority 
of abuses (some 85%), including 
massacres of more than 500 men, 
women, and children at the Sumpul
River and the town of El Mozote; 
that the Guardia Nacional m ur­
dered four American nuns on the 
side of a highway in 1980; that 
Roberto D’Aubisson, founder of 
the ruling Alianza Republicana Na- 
cionalista (ARENA), paid assassins 
to kill Archbishop Oscar Romero 
as he said mass in 1980; and that 
the FMLN m urdered four off- 
duty US Marines in 1985 and two 
wounded US servicemen in 1991.
The report confirmed that mem­
bers of the army killed six Jesuit 
priests and their housekeeper and 
her daughter in 1989. Mid-level 
military officers were tried and con­
victed of the crime in 1991, but the 
T ruth Commission established for 
the first time that they carried out 
the killings under explicit orders 
from the military high command. 
Specifically, the report finds that 
Colonel Rene Emilio Ponce “gave 
the order to kill Father Ignacio 
Ellacuria and leave no witnesses.” 
Since reportedly giving that order, 
Ponce was prom oted to general and 
nam ed defense minister. Three 
days before the T ruth Commission 
report was released, he offered his 
resignation. Four m onths later he 
finally left his post and was re­
placed by Col. H um berto Corado 
Figueroa.
The T ruth Commission recom ­
m ended the 10-year political ban 
rather than legal proceedings 
against those nam ed in the report 
because, it claimed, “no adminis­
tration of justice exists [in El Sal­
vador] that meets the minimal 
requisites of objectivity and im­
partiality.” In banning individuals 
from public office, however, the 
T ruth Commission is touching one 
of the most critical nerves in the 
country—the 1994 elections. Villa­
lobos claims the purpose of his
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20-year struggle was not to run for 
political office, but he knows that, 
unless his party performs well in 
the 1994 elections and dem on­
strates credible political strength, 
the FMLN may lose at the polling 
place what it gained at the negotiat­
ing table.
Reforms under the 
Peace Accords
What the FMLN gained—at least 
on paper—has been called a “nego­
tiated revolution.” The com prehen­
sive peace accords signed by the 
government and the FMLN in Jan­
uary 1992 include provisions to 
end the military conflict, impose 
civilian controls over the military, 
revamp the judicial system, and, 
through a series of o ther reforms, 
institutionalize the peace.
In practice, the record has been 
mixed. On several issues, the gov­
ernm ent has backed away from, 
ignored, or openly opposed con­
cessions it made during the nego­
tiations. The FMLN, for its part, 
m aintained secret caches of arms 
in Nicaragua, including surface-to- 
air missiles, while claiming to have 
disarmed entirely.
Despite these failings, however, 
there have been concrete advances. 
The military conflict ended in Feb­
ruary 1992 and the guerrilla army 
was demobilized over the following
11 months. At the end of this proc­
ess, the FMLN was legalized as a 
political party.
Many provisions of the accords 
are aimed at reversing 60 years of 
dom ination by the armed forces. 
The UN-sponsored Ad Hoc Com­
mission, composed of three Salva­
dorans, reviewed the records of 
Salvadoran officers and recom­
m ended 103 for transfer or dismiss­
al. The US has frozen $11 million 
in military assistance pending full 
im plem entation of the Ad Hoc 
Commission report, and General 
Ponce referred to these “pressures” 
as he tendered his resignation.
Ponce is reportedly nam ed by the 
Ad Hoc Commission, although its 
report has never been made pub­
lic. On July 1, 1993, nine months 
after the original deadline, Presi­
dent Alfredo Crisdani announced 
changes in the military high com­
m and to remove the last of the 
officers nam ed in the Ad Hoc 
Commission report, although 15 
will remain on the payroll through 
the end of the year.
One likely scenario is 
that the right will win 
the presidency and the 
left and center toill 
control the assembly.
Reforms to the constitution, rati­
fied in January 1992 as part of the 
peace process, limit the role of the 
armed forces to territorial defense 
and eliminate their responsibility 
for public security. Two military 
security forces formerly charged 
with public order, the Policia de 
Hacienda and the Guardia Na­
cional, no longer exist. Five elite 
battalions were disbanded, among 
them  the notorious Batallon Atla- 
catl that carried out the El Mozote 
massacre and the Jesuit murders. 
Manpower levels of the military as 
a whole have fallen by 40-50%.
The accords create a new na­
tional civilian police, trained by a 
new police academy, to maintain 
order. Yet the governm ent has not 
given the police sufficient resources 
and this has discouraged interna­
tional donors as well. The armed 
forces stripped the preexisting na­
tional police of almost every vehi­
cle and most of the infrastructure, 
leaving very little for the new force 
to inherit. In addition, the acad­
emy’s first class graduated in the 
face of trem endous anxiety about 
a rise in violent crime. Instead of 
accelerating deployment of the 
civilian police, however, the gov­
ernm ent has chosen to reinsert the 
arm ed forces into their form er se­
curity role, initiating military pa­
trols throughout the country as a 
deterren t to crime. Despite many 
delays and few resources, the Poli­
cia Nacional Civil seems to be suc­
cessfully operating in four of the 
country’s 14 departments.
Judicial reforms, outlined in the 
accords and passed by the Asam- 
blea Legislativa, sought to make 
the judiciary more independent by 
modifying the way in which judges 
at all levels are appointed. None­
theless, the judicial system, and par­
ticularly the courts, continues to 
come under fire. The Truth Com­
mission has called for the immedi­
ate resignation of all members of 
the supreme court, arguing that 
“the judicial branch continues un­
der the direction of the same peo­
ple whose failings created many of 
the problems Salvadorans are now 
trying to overcome.”
The report charges the pres­
ident of the supreme court, 
Mauricio Gutierrez Castro, with 
“unprofessional conduct” and ob­
struction of several hum an rights 
investigations. It further requests 
that he step down voluntarily. In 
making this request, the Truth 
Commission has taken on one of 
the most powerful officials in the 
country, once touted as a presi­
dential candidate for the ARENA 
party. As president he not only pre­
sides over the supreme court but 
controls the prom otion and sala­
ries of judges and the accreditation 
of lawyers throughout the country. 
“Only God can remove me from 
this post,” he announced soon af­
ter the report was released.
The Asamblea Legislativa unani­
mously passed a new electoral code 
that, despite some flaws, appears to 
have the support of all political 
parties, including the FMLN. The 
ARENA party, which dominates the 
Asamblea Legislativa, made a clear 
attem pt to reach consensus on this 
issue. As one ARENA official ex­
plained, “O ur objective was to pro­
duce an electoral code that could 
not be blamed for the success or 
failure of any party in the next elec­
tions.” Enforcem ent of some of the 
key provisions, however, will be
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very difficult. Television stations, 
for example, are strongly opposed 
to provisions that require equal 
media access at equal rates for all 
parties.
The March Elections
The 1994 elections are seen as the 
culmination of the peace process 
and its reforms, and thus as the 
point by which a relatively fair play­
ing field should be in place for all 
sectors of society. The hope was 
that by March 1994 the civilian 
police would be deployed across 
the country, but this goal will not 
be met.
O ne FMLN leader remarked: 
“For many years, we were outside 
the system; that is true. But we 
were always inside the society.” The 
elections will measure, imperfectly 
but in stark percentages, what por­
tion of society supports the FMLN. 
Political parties will have to pro­
duce votes or accept seats on the 
sidelines. To raise the stakes still 
higher, elections at all three lev­
els—local, legislative, and presiden­
tial—coincide in 1994, something 
that happens only once every 15 
years.
The main issues of the cam­
paign are already emerging: the 
economy, crime, and the provision 
of basic services such as drinking 
water. The large majority of Salva­
dorans still live in extreme poverty. 
They need economic opportunity.
The left, right, and center cur­
rently face critical choices about 
electoral strategy. The left and its 
most im portant com ponent, the 
FMLN, are seriously divided. Ruben 
Zamora will be the presidential can­
didate for the Convergencia De- 
mocratica: a coalition of three 
center-left parties. The FMLN has 
endorsed Zam ora’s candidacy as 
well, but only after a series of de­
lays and over the opposition of two 
of the five groups that comprise 
the FMLN. Divisions within the left 
may also cause the FMLN and the 
Convergencia Democratica to run 
candidates against each o ther at 
the legislative level, a strategy likely
to reduce their total num ber of 
seats in the assembly.
Two of the five FMLN factions 
supported Christian Democrat 
Abraham Rodriguez, but his candi­
dacy was largely derailed when he 
lost his party’s nom ination to Fidel 
Chavez Mena. As general secretary 
of the Christian Democrats, Chavez 
Mena has been plagued by deep di­
visions within his party. He ran for 
the presidency in 1989, losing to 
Cristiani, but continues to enjoy 
the support of many loyal party 
members. He must decide if the 
Christian Democrats will partici­
pate in the elections alone—as he 
maintains they will—or enter into 
an informal pact with the left. The 
Christian Democrats are unlikely to 
win the presidency alone, but they 
might lose their claim to the cen­
ter—and the conservative portion 
of their base—if they ally with the 
left.
If the interests that 
mobilize against the 
government can find  
expression urithin the 
system, it may be the 
beginning of real 
democracy.
On the right, one ARENA dep­
uty stated that his party fully ex­
pects the 1994 elections to be “all 
parties against ARENA.” San Salva­
dor mayor Armando Calderon Sol 
will be the ARENA candidate. He 
was chosen over more moderate, 
less ideological candidates—like 
businessman Roberto Murray 
Mesa—who m ight have attracted 
broader support outside the party, 
but caused greater divisions within 
it. Some ARENA sectors are report­
edly unhappy that the party did 
not take the bold step of seeking a 
more charismatic candidate. None­
theless, ARENA knows how to run 
national campaigns and has the 
resources to do it well. Unless a
clear alternative to ARENA soon 
emerges, Calderon Sol and his 
party organization will be difficult 
to beat.
The months leading up to the 
March elections will be brutal and 
divisive. Already there are reports 
of both party activists and members 
of the military being kidnapped, or 
simply disappearing. The Tribunal 
Supremo Electoral, dom inated by 
parties on the right and deeply poli­
ticized, has finally approved a na­
tional voter registration plan—four 
months short of the registration 
deadline. The legitimacy of the 
coming elections will be largely 
determ ined by the extent to which 
the Tribunal and all political par­
ties can work together in the time 
that remains to prom ote massive 
voter participation.
If the right wins in 1994, it will 
face a well-organized left—possibly 
with a majority in the Asamblea 
Legislativa—prepared to defend 
recent reforms and supported by 
popular organizations. If the left 
wins, it will face a business sector 
and an army capable of defending 
their own interests and controlling 
key resources in the country. A cen­
trist government will have to care­
fully seek out more powerful allies 
and construct a coalition that will 
hold. One likely scenario is that 
the right will win the presidency 
and the left and center will control 
the assembly, forcing the parties to 
work together to avoid gridlock.
The 1994 elections will produce 
the first post-war government in El 
Salvador. Whatever the govern­
ment, however, if the interests that 
mobilize against it can find expres­
sion within the system, it may be 
the beginning of real democracy in 
El Salvador. It is critical the next 
president of El Salvador bear in 
mind that the civil war did not end 
and the peace accords were not ne­
gotiated because one side defeated 
the other, but rather because each 
side finally recognized the strength 
of the other; there was no winner.
In 1994 there will be a winner and 
his or her task will be to govern a 
still divided country. ■
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Ecuador: Is Modernization Enough?
by Donna Lee Van Cott
During President Sixto Duran Ballen’s visit to Washington in March 1993, President Bill Clin­ton cited Ecuador as a model of democracy in 
Latin America and praised its eco­
nomic reform  program. But the 
Duran Ballen governm ent’s reform 
plan, as set forth in the proposed 
Ley de M odernization del Estado, 
which now dominates political de­
bate in the country, falls short on 
at least one critical score: it fails to 
address significant problems in 
Ecuadoran democracy and eco­
nomic development caused by the 
exclusion of Ecuador’s large rural 
population—particularly Ecuador’s 
approximately 35% ethnic Indian 
population.
Ecuador’s Ley de M odernization 
del Estado follows the standard 
formula used by its neighbors to 
increase the efficiency of the state 
and the economy. It would stream­
line the bureaucracy, privatize 
national industries, eliminate mo­
nopolies, and dismantle cumber­
some regulations. One flaw in the 
plan, which has been advertised as 
an effort to decentralize the gov­
ernm ent, is that decisionmaking 
power will be further concentrated 
in the hands of the executive, and 
away from congress, provincial offi­
cials, and unions, as these groups 
are cut out of the revenue food 
chain.
The plan is opposed by several 
o f the major political parties, in 
part because they stand to lose
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their powers of patronage. The 
most strident criticism of the law is 
voiced by congressional president 
Carlos Vallejo, who has called for a 
national plebiscite and an open de­
bate over the merits of the pro­
gram, an idea seconded by the 
labor sector, which faces the loss 
of thousands of state jobs. Details 
of the plan have not been pub­
lished, creating an atm osphere 
of speculation and mistrust.
The government’s 
reform plan fails to 
address significant 
problems; it excludes 
Ecuador’s large 
rural population, 
particularly ethnic 
Indians.
But not all the criticisms are self- 
interested. The Ley de Moderniza­
tio n  del Estado fails to do what 
highly centralized economies like 
Ecuador’s must. It fails to “democ­
ratize” the economy; that is, it fails 
to allow local preferences and de­
mands to flow to the centralized 
state agencies responsible for satis- 
lying them.
The Development Quagmire
Economic developm ent as prac­
ticed in Ecuador—and in the rest 
of Latin America—is already
marked by a lack of consultation 
between government and rural 
communities. “Nos imponen— no 
mas" (“They impose them  on us— 
that’s all”), explains Mariano Curi- 
cama, president of the Consejo 
Municipal de Guamote in the heav­
ily Indian Chimborazo province. 
Curicama is an example of the 
increased political presence of in­
digenous Ecuadorans since the na­
tionwide indigenous uprising of 
1990. In many areas, strong local in­
digenous organizations and persist­
ence have com bined to dem and 
and receive the attention of the 
distant Quito government. In ex­
change for an endorsem ent of 
Duran Ballen’s candidacy in 1992, 
Curicama’s indigenous organiza­
tion received assurances from the 
future president of attention to the 
development and infrastructure 
needs of the area’s 30,000 Indians.
Since taking office in May 1992, 
Curicama has been able to involve 
the community in the planning 
and im plementation of state-spon­
sored development plans for the 
area—something unheard  of in the 
majority of Ecuador’s indigenous 
municipios, where all plans are im­
posed from above and 70-80% of 
funds earm arked for community 
projects are absorbed by Ecuador’s 
central administrative apparatus. 
According to Curicama, the ha­
bitual lack of community par­
ticipation in the design of state 
development projects ensured the 
continued poverty of the region.
By directly contacting the US 
administration and the Inter- 
American Development Bank in 
Washington, he has been able to 
force the Duran Ballen administra­
tion to deliver funds reserved for 
his community that have, in the 
past, been diverted.
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The majority of indigenous com­
munities have not been so fortu­
nate. Carlos Moreno, head of 
COMUNIDEC, an Ecuadoran 
not-for-profit organization that 
manages grassroots development 
projects for international organi­
zations, is all too familiar with the 
problem. He explains how cen­
trally generated development plans 
are launched without consulting 
the community affected or even 
calculating what the needs of the 
community are. They are imple­
m ented without participation of 
the local population or local leader­
ship. For Ecuador’s indigenous 
population, the absence of com­
munity participation reflects the 
belief of government officials that 
Indians are incapable of contribut­
ing to their own development.
M oreno’s long experience with 
developm ent projects in indigenous 
communities has proven that com­
munity planning and participation 
are the key to the success of any 
project. Indigenous leaders—like 
Curicama and Miguel Puwainchir 
of the Shuar Federation—state 
time and again that projects im­
posed and im plem ented by outsid­
ers receive little enthusiasm from 
the local population. Due to the 
lack of community participation 
and poor planning, according to 
M oreno, the few social investment 
projects undertaken in these aus­
tere times are doom ed to failure or 
irrelevance.
The Armed Forces— Exploiting 
the Development Vacuum
Though the central government 
has not responded to indigenous 
demands for participation in devel­
opm ent initiatives, the Ecuadoran 
military has. Stunned by the depth 
of rage in the countryside mani­
fested by the 1990 nationwide 
indigenous uprising, the military 
has moved independently of the 
elected government to increase its 
presence in the provinces, espe­
cially in the Amazon, where the 
military provides most public serv­
ices—and where many retired offi­
cers have large landholdings. The 
armed forces have also worked on 
infrastructure projects with local 
indigenous leaders, such as Puwain- 
chir’s Shuar Federation. The mili­
tary’s attention has satisfied some 
of the Indians’ material demands, 
but in doing so has perpetuated 
the dependency of campesino and 
indigenous communities on the 
goodwill of a powerful patron.
Military blockade in Ambato during the 
Columbus quincentennial celebration (1992)
The Duran Ballen administra­
tion can address both the objec­
tions to its Ley de M odernization 
del Estado and the frustration of 
Ecuador’s diverse Indian nationali­
ties by opening a debate on the 
country’s economic future. He 
could also borrow two im portant 
themes from the Plan Nacional de 
Desarrollo para las Poblaciones 
Indigenas being developed by his 
own Oficina de Asuntos Indigenas 
de la Presidencia de la Republica. 
That plan was devised by Ecuador’s 
first indigenous director of the of­
fice—Jose Quimbo, an Otavalan 
lawyer. The plan incorporates the 
active local participation into the 
planning, implementation, and 
evaluation of economic develop­
m ent projects—a proven way to 
make projects m ore efficient and
politically popular. Moreover, it 
concentrates resources on Ecua­
do r’s most intractable economic 
and political problem: the poverty 
and isolation of its Indian popu­
lation. According to Q uito’s El 
Comercio, scarcely 1 % of social and 
economic spending is directed to­
ward this population.
Curicama hopes Q uim bo’s par­
ticipatory development programs 
receive substantial support and re­
sources from the state: “We hope 
he does not fail; that we d on’t have 
to wait for three more years, or the 
next administration. Hopefully we 
will not have to paralyze the coun­
try again to get the governm ent’s 
attention.”
In mid-June 1993 the Confedera­
tion  de Nacionalidades Indigenas 
de Ecuador (CONAIE) jo ined 
urban unions to protest the gov­
ernm ent’s refusal to consider an 
alternative agrarian policy. Demon­
strations were called off, however, 
when the government and con­
gress agreed to discuss the Indians’ 
plan. But not before Antonio Lan- 
chimba—a CONAIE activist from 
Im babura—was killed in a car acci­
dent that witnesses blame on the 
military. Several o ther CONAIE 
leaders were beaten and jailed.
The government was furious 
that the protests coincided with the 
Copa America soccer cham pion­
ship, hosted by Ecuador, which 
had drawn the international press 
to Quito. While most Ecuadorans 
were enthralled by the national 
team ’s semifinal match, congress 
passed the first 6 of 63 articles of 
the Ley de M odernization del 
Estado.
The leaner Ecuadoran state en­
visioned by the Ley de Moderni­
zation del Estado is a worthwhile 
goal, but it alone will not enable 
Ecuador to measure up to Clin­
ton ’s praise or provide an example 
for o ther modernizing Latin Amer­
ican nations. To do that, Duran 
Ballen must open a dialogue on 
the country’s economic future 
and seriously focus on the needs 
of the nation’s long-neglected In­
dian communities. ■
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Women Judges in Central America
by Tirza Rivera-Cira
Num erous international declarations emphasize that gaining equal access to decisionmaking posi­tions is a key to wom en’s struggle for equality. In 
Central America, however, there 
are very few women in such posi­
tions. In the political sphere, only 
15% of candidates for elected of­
fice are women, which, in turn, 
yields a limited num ber of parlia­
mentary representatives (10%) and 
local government officials (between 
8 and 28%). In the economic sphere, 
only 20% of all union leaders are 
women. It is truly surprising, then, 
to find that 23% of Central Amer­
ica’s judges are women. Indeed, 
women account for more than a 
third of the judges in Costa Rica, 
Panama, and Nicaragua.
This notable group of Central 
American women has advanced 
dramatically in a major position of 
influence traditionally dom inated 
by men. Every day, these women 
issue decisions that have substan­
tial impact on individuals and com­
munities. In a region where less 
than 3% of women everacquire a 
university education, simply being 
both a lawyer and a woman is a 
uniquely privileged position. Never­
theless, the persistence of gender 
inequality has kept women judges, 
for the most part, in the lower lev­
els of the judicial hierarchy.
A 1991 study profiling women 
judges shows they are relatively 
young (40-44 years old) and tend 
to come from small, middle-class
Tirza Rivera-Cira, former deputy direc­
tor of the Center for the Administration 
of Justice at Florida International Uni­
versity, is a Costa Rican legal researcher.
families where the m other’s edu­
cational level was higher than the 
father’s. Commonly they are the 
oldest of three children. Their ini­
tial education was in public schools, 
and very few of them  have done 
postgraduate studies after law 
school. Most were m arried in their 
twenties and have three children 
(between 14 and 25 years old).
Most have served some 10 years in 
the judiciary.
Though ever more 
Central American 
women are opting for 
the judiciary, once 
in the system, they 
encounter more 
stumbling blocks to 
advancement than do 
their male colleagues. 
Significant historical 
and cultural obstacles 
to women remain.
Access to the judiciary in Cen­
tral America has been fostered by 
the increasing num ber of women 
studying and practicing law. Today, 
50% of Central America’s law stu­
dents and 40% of its law school 
graduating classes are women. 
While women lawyers are a grow­
ing force in the Central American 
labor market, most of them  still 
have problems obtaining employ­
m ent in private law firms. The jud i­
ciary thus emerges as an attractive 
employment option, especially as 
low judicial salaries diminish the 
interest of male lawyers. The issue 
of equal access aside, the terms of 
judicial employment are them ­
selves attractive to women lawyers. 
Women judges have cited job  and 
salary stability, fixed work sched­
ules (which allow time for family 
responsibilities), and potential 
benefits (such as maternity and 
sick leaves and scholarship possi­
bilities) as incentives to seeking 
employment in the judiciary.
Though ever more Central 
American women are opting for 
the judiciary, once in the system, 
they encounter more stumbling 
blocks to advancement than do 
their male colleagues. Significant 
historical and cultural obstacles to 
women remain. Pertinent to this 
problem  is the fact that women 
have only been enfranchised as 
voters, and therefore eligible for 
nom ination or election to the jud i­
ciary, for about 40 years.
The region’s first women judges 
were restricted to courts dealing 
with traditionally “feminine prob­
lems,” such as family and children. 
The first handful of Central Ameri­
can women nam ed to supreme 
courts only took office in the early 
1980s. Women sitting on supreme 
courts continue to be isolated sym­
bols of progress whose decisions 
have little impact beyond the im­
mediate judicial sphere.
Supreme courts in Central Amer­
ica tend to have the fewest women 
as sitting judges. Currently there 
are two women sitting on the su­
prem e courts of Costa Rica, Gua­
temala, and Panama, one each 
in Honduras and Nicaragua, and 
none in El Salvador. These appoint­
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ments, however, are the result of 
party politics rather than organized 
pressure to place women in higher 
judicial positions. Only one woman 
has ever presided over a supreme 
court in the region. In that case, 
Marisol Reyes, who became presi­
dent of the Panam anian supreme 
court in 1984, was heavily criticized 
because of her personal friendship 
with then-dictator, Gen. Manuel 
Noriega.
Within the judiciaries of Central 
America, the formal mechanisms 
of selection and advancement are 
gender-neutral, but de facto dis­
crimination blocks women from 
prom otion. A basic disadvantage is 
that selection boards are usually 
composed entirely of men. Dis­
crimination by m en is not the only 
obstacle, however. Women judges 
may simply be more reluctant than 
their male colleagues to compete 
for higher positions because of 
cultural conditioning: traditional 
stereotypes of female inferiority 
and insecurity can lead women to 
exclude themselves from considera­
tion for advancement.
Women judges have suffered in 
the past for their lack of political 
organization. Realization of this, 
however, has inspired some crea­
tive action, as women judges in 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Gua­
temala have recently established 
their own political associations. 
These new associations have de­
cided not only to prom ote the pro­
fessional advancement of their 
members, but also to work toward 
a general improvement in the inde­
pendence, accessibility, and ac­
countability of Central American 
judiciaries.
In the final analysis, being a 
woman on the bench may prove 
to be an advantage. The prevailing 
perception in Central America ap­
pears to be that women judges are 
m ore honest and less susceptible 
to corruption than their male col­
leagues, and that they are more 
concerned than their male col­
leagues about o ther problems in 
the judicial system. A wom an’s atti­
tude about her role as a judge also
The emergence of 
new opportunities 
for women in Central 
America is crucial 
for the reform of the 
region’s judiciary, 
which can play a 
strategic part in the 
wider process of 
democratizati on.
differs considerably from that of 
her male counterpart. In listing 
their personal reasons for becom­
ing judges, the most frequently 
cited responses from women were 
“the possibility of serving others” 
and “the possibility of making a 
better society.” In contrast, male 
judges tended to cite “the possibil­
ity of administering justice and 
applying the law,” as well as “the 
prestige” and “social status” at­
tached to being a judge.
This difference in viewpoints 
between male and female judges 
indicates that the enhanced partici­
pation of women in national jud i­
ciaries will make the exercise of 
justice more democratic. Increased 
formal and informal exchange be­
tween female and male judges will 
mutually educate and sensitize 
them  to the urgent problems of 
their societies. Education of judges 
and judicial personnel to matters 
o f gender equity in the courts is 
particularly important; studies indi­
cate that Central American women 
are often shortchanged in cases of 
divorce, child care, domestic vio­
lence, and sexual offenses because 
of the stereotypes of women held 
by male judges.
The emergence of new opportu­
nities for women in Central Amer­
ica is crucial for the reform of the 
region’s judiciary, which can play a 
strategic part in the wider process 
of democratization. While many 
women judges have acted individu­
ally to improve the administration 
of justice, as a politically organized 
force they will achieve far more for 
both women and the cause of jus­
tice in general. ■
WOMEN IN THE JUDICIARY
% of all judges
Costa Rica Panama Honduras El Salvador Guatemala Nicaragua 
Source: Center for the Administration of Justice, Florida International University, 1991
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Insider briefs on people and institutions 
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs
Cuba on My Mind
A 1995 poll of Cuban-Americans 
living in Miami revealed that 80% 
favor m aintaining the current pol­
icy of no diplomatic relations and 
no trade with Cuba and 60% favor 
a US invasion of Cuba. Conducted 
by Florida International Univer­
sity’s Institute for Public Opinion 
and Research for the Cuban Re­
search Institute, the poll sampled 
the opinions of 601 Cuban-Ameri­
cans in Dade County. For more 
information, contact CRI at 
(305) 348-1991.
■
Fast Food— But Don’t 
Forget the Chorizo
Franchising is one of Latin Amer­
ica’s fastest growing new business 
opportunities. McDonald’s already 
has 227 stores throughout the re­
gion, including 100 in Brazil and 
65 in Mexico. RFC is close behind 
with 203 stores, including 10 in 
Panama. Burger King has half that 
num ber, with 105. Even Taco Bell 
is beginning to show a presence, 
with 3 stores in Mexico, 3 in Guate­
mala, and 13 in all throughout the 
region. Asked about the growing 
presence of fast-food operations in 
his country, the Mexican manager 
of a more traditional restaurant dis­
missed the potential challenge of 
the fast-food shops: “Mexico is a 
country of street food. If I’m look­
ing for something cheap and quick, 
I’ll have a chorizo on the corner . . . ” 
( US/Latin Trade, October 1993).
Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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IDB Going Back to Its Roots
One of the speakers in the Inter- 
American Development Bank’s 
Cultural Center lecture series last 
summer was Benito Peralta, a Pai- 
Pai Indian from Baja California. 
The 76-year-old visitor told the tale 
of a giant m onster nam ed Jalkutat, 
who lived in the rocks near a water­
fall outside the village of Jaktbjol, 
Baja California. The narrative is ac­
tually an allegory about the Spanish 
conquest of Mexico’s native peoples. 
Given all the concern about how 
the IDB develops its projects, one 
might wonder what the IDB really 
intended with Don Benito’s visit.
Come Back to Jamaica
A large new investment in Jamaica 
may help that country to improve 
the visibility of one of its major 
products in the US market. Guinness 
PLC purchased 51% of Desnoes 
& Geddes, a 75-year-old Jamaica- 
based company that produces, 
among other products, Jam aica’s 
Red Stripe lager beer. Guinness 
paid $62 million in the acquisition, 
which is intended to help Guinness 
expand its share of the North Amer­
ican beverage market.
A View from the South
The Centro de Economia Interna­
tional—based in Santiago, Chile— 
published, in its July 1993 newslet­
ter, an exhaustive analysis of that 
sum m er’s Group of Seven Eco­
nomic Summit in Tokyo and its im­
plications for developing countries. 
H ernan Buchi, one of the architects 
of Chile’s economic opening, is 
on the center’s board of editors.
Beats Me, Mon
When John  Paul II visited Jamaica 
on August 9, 1993, many Jamaicans 
asked themselves why the Pope 
chose to visit the country in the 
first place. After all, only 7% of the 
island’s 2.3 million people are 
Catholic. His visit to the island na­
tion was the first in papal history, 
an event made even more singular 
by the fact the vast majority of Ja­
m aica’s church-going citizens be­
long to the Anglican, Methodist, 
Presbyterian, and evangelical 
churches.
A Ruminating Gringo
The Strategic Studies Institute of 
the US Army War College pub­
lished a well-written “trip repo rt” 
(September 1993) that pulls no 
punches when evaluating the lead­
ing candidates for H onduras’s 
November 1993 presidential elec­
tion. According to author Donald 
Schulz, “. . . [Oswaldo] Ramos Soto 
[the Partido Nacional candidate] is 
a loose cannon. If he is elected, 
one anticipates an orgy of corrup­
tion. The . . . candidate represents 
the most retrograde and authoritar­
ian sectors of the Partido Nacional 
and the military. He is a supreme 
demagogue and opportunist whose 
election could well endanger the 
democratic gains that Honduras 
has made over the last 13 years.”
O f the o ther candidate—Carlos 
Roberto Reina—Schulz writes that 
he . . is an old party war-horse, a 
socialist dem ocrat who still carries 
a lot of political baggage . . .  he 
is an honorable man and fairly 
com petent, even if still somewhat 
mired in a 1960s leftist mindset. . . .”
Just the Facts Good News Case Studies
Flash Facts—an autom ated facsim­
ile delivery system—provides up-to- 
date inform ation on the Mexican 
market. Managed by the US Depart­
m ent of Com m erce’s Office of Mex­
ico, Flash Facts offers 24-hour-a-day 
access to m ore than 100 different 
m enu items, each focusing on a 
different aspect of the Mexican 
market. The service can be ac­
cessed by calling (202) 482-4464.
Good News, Bad News
A Journal of Commerce article (May 4, 
1993) filed from Brazil by journalist 
Katherine Ellison presents some 
startling information. According to 
the article, Brazilian families now 
watch television an average of seven 
hours a day—some 20 minutes 
longer than US families. Worse yet, 
Brazilian Planning D epartm ent sta­
tistics show that more families own 
televisions than refrigerators. In ad­
dition, an estimated 800,000 Brazil­
ian families own parabolic dishes, 
with an average of 30,000 additional 
systems being sold each month.
Workers and NAFTA
At the AFL-CIO’s annual meeting 
in San Francisco in O ctober 1993, 
President Bill Clinton provided his 
own analysis of labor’s opposition 
to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement: “What I really believe 
is that this has become the symbol 
of the legitimate grievances of the 
American working people about 
the way they’ve been worked over 
the last 12 years.”
Net capital inflows to Latin America 
rose to $57 billion in 1992. The pre­
vious year, such inflows were $39.2 
million, double the level of 1990. 
For the past two years, Latin Amer­
ica has been a net im porter of capi­
tal. For further information, see the 
UN World Investment Report, 1993.
He’s Good for Capitalism
Fernando Enrique Cardoso—one 
of Brazil’s leading public affairs 
personalities—is best known in 
academic circles for his stinging 
analyses of capitalism’s negative im­
pact on developing countries. Now 
that he is the country’s minister of 
finance, however, he seems to be 
good for capitalism. Sao Paulo’s 
stock market had a record day on 
Septem ber 17, 1993, when Cardoso 
hinted he might unify Brazil’s ex­
change rate. Nearly $280 million 
worth of securities were exchanged 
as the m arket’s index rose by more 
than 7%.
He’s Also Good for Sweets
Brazilian chocolate is being con­
sumed in record quantities. By Sep­
tem ber 1993 Brazilians had already 
eaten an average of 3.3 pounds 
of chocolate, nearly double the 
am ount that was consumed in 1980. 
O ne of the latest candy products in 
Brazil is Nestle’s Turm a de Monica 
bar, combining dark and white 
chocolate. Intended for children, 
the Brazilian cartoonist Mauricio 
de Souza has been contracted to 
design his characters onto the bar.
The Georgetown University Pew 
Case Study Center is circulating 
a very useful catalog that lists and 
provides an abstract of case studies 
in international affairs that have 
been developed under the center’s 
auspices. As described in the cata­
log, “a case study is essentially a 
scenario which describes a situa­
tion up to a point at which some 
decision needs to be taken. The 
student is asked what they would 
do about the issues being posed. 
The m ethod involves active learn­
ing.” Latin American cases include 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, Conta- 
dora, the Panama Canal negotia­
tions, and US-Grenada relations. 
For further information, contact 
the center at (202) 687-8971.
Role Models
In the face of a dramatically shrink­
ing economy, Cuban government 
officials are now once again look­
ing east for assistance—this time to 
Vietnam and China. According to 
an August 21, 1993, Reuters report, 
Cuba’s minister of finances Jose 
Luis Rodriguez said in Hanoi that 
“he was interested in studying how 
Vietnam had initiated economic 
reforms even while maintaining 
its socialist identity.” But he also 
cautioned that lessons from the 
economic policies of Vietnam 
and China would have to be 
adapted to the realities of Cuba. 
Perhaps he was thinking of the 
wage structure in both countries, 
where hourly labor is the lowest 
paid in the world at about 24 and 
28 cents respectively.
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Quid Pro Quo with Cuba
by Anthony P. Maingot
Now is the time to draw Fidel Castro away from the arena he dominates— Cuban 
nationalism vs. US imperialism—and into the arena he doesn’t: Cuban economic 
performance. The US embargo is an obstacle to such a shift
A
ccording to Deputy Sec­
retary of State Clifton 
R. Wharton, Jr., the 
Clinton administration 
is committed to a West­
ern Hemisphere “linked 
by open markets and democratic 
values” (Washington, DC, May 3, 
1993). As worthy and laudable 
a goal as this is, the question is 
whether generating open markets 
necessarily engenders democratic 
values in authoritarian societies. 
This question applies as much to 
Cuba as it does to China. Unfortu­
nately, we have been m uch more 
prone to discuss the Chinese case 
than the Cuban one. It is time the 
US government changes this non­
productive and politically moti­
vated predisposition.
The opening of com m and 
economies can lead to pressures 
for the institution of democratic 
values. In the case of Cuba, the first 
step towards encouraging an open 
market should be the commence­
m ent of negotiations to lift the US 
embargo. Negotiations aimed at 
the institution of democratic values 
in Cuba via the opening in the com­
m and economy should be on a 
quid pro quo basis, i.e. specific eco­
nomic openings in exchange for 
specific political changes.
Anthony P. Maingot is editor of 
Hemisphere.
The single most im portant socio­
logical study of Cuba done before 
1959 was Lowry Nelson’s Rural Cuba 
(1950). Observing the richness of 
Cuba’s soil and the vast am ount 
of government-owned land lying 
fallow (the so-called realengos), Nel­
son felt that if such natural endow­
ments were everything, Cuba’s 
future was assured. But natural 
endowments are never everything.
It is time the US 
government changes 
its nonproductive and 
politically motivated 
predisposition to 
discuss China more 
than Cuba.
Much depends, Nelson reasoned, 
upon the degree of imagination 
that the Cuban people can bring to 
the task of finding and developing 
new products from their natural re­
sources. The Cuban revolution 
of 1959 was initially premised on 
m eeting that very challenge. Three 
decades later, Cuba is being chal­
lenged like never before, as the 
country’s economists are admit­
ting with remarkable candor.
The economic literature em anat­
ing from Cuba today confronts the 
present crisis with great realism 
and a predisposition to accept 
changes. In 1993 Julio Carranza 
Valdes, Cuba’s most articulate po­
litical economist, seemed to be 
echoing Nelson’s words when he 
warned that the survival of the 
Cuban revolution depends on a 
“strategic redefinition of the revolu­
tionary model. . . . This is the chal­
lenge: what is needed is creativity 
and political audacity” (Cuademos 
de Nuestra America 19, 1993).
The nature of the challenge is 
simply m onumental: making the 
socialist system work with less than 
a third of the resources that it had 
in 1989. That 70% drop reflects 
the disappearance of socialist bloc 
subsidies. What is the capacity of 
the national economy to com pen­
sate for a loss of such magnitude?
It is impossible to be optimistic, for 
reasons cited by Cuban economists 
themselves. Even if Cuban produc­
tion during the “Special Period in 
Time of Peace” achieved total effi­
ciency in making and selling local 
products, it would still be 40% be­
low what in 1989 was considered 
minimally necessary to sustain the 
“norm al” rhythm of the economy.
According to the UN Develop­
m ent Program ’s Human Develop­
ment Report for 1993, Cuba is now 
in 75th place on the hum an devel­
opm ent index (which measures 
real purchasing power, education,
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and health). Compare this to the 
20th place of Barbados or the 31st 
place of Trinidad and Tobago. In 
the Caribbean, only St. Vincent 
(76th) and Guyana (105th) rank 
lower than Cuba.
Flagging Spirits
Though hardly ever discussed in 
such terms by economists (who 
refer, am ong other things, to “the 
need for more labor discipline”), 
analysis has to begin with certain 
domestic realities, prime among 
them  being the social-psychological 
climate in present-day Cuba. In 
fact, every even modestly impartial 
observer has rem arked that, since 
the closing of the free peasant mar­
kets that were authorized in 1986, 
there has been an evident flagging 
of Cuban spirits. A large num ber of 
commodities, especially food items, 
that had not been seen in years 
were made available virtually over­
night by the mercados campesinos. 
Within months Castro ordered the 
experim ent stopped, politically iso­
lated the economists who had de­
signed the experiment, and began 
what was called the rectification de 
errores, that is, an attem pt to create 
a purer form of socialist disinterest.
None of this had anything to 
do with the US embargo. In 1986 
Cuba’s leadership made what now 
appears to have been a fatally 
flawed decision to further central­
ize and tighten the com m and econ­
omy at the expense of individual 
initiative. The ideas behind peres­
troika and glasnost were already in 
the air. The socialist countries that 
subsidized the Cuban form of so­
cialism were evidently in structural 
crisis. Mikhail Gorbachev was as 
clear as a rooster’s crow when he 
warned in his 1987 book, Perestroika,
that “socialism’s prestige and possi­
bilities would be directly harm ed if 
we cling to the old forms of coop­
eration. . . . ” The forms of coopera­
tion most obviously targeted for 
revision were the socialist bloc’s 
agreem ent to pay more than 150% 
of the world market price for every­
thing im ported from Cuba, and 
the subsidization of Cuban oil 
purchases.
Economic indications 
are that the Cuban 
system is involved in a 
pattern of deterioration 
that the mere lifting 
of the embargo urill 
not correct.
Aside from a social-psychological 
factor that we might call “sacrifice 
exhaustion,” there are economic 
indications the Cuban system is in­
volved in a pattern of deterioration 
that the mere lifting of the em bar­
go will not correct. The com bined 
impact of a totally centralized econ­
omy of imports and exports and 
fuel and equipm ent shortages is 
taking a terrible toll in terms of the 
increasing am ounts of inputs neces­
sary to produce marginal gains in 
outputs. For every one peso in­
vested between 1981 and 1985 
there was a $0.53 increase in Cu­
ban production. Between 1986 
and 1990 the situation was simply 
unsustainable: for every one peso 
invested there was only a $0.02 
increase in production. The inef­
ficiency of the system could also be 
judged  by the fact that, as Cuban 
economists now admit, fully
600,000 people were unproduc- 
tively employed. This was part of 
a payout in social services that was 
growing three times faster than 
productivity.
As if those indications were 
not warning enough, it is now re­
vealed that during the last five 
years money in circulation has 
been growing 1.5 times faster than 
the availability of merchandise.
The results were predictable: not 
just inflation but a booming black 
market. Just how artificial, not to 
say unreal, things have become is 
evident in a study by Cuba’s Centro 
de Investigaciones de la Economia 
Mundial, which reveals that in 
1989 70% of the existing savings 
accounts contained less than 200 
pesos, or US$3.50 at black-market 
exchange rates. Clearly the level of 
internal savings needed to capital­
ize a new initiative in local produc­
tion is simply not there.
The Cuban Catch-22
Nothing illustrates the virtual 
collapse of the Cuban economic 
model more dramatically than the 
paradox of sugar as it affects plans 
to reinsert Cuba in the world 
economy—the one thing all play­
ers seem to agree on. Manual Rua 
and Pedro M onreal’s much-cited 
article, “La apertura economica cu- 
bana” {Cuba’sForeign Trade, Feb­
ruary 1993), illustrates the problem, 
a veritable Cuban Catch-22 that is 
related not to the US embargo but 
to earlier decisions.
Rua and Monreal believe Cuba’s 
reinsertion into the world economy 
can be achieved through an aper­
tura economica anchored on three
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pillars: attracting more foreign 
investments, diversifying Cuba’s 
foreign trade, and accelerating the 
development of the tourist sector. 
The authors note that the appropri­
ate legal changes to accommodate 
these initiatives have been made, 
to wit: Article 23 of the 1992 consti­
tution, which recognizes and pro­
tects foreign investments, and the 
decision to remove the state’s mo­
nopoly over exports. The Cuban 
Camara de Comercio claims that, 
by 1993, 500 economic entities 
were directly, if not totally autono­
mously, involved in foreign trade.
Ah, but there is a fly in the oint­
ment. The fundam ental engine 
driving that economic reorienta­
tion, according to the authors and 
many others, would still have to be 
the sugar industry. As Cuba’s eco­
nomic czar, Carlos Lage, said in No­
vember 1992 on Havana television, 
Cuba’s goal is to gain an increased 
share of sugar’s hard-currency mar­
ket. This, he admits, will require 
more land, more fertilizer, and a 
longer cane-cutting season to in­
crease production.
New Wine, Old Bottles
Cuba’s 1992 production of 7 mil­
lion tons gave Lage and the authors 
in Cuba’s Foreign Trade the confi­
dence to believe that, with 6.3 mil­
lion tons for export, Cuba might 
just make it. Unfortunately for 
Cuba, this has turned out to be 
little more than pouring new wine 
into old bottles. For the past 25 
years Cuba has hitched its eco­
nomic destinies to that star called 
sugar. Sugar cultivation takes up 
nearly 60% of all of Cuba’s culti­
vated area, consumes m ore than 
30% of the nation’s energy, and 
employs 440,000 people. But even 
Lage had to recognize some crucial 
economic realities that would sure­
ly affect Cuba’s plans: in 1989 Cuba 
im ported 13 million tons of oil; in 
1992 that am ount was cut in half. 
Keeping in mind that Cuba’s sugar 
milling equipm ent is of gas guz­
zling (and polluting) vintage, that 
its sugar mills are spread across
Cuba, and that such dispersion 
requires an intensive use of fuel- 
driven transportation, the drastic 
nature of fuel deficits is clear.
A nother problem  is that Cuban 
sugar has become dependent on 
the extensive use of fertilizers. In 
1989 Cuba im ported 1.3 million 
tons of fertilizer; by 1992 that fig­
ure was slashed by some 75%. In
1989 Cuba purchased US$80 mil­
lion worth of herbicides; by 1992 
that had been cut by about 60%.
Should a country 
that cannot produce 
enough alcohol or 
aspirins for its 
hospitals invest so 
heavily in interferon?
The result of these reductions was 
quickly evident: the 1992-93 sugar 
harvest, a crop of 4.2 million tons, 
is the smallest in 30 years, repre­
senting the single largest annual 
drop in sugar production. Cuba 
has argued force majeure in sus­
pending sales of sugar contracted 
to convertible-currency clients— 
hardly a way to start a reinsertion 
into the world market.
The news could not have come 
at a worse time for the island. With 
so much land devoted to sugar, the 
deficit in food production has been 
increasing: in 1989 Cuba was im­
porting 57% of the proteins and 
51% of the calories consumed. 
C uba’s purchasing power in 1993 
is considerably less than it was in
1989. The deficiency in local food 
production has affected plans to in­
tegrate the tourist industry through 
backward linkages into the agricul­
tural sector, which, in the rest of 
the Caribbean, is sustained by im­
ports. As we shall see, it is relevant 
as well to state initiatives in the do­
main of biotechnology.
Cuba began investing in medical 
education and research early in the
revolutionary phase. In those days 
the idea was to perform  “interna­
tionalist” duties in other devel­
oping countries. Today’s goal is 
medical technology as a business. 
Plans exist to create a locally based 
complex for medical treatments of 
all sorts—from cosmetic surgery 
to oncology—for patients paying 
hard currency. Such a complex 
could intersect with the burgeon­
ing tourist industry. A nother di­
mension of the plan calls for 
exports from the Cuban medical 
complex, including physical plants, 
instruments, equipm ent, and even 
the doctors and technicians to op­
erate them. Cuban agencies using 
Western-style marketing tech­
niques are already at work. Medi- 
Cuba and H eber Biotec handle 
sophisticated medications such as 
reagents, epidermal growth factors, 
diagnostic kits for the HIV virus, 
hepatitis B and meningitis B vac­
cines, and alpha, beta, and gamma 
interferons. According to US soci­
ologist Julie Feinsilver’s Healing 
the Masses: Cuban Health Politics at 
Home and Abroad (1993), indica­
tions are that Cubans are at least 
breaking even and that their 15- 
odd biotechnological centers are 
self-sustaining.
The very first issue regarding 
this sector is the question of m atch­
ing appropriate technology to lev­
els of development. One question 
repeatedly asked about Cuba is 
whether a country that cannot 
produce enough alcohol or aspi­
rins for its hospitals should be in­
vesting so heavily in the production 
of interferon.
Investor Liabilities?
Beyond this relatively simple issue 
of accounting and opportunity costs 
lie the risks that, with or without 
the US embargo, any potential in­
vestor should consider. Potential 
legal liabilities are one such risk.
In a field dom inated by US, Euro­
pean, and Japanese multinationals, 
the Cubans appear weak in both 
basic research and sales. Indeed, 
Cuba does not recognize patents,
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a major problem  any jo in t ventures 
will have to take into account.
The relationship between ap­
propriate technological inputs and 
productive outputs also applies 
to Cuba’s goal of becoming self- 
sufficient in foodstuffs. The plan 
has been to increase production 
through greater and greater in­
fusions of highly trained technical 
personnel. According to the Boletin 
de Information sobre la Economia Cu- 
bana (January 1992), Cuba has 
been spending twice the Latin 
American average on technical 
and scientific education and train­
ing. As in medicine, the Cuban 
governm ent has decided that ad­
vanced technological and scientific 
inputs are the paths to agricultural 
development. Yet Cuba remains 
heavily dependent on the im port 
of a wide range of cereals, beans, 
oils, milk, poultry, and other basic 
foodstuffs. Similarly, if Cuba is 
marketing five different types of 
advanced biotechnological medica­
tions for veterinary use, why has it 
failed to stop simple fowl diseases 
from underm ining plans to have 
people raise their own poultry?
Tourism Dollars
Havana took off as a major tourist 
spot after World War II. When 
Miami Beach rejected the institu­
tion of gambling casinos, the big 
money moved to Havana. This 
move would prove to be a double- 
edged sword: the m ore successful it 
became as an industry, the more it 
fueled nationalist and reformist re­
sentment. Among the first acts of 
the revolutionary government in
1959 was to close down all casinos 
and de-emphasize tourism in gen­
eral. Thirty years later, the regime 
reversed itself and launched a dra­
matic tourism initiative. Its first 
step was to open up the industry to 
jo in t ventures, with considerable 
success thus far. In 1991 Cuba 
attracted 300,000 tourists, m atch­
ing the highest figure of the pre­
revolutionary days—and is perhaps 
over-optimistically targeting 1.5 mil­
lion tourists by 1995.
Tourism will be contained in 11 
major tourist enclaves, the biggest 
being Varadero Beach. Access to 
this truly magnificent stretch of 
white sand and crystal clear waters 
is made possible by a first-rate high­
way running from Havana, an inter­
national airport that can service 
the largest jum bo jets, and a mod­
ern m arina with moorings for 110 
deep-sea fishing yachts. In the Euro- 
pean-style grading system, Varadero 
will have three five-star hotels and 
another 5,000 rooms of at least 
three stars.
The embargo reduces 
the maneuverability 
of Cuban interests 
who understand that 
reforms are the only 
way out.
Spanish, Mexican, British, and 
Jam aican interests have entered 
into jo in t ventures and manage­
m ent arrangements, which give the 
foreigners nearly complete freedom  
of managerial and administrative 
policy. Several West Indian firms 
have been inquiring about (and 
some were investing in) a range 
of possible deals, from building 
new—or restoring old—hotels, 
and supplying foodstuffs, to the 
assembly of small cars for the 
rental business. Firms from other 
Caribbean nations are interested in 
pursuing the Cuban idea of multi­
destination packaging.
The truly big plums, of course, 
would be multidestination packages 
with Miami and San Juan, Puerto 
Rico. The risks of such investment 
are great, but the new investors are 
gambling on the profitability of 
what is surely the future of Carib­
bean tourism: multidestination 
vacations, perhaps with Cuba as 
the principal site.
The Embargo’s Effects
Cuba’s economic decline cannot 
be attributed to the embargo. What 
the embargo does, however, is two­
fold. First, it monopolizes both the 
language and the agenda of eco­
nomic opportunities by focusing 
attention where it should not be: 
on Cuban nationalism vs. US im­
perialism. And second, precisely 
because of this monopoly, the 
embargo reduces the maneuver­
ability of those interests in Cuba 
who understand that basic eco­
nomic and political reforms, not 
simply lifting the embargo, are the 
only way out.
Those concerned with Cuba’s 
economic and political future un­
derstand that half-measures will 
not bring the island’s economy 
out of its structural crisis. Remov­
ing the embargo will merely be a 
half-measure given the absence of 
hard-currency credits, the elimina­
tion of barter trade, and, most fun­
damentally, the lack of opportunity 
to sell at a profit what is locally pro­
duced. If the lifting of the embargo 
would encourage such changes, 
then it would be worthwhile. But 
let me repeat: the political realities 
in the US are such that a whole­
sale, unilateral, lifting of the em­
bargo is perhaps not possible. What 
might be possible is a negotiated 
quid pro quo—specific economic 
openings in exchange for specific 
political changes in Cuba.
Now that the Cuban economy 
has been “dollarized”—an admis­
sion that the informal economy is 
more im portant than the com­
m and economy—the time is right 
to facilitate further change and re­
form. There is no absolute guaran­
tee that such a measure will work. 
Yet, when balanced against the fu­
tility of 33 years of political and 
economic stagnation, the risk is 
certainly worth taking. ■
Editor’s Note: Edited excerpts of testi­
mony presented to the US Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, July 29, 
1993.
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The Social Safety Net Unravels
by Carmelo Mesa-Lago
--------rior to the collapse of so­
cialism in Eastern Europe 
and the USSR, Cuba had 
the most comprehensive, 
generous, and costly state 
social safety net (SSN) 
am ong all those countries, as well 
as in Latin America. That feat was 
largely possible because of the enor­
mous economic aid provided by 
the USSR and the Council for Mu­
tual Economic Assistance (CMEA). 
The disappearance of the latter has 
generated a severe economic crisis. 
As the economy has fallen, the bur­
den of the SSN has become unbear­
able. The crisis is quite evident in 
the areas of health care, education, 
employment, social security, hous­
ing, and, more broadly, in general 
patterns of consumption.
The Boom and Deterioration 
of Health Care
By the end of the 1980s, Cuba 
had one of the most com prehen­
sive free health-care systems in the 
world, yielding some of the highest 
health standards on the planet. 
Cuba led Latin America and the 
socialist world in virtually all health 
indicators: infant mortality was only
11 per 1,000 (the lowest in all Latin 
American and socialist countries); 
life expectancy reached 75 years 
(matched only by Costa Rica); there 
were 33 physicians per 10,000 in­
habitants (equaled only by the 
USSR and Czechoslovakia); and
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there were 5.3 hospital beds per
10,000 inhabitants (superseded 
only by Argentina, Uruguay, and 
the USSR). Although the most 
im portant health-care problems 
had been solved by 1986, Cuba 
launched a costly family doctor 
program  that covered 67% of the 
population by 1992, but, in the 
midst of severe scarcities, was a 
wasteful extravagance. A nother 
indication of waste was a national 
hospital-bed occupancy rate of less 
than 73% and an average rate of 
almost 10 days of hospital stay; the 
first was low by international stan­
dards, the second clearly excessive.
Cuba’s health-care system was 
therefore one of the world’s most 
capital intensive, costly, and waste­
ful. Such largesse was possible 
mainly because of generous Soviet 
economic aid to Cuba—estimated 
at $65 billion between 1960 and
1990. US social scientist Kathleen 
Barrett has amply docum ented the
devastating impact of the collapse 
of the Soviet bloc on Cuba’s health­
care system.
According to Barrett, Cuban 
health care has been plagued by a 
num ber of shortages, most of which 
are associated with the deprivation 
stemming from the collapse of 
socialism in Eastern Europe and 
the USSR. These shortages are led 
by a sharp decline in CMEA im­
ports of drugs and medical equip­
ment, as well as raw materials, 
required to produce 85% of the 
medicines consumed in Cuba.
This has resulted in the virtual dis­
appearance of 229 drugs (includ­
ing antibiotics, anesthetics, asthma 
medicine, and insulin). O ther ba­
sic supplies, such as sutures, x-ray 
plates, and surgical gloves are also 
scarce. The lack of condoms and 
antibiotics has com bined with the 
increase in tourism and prostitu­
tion to create a fast expansion in 
venereal diseases. Cases of syphilis
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and gonorrhea jum ped twofold be­
tween 1980 and 1989, and the situa­
tion was reportedly worse between
1990 and 1992.
While not directly connected 
with the practice of medicine, 
the scarcity of o ther vital mate­
rials—spare parts for ambulances, 
operating pumps for the public 
water system, and insecticide used 
in combating malarial mosqui­
toes—seriously impairs the health­
care infrastructure. The lack of raw 
materials for making soap renders 
the maintenance of personal hy­
giene much m ore difficult. Fuel 
reductions affect everything from 
garbage pick-up (which sometimes 
does not occur for months) to the 
refrigeration of blood supplies. 
Food shortages have re-introduced 
the specter of m alnutrition-rooted 
diseases, such as the optic neurop­
athy blam ed on a deficiency of 
B complex vitamins.
Not surprisingly, growing stress 
on the population has probably in­
creased ulcers, hypertension, and 
cardiac and m ental diseases. The 
tightening of the US embargo and 
US pressure on Western European 
countries and Japan not to export 
to Cuba have aggravated these scar­
cities and problems.
Barrett reports that the govern­
m ent has taken several measures to 
cope with the health crisis:
■ Scarce medicine and food have 
been reserved for vulnerable 
groups such as pregnant m oth­
ers, children below the age of 
seven, the elderly, and those with 
chronic diseases.
■ Traditional and herbal medicine, 
thermal waters, and acupuncture 
are used even in the best hospi­
tals (e.g., acupuncture has re­
placed anesthetics for surgery 
and a powder m ade of crusty 
shells is used to heal wounds).
■ Patients are treated at home 
whenever possible, thus reducing 
hospital admissions and length 
of stay (but increasing under­
utilized services).
■ Diagnosis is increasingly done 
with clinical examinations rather 
than tests.
■ The reduction of fat and meat 
consumption, com bined with an 
increase in exercise (i.e., riding 
bicycles), is claimed to have re­
duced cholesterol levels (but con­
sumption of eggs has increased, 
more accidents may be occurring 
because of bikes, and malnutri­
tion has grown).
■ A new program  monitors health 
care using family doctors to de­
tect diseases, but it lacks the medi­
cations necessary to cure most of 
them.
These policies are a 
mere survival strategy. 
The crisis can only be 
solved ivith massive 
aid and imports 
that are unlikely to 
materialize in the 
near future.
Barrett concludes that these pol­
icies are a mere survival strategy 
and that the crisis can only be 
solved with massive aid and im­
ports that are unlikely to material­
ize in the near future. She reports 
widespread skepticism and cyni­
cism on the part of a population 
besieged by all types of difficulties, 
while simultaneously bom barded 
by government claims that health 
standards are improving. Some of 
the physicians and public health 
officials she interviewed acknow­
ledged—in private—the deteriora­
tion of health standards and the 
potential for epidemic. Barrett 
observes that health statistics have 
no t been released for three years, 
probably because they are negative 
and—in view of the political stat­
ure of health care—would damage 
the image of the revolution abroad.
Educational Standards, 
Costs, and Crisis
All levels of education are free in 
Cuba. There is universal access to 
elementary school and nearly uni­
versal access to secondary educa­
tion; entrance to higher education 
is conditioned on exams and quotas.
Between 1953 and 1970 Cuba’s 
illiteracy rate was almost halved; 
by 1990 it had declined to 16% of 
the 1953 level and was 25% of the 
Latin American average. In 1987 
virtually the entire population of 
elementary-school age was enrolled, 
as were 88% of those of secondary- 
school age (a sixfold increase over 
1960) and 23% of those of college 
age (7.6 times that of 1960).
While the ratio of students per 
teacher was 16 in 1979-80, it fell to 
10 in 1989-90. At the beginning of 
the 1990s Cuba’s m ean years of 
schooling was 7.6, similar to that 
o f the Soviet bloc and twice the 
average of the developing world. 
Fellowships that, in addition to free 
education, included food, clothing, 
and shelter were awarded to 43% 
of all students enrolled in secon­
dary school in 1989-90 and to 28% 
of all students enrolled in higher 
education. In 1988-89 there were 
6,029 Cubans with fellowships en­
rolled in higher education abroad. 
In addition, there were 4,660 for­
eign students enrolled in higher 
education in Cuba, and as many as
22,000 in all educational levels who 
received those services free. Many 
had Cuban fellowships in addition.
As a percentage of gross social 
product (GSP), educational expen­
ditures increased from 4.2% in 
1970 to 6.8% in 1990. The latter 
was almost twice the average pro­
portion of the developing world 
and Latin America (3.5%) and 
higher than the average of the in­
dustrial world (5.9%). Because of 
declining GSP in 1990-92, the Cu­
ban share of educational expenses 
probably increased, with estimates 
ranging from 8.5% to 13% of GSP 
in 1992.
The Cuban government has 
tried to maintain educational
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standards during the crisis, but it 
has been forced to make im portant 
cuts and changes. Unlike health 
care, however, we lack detailed in­
formation on the impact of the 
collapse of the Soviet bloc on the 
quality of Cuban education.
Fidel Castro claims that no 
schools have been closed and that 
there is no paucity of books and 
other utensils. Recent visitors to 
Cuba report otherwise. They claim 
there are grave shortages of books, 
paper, and chalk in schools, as well 
as a reduction in student meals. 
Part of the textbook deficit can be 
attributed to the fact that very few 
books are now imported. About 
30% of the raw material used in 
the domestic production of paper 
is wood pulp (the rest is sugarcane 
bagasse), which used to be im­
ported at very low prices from 
Eastern Europe and the USSR; it 
now must be bought through the 
world market in hard currency. In 
addition, 25-30% of paper output 
is wasted due to obsolete technol­
ogy, lack of spare parts, inadequate 
raw material, and labor and quality 
control problems. The scarcity of 
books is so severe that a small book 
fair organized at the end of 1992 
drew a line three-city blocks long.
The decline in production and 
supply comes at a time when most 
of Cuba’s textbooks are in need of 
revision or replacement. The col­
lapse of socialism in the Soviet bloc 
has forced education officials to 
drastically review textbooks (e.g., 
on economics and Marxism) that 
used to be published by those coun­
tries, and significant changes are 
being introduced in the curriculum.
With the Soviet bloc transition, 
virtually all Cubans studying in 
those countries returned home 
or asked for asylum. The alterna­
tive, that of sending Cubans to 
study in hard-currency countries, 
is precluded by the scarcity of re­
sources. To compensate, the gov­
ernm ent has relaxed the restric­
tions on Cuban scientists going 
abroad for training in developed 
m arket countries, and is encourag­
ing groups of technical personnel
to work abroad and share their 
earnings with the state.
Prior to the crisis, emphasis was 
placed on formal academic train­
ing, as opposed to vocational educa­
tion. That priority was inconsistent 
with the labor m arket’s needs and 
is even more incongruous now in 
terms of prospects for employment 
generation. In 1989-90, 76% of 
students who had com pleted ele­
mentary school were enrolled in 
secondary, pre-university, or higher
Living conditions 
among the elderly 
and pensioners have 
rapidly deteriorated. 
Old people lack 
transportation to 
receive medical 
attention and cannot 
stand in long lines 
for food.
education, while only 24% were 
enrolled in technical-professional 
(20.3%), special (3%), and voca­
tional (0.5%) schools. In 1991-92, 
however, the Ministerio de Edu­
cation established that 60% of 
students would go to vocational 
schools and only 40% to pre-uni­
versity schools; many of the latter 
were being converted into voca­
tional schools.
Employment and Social Security
Throughout the revolution, a pol­
icy of full employment has been 
pursued that now faces enormous 
difficulties. In 1970 open unem ­
ployment registered its lowest rate:
1.3% of the labor force—virtually 
full employment. Underemploy­
ment, however, was enorm ous in 
the state sector, which embraces 
95% of the labor force. As the mild 
economic reforms introduced in 
1971-85 released part of the hid­
den labor surplus, the rate of unem ­
ployment rose to about 6% during 
most of the 1980s. Most of these 
idle workers, nevertheless, contin­
ued receiving their wages and were 
put on a “reserve” until they found 
o ther jobs. The crisis of the 1990s 
has severely aggravated this prob­
lem as probably 80% of factories 
have been shut down, transporta­
tion is virtually paralyzed, and 
electricity production, as well as 
commerce and entertainm ent ac­
tivities, have declined dramatically. 
In 1992 an estimated 10-18% of the 
labor force was inactive and most 
of it (as well as young workers en­
tering the m arket after graduation) 
was under some type of unemploy­
m ent compensation.
In the early 1990s Cuba had the 
most comprehensive and liberal 
social security system in both Latin 
America and the socialist world. Vir­
tually all the labor force was enti­
tled to pensions (old age, disability, 
and survivors), as well as paid leave 
for sickness and maternity. Employ­
ers alone contributed to this fund. 
The age of retirem ent was lower in 
Cuba than in the four most socially 
advanced Latin American coun­
tries, but the island’s life expectan­
cy was higher. The average pension 
replaced 90% of the salary previous 
to retirem ent, which was quite gen­
erous in the wider Latin American 
and socialist perspective. Relaxa­
tion of requirem ents for pensions 
took place in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, which, com bined with 
poor financing, led to a 40% defi­
cit in the system. This deficit was 
automatically covered by the al­
ready overstretched state budget. 
Still, living conditions am ong the 
elderly and pensioners have rapidly 
deteriorated: old people lack trans­
portation to receive medical atten­
tion as well as essential drugs, they 
cannot stand in the long queues in
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front of state stores that may last 
six or seven hours, and, because 
their minimum pension equals 
about US$1 in the black market, 
they cannot buy adequate food.
Estimates of the cost of Cuba’s 
SSN in 1992 (combining health 
care, education, and social security 
expenditures) range from 22% to 
34% of GSP—not including the 
costs of consum er goods subsidies 
and unem ploym ent compensation. 
As GSP was cut by half in 1992-93, 
the burden of the SSN became 
intolerable.
Housing Shortages
In contrast with the development 
of o ther social services, housing 
has been seriously neglected in 
Cuba. Cuba’s housing deficit was 
an estimated 655,000 units at the 
beginning of the revolution. From
1960 to 1980 not only was the 
am ount of housing constructed 
severely inadequate but a good 
part of the existing stock disap­
peared because of lack of m ainte­
nance: the government neglected 
repairs of public housing and those 
residents who own their homes 
lacked construction materials to 
maintain them. Even as the popu­
lation growth rate declined, these 
problems raised the housing deficit 
considerably.
In the early 1980s the expanded 
availability of m ore construction 
materials to build and repair pri­
vate housing construction by the 
state m eant that the housing deficit 
grew by only 1%. In 1985, however, 
the deficit was 36% higher than in 
1959. For the years since then, the 
scarce data indicate substantial 
worsening of the situation. The 
new housing law enacted in 1988 
tightened the rules for private con­
struction and exchange while state 
construction also decreased.
U nder the first wave of adjust­
m ent measures in 1990, housing ex­
penditures were cut by 20%, and in 
1991-92 there was a virtual freeze 
in housing construction (except 
for labor camps in the countryside). 
In spite of Castro’s claim that con­
struction microbrigades would 
build 100,000 dwelling units an­
nually, they built only 18,315 units 
from 1986 to 1989. Cement produc­
tion has sharply decreased and it is 
impossible to get the needed mate­
rials for repairs. By 1992 the hous­
ing deficit probably surpassed the 
one million mark. Furtherm ore, 
the housing stock is rapidly dete­
riorating: in some Havana neigh­
borhoods most buildings are 
propped up.
HOUSING DEFICIT
Millions of units+1--------------------
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Source: Based on Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Historia
Economica de Cuba Socialista (forthcoming)
Consumption Levels
Consumption of essential consumer 
goods has been quite restricted un­
der the revolution. Rationing was 
introduced in 1962 and rapidly 
expanded to cover most consumer 
goods. Between 1966 and 1970 the 
num ber of goods rationed was ex­
panded and their physical quotas 
reduced, but under the mild eco­
nomic reform of 1971-85 there 
was some improvement in both 
liberating goods from rationing 
and increasing the quotas. In ad­
dition, the quotas could be sup­
plem ented by purchases in the 
state-parallel, free-peasant, and 
artisan markets. The Proceso de 
Rectification launched in 1986, 
com bined with the collapse of so­
cialism in the Soviet bloc and the 
“Special Period in Time of Peace” 
in the early 1990s led to the worst
cuts in consum ption under the 
revolution: 15% in 1989-91 and 
much more in 1991-92.
By the beginning of 1993 vir­
tually every consumer good in 
Cuba was rationed. It is estimated 
that current rationing quotas (as­
suming they are fulfilled in prac­
tice, which is no t usually the case) 
only satisfy 14 days of the popula­
tion’s minimum food needs. In 
1989, 57% of the protein and 51% 
of the calories consum ed in Cuba 
came from imports. The result is 
that the daily caloric intake de­
clined from 3,103 in the mid-1980s 
to 2,000 in 1992, below the mini­
mum standards set by the World 
Health Organization.
Restructuring the SSN
It should be evident from this 
analysis that different social poli­
cies—geared to the short and long- 
run—should be im plem ented in 
both the transition period and 
later, as a full-market economy is 
approached. It is im portant to 
avoid the introduction of perm a­
nen t rights that could not be fi­
nancially feasible in the long run. 
Scarce resources should be tar­
geted to protect the most vulner­
able groups, and clear priorities set 
to preserve or cut programs and 
specific benefits.
The shares of the various pro­
grams within Cuba’s SSN should be 
restructured according to the fol­
lowing guidelines:
■ Social security expenditures 
should be cut by tightening en­
titlem ent conditions for both 
pensions and sickness-maternity 
monetary benefits.
■ Health and education expendi­
tures should be reduced (as their 
infrastructure and personnel are 
more than sufficient) through 
improved efficiency.
■ Subsidies to prices and enter­
prises should be eliminated.
■ Unemployment compensation 
should be extended (as the num ­
ber of jobless will expand), but its 
entitlem ent conditions should be 
tightened.
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■ Social assistance expenditures 
should be expanded to protect 
the poorest and most vulnerable 
groups.
Although the bulk of the SSN 
in socialist countries is furnished 
and financed by the central govern­
ment, state enterprises usually pro­
vide some monetary benefits such 
as: occupational accident insur­
ance, sickness and maternity paid 
leaves, partial disability and provi­
sional pensions, funeral aid, and 
subsidized cafeterias. As these en­
terprises are privatized it will be 
necessary to develop a new infra­
structure and funding to sustain 
such benefits. Furtherm ore, several 
socialist countries in transition (as 
well as Latin American nations) 
have decentralized social programs 
by transferring them  to local gov­
ernments. They have failed, how­
ever, to provide adequate financing. 
Administrative decentralization is 
normally a positive development, 
but it should not be used as a trick 
to cut benefits.
The SSN in socialist countries— 
including Cuba—is financed by the 
central government and state enter­
prises at virtually no charge to the 
user. In the transition to the full 
market, the financial burden on 
employers should be balanced with 
employees’ contributions, user fees 
for some health services, etc. The 
state burden should be reduced by 
those techniques, as well as increas­
ing the participation of the private 
sector.
Part of any international aid 
provided to help finance the 
transition in Cuba should be al­
located to defray a portion of the 
cost of the SSN, particularly in its 
first stage, through direct aid to 
the needy. Such action would 
facilitate the shutdown of ineffi­
cient enterprises; reduce pressure 
on the government to prin t money 
and increase the budgetary deficit; 
enable the government to reduce 
or eliminate subsidies for con­
sumer goods; aid in stabilizing 
the m onetary currency; and
generate political support for the 
reform.
If an adequate SSN is not pro­
vided, there will be serious political 
and economic costs. A consensus 
or social pact will either be impossi­
ble to achieve or, if initially estab­
lished, will rapidly vanish. Strong 
popular opposition to the needed 
m arket reforms will obstruct their 
passage and enforcem ent or re­
verse those measures already im­
plem ented. The probability of 
violence and authoritarianism will 
increase, and there will be a high 
risk of massive emigration to the 
US. The lesson is that early invest­
m ent in a Cuban SSN would be less 
costly than repairing the damage 
created by the lack of it. ■
Editor’s Note: Edited excerpts from 
“Transition in Cuba: New Challenges 
for US Policy, ” a study prepared for the 
US Department of State by the Cuban 
Research Institute at Florida Interna­
tional University.
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Seized Properties vs. Embargo Losses
by Archibald R. M. Ritter
hould Cuba pay com pen­
sation to US citizens for 
properties seized without 
payment between 1959 
and 1961? Should the 
US pay compensation to 
Cuba in view of the damages to the 
economy and the harm  to the mate­
rial welfare of Cubans that resulted 
from the embargo? These questions 
do not have quick or easy answers.
The normalization of Cuba’s 
place in the international financial 
and trading system requires a reso­
lution of its debt problem  and the 
issue of compensation for the prop­
erties of US nationals seized be­
tween 1959 and 1961—a time of 
radicalization in Cuba and deterio­
rating relations with the US. The 
current value of the properties ex­
propriated is estimated to be $5.3 
billion. At the same time, however, 
there are indications that Cuba is 
considering a $28 billion counter­
claim against the US for damages 
due to the embargo.
Concerning compensation for 
nationalization, international law 
and precedent are reasonably un ­
ambiguous. Indeed, Cuba’s 1959 
“Fundam ental Law of the Revolu­
tion” recognized the appropriate­
ness of compensation, and, in fact, 
Cuba has com pensated the nation­
als of o ther foreign countries for 
the expropriation of their proper-
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ties during 1959-61. In contrast, 
there appears to be no body of in­
ternational law relating to em bar­
goes or economic sanctions. While 
law may not support any claim that 
Cuba may make for losses arising 
from the US embargo, a sense of 
fairness and equity would suggest 
that the severe damage that the em­
bargo was designed to impose on 
Cuba should not be ignored in fu­
ture negotiations on compensation.
Some Ethical Questions
There are a num ber of reasons why 
Cuba should pay compensation for 
the expropriated properties. First, 
in most countries, governments are 
legally required to protect citizens 
and businesses from damages aris­
ing from arbitrary government 
actions, as well as to refrain from 
imposing such damages in the first 
place. Thus, while governments are 
entitled to acquire properties for 
the well-being of society, it is con­
sidered appropriate that they in­
demnify the original owners of
Fairness suggests that 
the damage caused by 
the embargo should 
not be ignored in 
future negotiations 
on compensation for 
expropriated property.
these expropriated properties. 
Second, the Cuban government 
did compensate the citizens and 
businesses of countries such as Can­
ada, Spain, and Switzerland. Cuba 
also allowed for some compensa­
tion—though it was not paid—to 
landowners whose lands were be­
ing nationalized under the first 
agrarian reform law of May 1959; 
these lands included the large hold­
ings of some US companies, espe­
cially in sugar. Third, the Cuban 
government initially agreed to com­
pensate US nationals for some of 
the major nationalizations of prop­
erties, but the terms of repayment 
did not appear reasonable.
On the o ther hand, there are a 
num ber of grounds on which, argu­
ably, compensation for the expro­
priation of US properties should 
not be paid. First, if the properties 
had been acquired in the first place 
through theft or corrupt practices, 
then compensation would not be 
appropriate. (The properties 
seized from Batista and his close 
associates in February 1959 were 
allegedly acquired illegally, and, as 
a result, they did not receive com­
pensation; this policy was widely 
viewed as reasonable.) There were, 
however, no allegations at the time 
that the expropriated US proper­
ties were illegally acquired, and to 
my knowledge this argum ent has 
not been made since.
Second, it m ight be argued that 
the US enterprises that were ex­
propriated had paid adequate or 
more-than-adequate returns to 
their owners through profit repa­
triation or o ther means (i.e., trans­
fer pricing or expatriate employee 
remittances). This may have been 
the case, but it would now be dif­
ficult to determ ine if it was indeed. 
Nonetheless, whether this justifies
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nonpaym ent of compensation or 
no t is a m atter open to question.
Third, should current and future 
generations of Cubans be liable for 
the actions, policies, or errors of 
the Cuban leadership between 1959 
and 1961? Here one could con­
clude that, just as we do not hold 
children responsible for the ac­
tions of their parents, Cubans to­
day should not have to pay for the 
earlier actions of their government. 
While this appears to apply in crim­
inal law and everyday life, it does 
not seem to apply to finance and 
economics (or the environm ent), 
where future generations in fact do 
assume responsibility for domestic 
fiscal debts and external debts (as 
well as environmental damages) 
incurred by earlier generations for 
short-term gains.
Fourth, it m ight be argued that 
the particular compensation ar­
rangem ents proposed and the fail­
ure to provide any compensation 
must be viewed within the specific 
historical context of 1959-61, that 
is, the deterioration of relations 
with the US that led ultimately to 
the embargo and the rupture of 
diplomatic ties. If the US had not 
been applying pressures on the 
Cuban government in order to in­
fluence the design of public policy 
and to defend the economic and 
strategic interests of the US, or to 
destabilize or overthrow the Cuban 
government, perhaps neither the 
embargo and the diplomatic break 
nor the radicalization of the revolu­
tion would have occurred. In this 
case, a more reasonable compensa­
tion arrangem ent might have been 
proposed, negotiated, and accepted.
If the rupture of economic and 
political relations had been purely 
the result of unilateral US actions, 
then perhaps one could argue that 
the proposed compensation pack­
age and the nonpaym ent of com­
pensation were a natural and 
reasonable response. The rupture 
of relations, however, was not sim­
ply the result of unilateral action by 
the US to which Cuba responded 
by nonpaym ent of compensation. 
Instead, it was an action-counter-
US CLAIMS
($US M illions)
Cuban Electric 797.5
ITT 389.5
North American Sugar 324.8
Moa Bay Mining 263.1
United Fruit Sugar 253.6
West Indies Sugar 253.0
American Sugar 241.4
Standard Oil 213.4
Bangor Punta 159.1
Francisco Sugar 156.7
Texaco 149.3
Manati Sugar 144.8
Nicaro Nickel 98.3
Coca-Cola 82.0
New Tuinueu Sugar 69.4
Lone-Star Cement 65.3
Colgate Palmolive 42.9
Braga Brothers 37.5
Broise Cascade 34.9
American Brands 31.6
Atlantic Richfield 30.4
Burns Mills 29.2
Pan American Life Insurance 28.9
United States Rubber 28.3
F. W. Woolworth 27.4
Havana Docks 26.8
Continental Can 26.5
Firestone Tire and Rubber 24.7
International Han/ester 24.7
Owens-Illinois 24.1
General Motors 22.9
Chase Manhattan 21.8
IBM World Trade 19.1
First National City Bank 18.5
Swift 17.9
First National Bank, Boston 17.6
General Electric 17.6
Libby 17.0
Goodyear Tire and Rubber 15.2
Sears Roebuck 11.0
Reynolds Metals 10.1
Lykes Brothers 10.1
Sherwin Williams 10.1
Note: For compensation under the 
Cuban claims program of the US 
Federal Claims Settlement Commission
Source: Updated data based on 
Business International Corporation 
(New York), March 1992
action phenom enon with both 
Cuba and the US responding to 
the actions of the o ther—cycles 
characterized on both sides by mis­
calculation, provocation, brinkm an­
ship, and recklessness. The Cuban 
government bears a share of the 
responsibility for the course of 
events in its relationship with the 
US. Indeed the revolutionary lead­
ership welcomed the cancellation 
of the sugar quota and the eco­
nomic embargo, at least in their 
official statements. They seemed to 
willingly participate in the escala­
tion of economic animosities be­
tween the two countries.
Thus it would be difficult to 
argue that Cuba should be freed 
from an obligation to pay com pen­
sation on the grounds that it was 
the victim of purely unilateral ac­
tion on the part of the US. On the 
o ther hand, the US was also an ac­
tive participant in the course of 
events that made it difficult, and 
then, after the diplomatic rupture, 
impossible for Cuba to negotiate or 
pay compensation.
A fifth argum ent is that, while 
under an obligation to pay com­
pensation, Cuba has already paid a 
num ber of times over through the 
damages caused by the economic 
embargo. Such damages were in­
flicted intentionally, they were 
genuine, and they were serious.
The value of such damages is 
probably impossible to determine. 
Should the US be liable for the 
damages caused to another coun­
try through imposition of an em­
bargo on that country? Again this 
is a difficult question. Are coun­
tries under a moral or legal obliga­
tion to trade with each other, or is 
this merely a m atter of mutual con­
venience? To my knowledge, no 
analyst, philosopher, or policy­
maker has proposed that when a 
country imposes tariff or nontariff 
barriers to trade or investment that 
there should be compensation for 
the foreign enterprises or coun­
tries that are damaged by such ac­
tion. Nor was it argued that the 
OPEC countries should com pen­
sate the oil im porting low-income
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countries for the economic injuries 
caused by oil embargo or subse­
quent higher oil prices. But when 
a very large country imposes an 
economic embargo on a small 
country whose economy is closely 
integrated into that of the large 
country, is the form er liable in 
some ethical senses for the damages 
inflicted on the latter? Perhaps. 
From a legal standpoint, however, 
there would appear to be no such 
liability. Can a similar argum ent be 
made for the Bay of Pigs Invasion 
or o ther covert actions?
Should Cuba be asked to make 
compensation when its foreign ex­
change earnings have fallen pre­
cipitously in real terms, when its 
internal economy has been in 
turmoil as a result of the disrup­
tions in relations with Eastern Eu­
rope and the form er Soviet Union, 
and when the difficulties of a tran­
sition to a more decentralized and 
export-oriented economy are just 
beginning to be felt? Whatever the 
government, should Cuba then be 
asked to make compensation pay­
ments involving real net resource 
transfers out of the country? Prob­
ably not.
Legal Dimensions
International law and established 
precedent seem to be reasonably 
clear on the issues of compensa­
tion for nationalization. Indeed, 
with the exception of US claimants, 
Cuba appears to have agreed with 
the principle and practice of com­
pensating enterprises and indi­
viduals whose properties were 
nationalized. On the o ther hand, 
there appears to be no body of in­
ternational law or established set of 
precedents concerning com pen­
sation payments to a country that 
has faced economic sanctions, em­
bargoes, or covert destabilization 
imposed by a large country on a 
smaller neighbor. The established 
corpus of law thus appears to favor 
the compensation claims of the US.
The standard approach to na­
tionalization and compensation 
from 1959 through to the present
is that nationalization is acceptable 
when carried out for a legitimate 
public purpose. The m anner of im­
plem entation must be nondiscrim- 
inatory and nonretaliatory, and 
compensation (if it is to be pro­
vided) must be “prom pt, adequate, 
and effective.” Most countries have 
bodies of law that incorporate these 
essential elements, and Latin Amer­
ica is no exception. Cuba’s Consti­
tution of 1940 and Article 24 of 
the Fundam ental Law of the Rev­
olution (adopted in 1959) were 
consistent with international law. 
Article 24 perm itted nationaliza­
tion: . . for duly established
reasons of public utility or social 
interest, and in every case after pay­
m ent in cash of proper compensa­
tion, the am ount of which will be 
determ ined by the court.”
International law concerning 
nationalization and compensation 
m ight be described generally as 
follows. First, nationalization is le­
gitimate when undertaken for pur­
poses of public interest. This may 
include general social and eco­
nomic reform, and specifically, the 
nationalization of large-scale land­
holdings or latifundia when this 
accomplishes more equitable land 
tenure patterns, m ore equitable 
patterns of income distribution, 
reduced poverty, and social justice. 
Thus, Cuba’s First Agrarian Reform 
Law has been considered an accept­
able rationale for nationalization 
in terms of public interest. Second, 
nationalization is supposed to be 
nondiscriminatory and nonretalia­
tory. It is supposed to focus on tar­
get groups equitably rather than 
being directed specifically against a 
particular ethnic, religious, racial, 
or national group. It also is not sup­
posed to be undertaken in retalia­
tion for actions of another party or 
government. Third, compensation 
must be paid, and the compensa­
tion is supposed to be “prompt, 
adequate, and effective.” There has 
been some disagreem ent over the 
terms of compensation. Immediate 
payment of cash for the market 
value of a nationalized property 
would certainly be highly “prompt,
adequate, and effective.” The 
“prom ptness” criterion, however, 
can be stretched out to 20 years or 
more with payment in installments 
or the issuing of bonds payable in 
the future, presumably earning a 
reasonable interest.
Greater controversy centers on 
what constitutes “adequate” com­
pensation. Should this be the mar­
ket value of the property, before or 
after expropriation is proposed? 
Should it be the tax assessed value 
(which is usually substantially be­
low the market-determined value)? 
How is “effective” compensation to 
be defined? Does this require pay­
m ent in convertible foreign cur­
rency or can local inconvertible 
currency be employed? For foreign 
owners, compensation would be 
of limited value if it could not be 
translated into a currency of use to 
them. In most cases this would ne­
cessitate payment in a foreign cur­
rency, or some arrangem ent to 
perm it convertibility.
Did Cuba’s nationalization law 
and processes conform to the com­
monly accepted international law 
and precedent? On that score, the 
First Agrarian Reform Law seems 
to have been largely acceptable 
and accepted:
■ It was undertaken for a purpose 
of legitimate public interest, 
namely, to reconstitute the lati­
fundia into different property 
forms and improve economic 
and social equity.
■ It was not passed in retaliation 
against the policies of a foreign 
government.
■ It was not im plemented with 
discrimination against specific 
ethnic, national, or religious 
groups—although it was directed 
at large-scale landholdings.
The compensation provisions of 
this law—payment through the is­
suance of bonds serviced in Cuban 
currency—were dubious with re­
spect to the “effectiveness” crite­
rion, because the Cuban peso was 
not convertible and the exchange 
controls would have made the 
transfer of funds out of Cuba dif­
ficult. As it turned out, however,
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COSTS TO CUBA OF THE US ECONOMIC EMBARGO
($US M illions)
Loss of Preferential US Sugar Market 4,676
Increased Inventory Requirements 1,990
Monetary and Financial Costs 3,128
Geographical Reorientation of Trade: Transport Costs 5,921
Losses to the Tourist Sector 3,508
Losses to Other Economic Sectors 9,224
Losses to Public Health, Culture, and Sport 234
Additional Infrastructure Investments Required 1,732
Loss of Access to US Technology 2,318
Loss of Human Capital through Emigration 1,779
Blockage of Attempts to Renegotiate the Debt (to 1990) 3,303
Obstacles to Financing through Unconventional Channels 84
Total 37,897
Source: Based on Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas (Havana), September 1992
the relevant lands, buildings, equip­
ment, and cattle were seized, often 
without court order, appraisal, or 
receipt. This would have made a 
systematic and equitable payment 
of compensation difficult. None­
theless, no compensation bonds 
were issued or apparently even 
printed; no formal valuations of 
the affected properties for com­
pensation purposes were made 
public; and no compensation was 
ultimately paid.
The various interventions of US 
enterprises that were undertaken 
were considered initially to be 
temporary rather than full nation­
alizations. For this reason the 
compensation issue did not arise 
initially. In time, however, the 
interventions became full nation­
alizations—mainly after the enact­
m ent of Nationalization Law 851 
on July 6, 1960.
Law 851 appears to be dubious 
with respect to its im plementation 
and compensation provisions. First, 
the law was explicitly retaliatory, 
aimed, as it was, at US-owned prop­
erties and in direct response to the 
action of the US Congress authoriz­
ing the president to cut Cuba’s 
preferential sugar quota. Law 851 
was discriminatory in that it af­
fected only properties owned by 
US citizens.
The compensation provisions of 
Law 851 appeared to be designed
to be unacceptable, although it 
is also possible that the Cubans 
thought that this m ight be a good 
position from which to begin nego­
tiations on compensation. The pro­
visions called for:
• payment in 30-year bonds, with 
2% interest rate payable on un­
amortized balances;
■ amortization and interest to be 
paid with 25% of the proceeds 
from US sugar purchase in excess 
of 3 million long tons (2,240 
pounds per ton) and with reve­
nues accruing when the price 
exceeded 5.75 cents per pound.
■ annual interest that could not be 
paid when the previous-cited con­
ditions did not occur would be 
considered canceled.
It would have been difficult for 
the US to accept these compensa­
tion provisions. Cuba’s quota in 
the preferential US market, where 
price was a good deal more than 
the world price, averaged about 
2.6 million short tons (at 2,000 
pounds per ton) from 1952 to 1959. 
To increase Cuba’s quota further 
in order to perm it compensation 
to be paid, the US would have had 
to reduce the quota shares of other 
foreign suppliers or of its own beet 
and cane sugar producers in order 
to make space for increased im­
ports from Cuba.
In any case, neither the US nor 
Cuba was bluffing. The US re­
sponded to Law 851 by cutting the 
sugar quota—though only for a 
three-m onth period—beginning in 
October. Cuba did not back down. 
Instead, it reacted by accelerating 
the nationalization process. With 
the imposition of the embargo 
(October 19), extension of the 
sugar quota, and the diplomatic 
rupture, Cuba argued that the US 
had made it impossible for it—as 
well as unjustifiable—to pay com­
pensation. Thus, there was never a 
serious negotiation or discussion of 
the compensation proposals of Law 
851. This is where the issue remains 
to this day.
In contrast to the existence of 
the reasonably well-elaborated body 
of law dealing with compensation 
for nationalization there appears 
to be no international law on com­
pensation for the impact of em bar­
goes, economic sanctions, boycotts, 
or any refusal of a country to trade, 
or have economic interaction on 
another country. Embargoes or 
sanctions are usually imposed on 
one country by another country or 
group of countries in order to pres­
sure the country to desist from cer­
tain actions, to change certain 
policies, or to comply with certain 
internationally accepted standards 
of behavior. The countries subject 
to such sanctions obviously have no 
recourse to compensation.
Law vs. Fairness
In o ther cases, countries have im­
posed embargoes in order to effect 
changes in the policies of other 
countries a n d /o r  to exercise collu­
sive power to increase export reve­
nues. The OPEC oil embargo of 
1973 is an obvious case in point. 
There is no law that says a country 
or countries imposing an export 
embargo for whatever reason then 
has to compensate the losing coun­
tries for the higher prices of their 
imports. Furtherm ore, countries 
may impose im port restrictions or 
prohibitions for a variety of rea­
sons. A considerable body of trade 
law, codified under the General 
Agreem ent on Tariffs and Trade
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(GATT), attempts to limit the im­
position of tariff or nontariff bar­
riers to trade. Again, however, 
there is no recourse to com pen­
sation for countries damaged by 
such actions. Retaliation by the ag­
grieved party is the only possible 
response if appeals through the 
GATT fail. In this situation, small 
countries that are highly depend­
ent on a trade or broader eco­
nomic relationship (e.g., capital 
flows, tourism, and workers’ remit­
tances) are vulnerable to the unilat­
eral action of the larger economic 
partner. Only the mutual accep­
tance of fair “rules of the gam e” as 
interpreted and ruled upon by a 
multilateral agreem ent such as the 
GATT or a formal bilateral trade 
agreem ent can constrain economic 
policies on the part of a large coun­
try that severely damage the econ­
omy and material well-being of a 
small trading partner.
There appears to be no recourse 
in international law for compensa­
tion for the economic damages im­
posed on one country as a result of 
the trade or o ther economic poli­
cies of another country. Thus in­
ternational law does not provide 
much if any support or encourage­
m ent to Cuba if it should try to ob­
tain recognition, valuation, and 
compensation for any of the dam­
ages imposed upon it by the em­
bargo and the break of virtually all 
economic relations with the US. 
Nonetheless, international law is 
not necessarily the same thing as 
fairness or equity.
Should Cuba Pay?
On the issue of whether Cuba 
“should” pay compensation to US 
nationals (through the US Federal 
Claims Settlement Commission 
[FCSC]), law and ethics provide 
contradictory answers. Interna­
tional law is particularly one-sided: 
it supports the right of property 
owners to receive compensation 
for properties expropriated by a 
foreign government. But it says 
nothing about the right of one 
country to claim compensation for
the damages inflicted by a hostile 
neighbor through the imposition 
of a trade boycott, economic em­
bargo, political destabilization, or 
even through invasion.
A basic sense of equity, on the 
o ther hand, does not support the 
right of a large country to damage 
a neighbor—and a small neighbor 
at that—by hostile economic, politi­
cal, military, or clandestine actions. 
Furtherm ore, because Cuba has 
already paid many times over 
through the damages of the em­
bargo, not to m ention the other 
US actions, it would be unfair for 
Cuba alone to have to pay com pen­
sation to the US while the US paid 
no compensation for the damages 
it imposed on Cuba. Finally, owing 
to its current and prospective eco­
nomic difficulties, Cuba will be 
unable to pay any compensation 
involving real net out-transfers of 
resources for many years to come.
Arguably, therefore, little or no 
net real compensation should be
paid by Cuba to US nationals (via 
the FCSC). Perhaps a “symbolic” 
payment could be made, though 
this would have to be in a “noncom ­
pensation” form, such as “general­
ized vouchers” that could then be 
used for purchase of equity in prop­
erties being privatized (i.e. a “com­
pensation for equity swap”).
When the US-Cuban relation­
ship is “norm alized,” the resolution 
of the compensation issue will prob­
ably be just a detail, albeit a diffi­
cult one to work out. At that time 
the weight of ethics and equity 
likely will overwhelm that of legali­
ties, and the issue will be resolved 
without large transfers of real re­
sources out of Cuba. ■
Editor’s Note: Edited excerpts from 
“Transition in Cuba: Neiv Challenges 
for US Policy, ” a study prepared for the 
US Department of State by the Cuban 
Research Institute at Florida Interna­
tional University.
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Crisis Challenges Social Researchers
by Francisco Leon
T o understand the role of social and economic re­search in Cuba today, it is necessary to discard the long-held image that the Cuban researcher con­
tinues to work in a monolithic, ho­
mogeneous research environment. 
Since 1985 heterogeneity more 
than homogeneity has charac­
terized Cuban research. This het­
erogeneity had its origins in the 
experiences gained in “internation­
alist” missions abroad, the profes­
sional formation completed in 
socialist countries going through 
transformations towards new mod­
els of economic and social organiza­
tion and in the sheer num bers of 
scholars seeking recognition. The 
critical issue today is whether that 
heterogeneity can survive the enor­
mous challenges posed by the des­
perate social and economic situation.
Traditionally the social scientist 
in Cuba had to face the challenge 
of a centralized bureaucracy, deeply 
prejudiced against the experience 
and capacity of the pure researcher. 
The very institutional structure gov­
erning scientific research served to 
stymie any contribution to solving 
national problems. Despite these 
adverse conditions, it is critically 
im portant to note that Cuban schol­
ars continued to produce scientific 
work that m ight have conceivably 
contributed solutions to a whole ar­
ray of grave national problems.
Francisco Leon is a Cuban sociologist 
and the social affairs officer of the UN 
Economic Commission for Latin Amer­
ica and the Caribbean in Santiago, 
Chile. His publications include “Cuba: 
procesosy dilemas, ”Cono Sur (1992).
The Academia de Ciencias de 
Cuba served as the cornerstone 
of the bureaucratic centralization.
It was built in the image of similar 
institutions in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe, simply an­
other part of the general Cuban 
emulation of the socialist model.
As such, its evolution was very much 
a function of the relations within 
COMECON.
The academy exercised a na­
tionwide hegemony over research 
through its control over academia 
via the distribution of resources, 
including grants to study in univer­
sities and research centers in social­
ist countries. Com plementing the 
academy’s functions were two types 
of centers that com pleted the circle 
of control. First, there were a lim­
ited num ber of research centers 
(viz. Centro de Estudios sobre Ame­
rica, Centro de Investigaciones de 
la Economia Mundial) that exer­
cised a virtual monopoly over 
relations with centers in North 
America, Latin America, and the 
Caribbean. Then there was the Co­
mite Estatal de Colaboracion Eco­
nomica (CECE), which controlled 
all research funds coming from ex­
ternal multilateral sources (i.e. UN, 
Sistema Economico Latinoameri- 
cano) as well as from bilateral 
sources such as Canada and Spain.
This monolithic system, includ­
ing the academy’s preponderance, 
began to show signs of fracturing 
after Russian and Eastern Euro­
pean socialism began to crumble. 
The academy’s domestic status was 
also affected by the willy-nilly adop­
tion of the Soviet model of develop­
m ent ordered by the highest circles 
in Cuba between 1970 and 1985. 
Despite these reverses, the acad­
emy retained its dom inant role as 
guide and evaluator of research at
the national level by continuing to 
recruit both researchers and evalua­
tors of their work.
The influence that the academy 
has had is evident in the prioritiza­
tion of technical areas of research. 
Areas such as the socioeconomic 
dimensions of development have 
received little attention. A survey 
of Cuban scientific contributions to 
the Asociacion Latinoamericana de 
Production Animal shows that Cuba, 
despite its late entry into the asso­
ciation (1978), has made more con­
tributions than Chile and Colombia; 
only the founding countries, Vene­
zuela and Mexico, appear to be do­
ing more research. Yet there have 
been no Cuban contributions to 
the socioeconomic section of the 
association. This absence is even 
more remarkable given the Cuban 
preoccupation since the 1960s over 
the relative economic benefits of 
grass or fodder as cattle feed. Con­
trary to the impression left by the 
technical studies, there was good 
socioeconomic analysis. It just 
never got published.
Despite this dominance, there is 
today growing evidence that other 
research centers, and especially 
CECE, are gaining new prom i­
nence and importance. This 
change is a function of two proc­
esses: the decline of funding from 
the ex-COMECON countries and 
the increased attention they are re­
ceiving as they reorient their re­
search from theoretical to practical 
areas. They are now expected to 
tackle the many urgent problems 
that Cuba faces, suggest alternative 
policies, and spell out the immedi­
ate economic consequences and 
opportunity costs of each.
It is somewhat ironic, therefore, 
that the present severe economic 
crisis that has overtaken Cuba has
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given new relevance to many stud­
ies that previously gathered dust on 
bureaucratic shelves. Some of the 
erstwhile unpublished works of re­
searchers such as Elena Alvarez, 
Vilma Hidalgo, and Lourdes Taba- 
res were given international prom i­
nence when Eliana Cardoso and 
Ann Helwege cited them  in their 
book, Cuba after Communism (1992).
The importance of all this is that 
these newly revealed works are not 
merely the idiosyncratic products 
of individual researchers but the re­
sult of serious and ongoing efforts 
by teams of researchers. To cite but 
one example, Elena Alvarez, often 
accompanied by Marfa Antonia 
Fernandez, has com pleted more 
than half-a-dozen im portant con­
tributions suggesting solutions to 
the present crisis. Their work is part 
of the research being done at the 
Instituto de Investigaciones Econo­
micas. Unfortunately, there are still 
num erous studies at that institute 
that lie unpublished despite their 
purported relevance to contem po­
rary problems. Additional cases in 
point are the works of Rogelio 
Torras on industrial (especially 
small industry) reorganization and 
of Estela Espina on food and nutri­
tion. In the same vein, the research 
of Tabares and Hidalgo includes 
contributions from a whole group 
of investigators from the Departa- 
m ento de Economia Nacional of 
the Universidad de la Habana. It is 
a pioneering effort that has been al­
lowed to continue, even as govern­
m ent officials continue to debate a 
return to national accounting (la 
vuelta al sistema de cuentas nacionales).
To repeat, these studies either 
remain unpublished or are pro­
duced for very limited circulation. 
Those researchers who have gained 
visibility through their publications 
represent a very small proportion 
of the nearly 1,000 who come from 
research centers across the island. 
Equally, they represent a small 
fraction of the more than 300 who 
presented papers at the Forum de 
Economistas, organized by the 
Facultad de Economia of the Uni­
versidad de la Habana in July 1992.
Because of the crisis m entioned 
above, however, some of these for­
merly unknown scholars are slowly 
breaking into the established jo u r­
nals (such as that of the Centro de 
Investigaciones de la Economia 
Mundial) or through new journals, 
such as Economia International, es­
tablished this year by the Centro de 
Investigaciones de la Economia In­
ternational of the Universidad de 
la Habana. The understandable 
desire of every researcher to be 
published has created a new re­
searcher-centered mechanism for 
independent evaluation and criti­
cism that is starting to counter­
balance the official bureaucratic 
control of social investigation.
The economic crisis 
gives new credence to 
innovation, creativity, 
and sound analysis.
In addition to the “international­
ist” causes m entioned above, it is 
also im portant to recognize that 
there have always been dissenting 
voices am ong Cuba’s intelligentsia 
and research community. They crit­
icized the 1969-70 “10 million ton 
harvest,” the model of total integra­
tion into, and thus dependence on, 
COMECON. But it is fundam en­
tally the nature of the present eco­
nomic crisis that has given new 
credence to innovative problem  
formulation, creative proposal writ­
ing, and sound analytical methods.
This new trend is evident in the 
m ore recent publications of Julio 
Carranza and Pedro Monreal of 
the Centro de Estudios sobre 
America, the work on urban pov­
erty of Blanca Morejon of the Cen­
tro de Estudios Demograficos, the 
work of Elena Alvarez of the Insti­
tuto de Investigaciones Economi­
cas on comparative advantages in
the biotechnological industry, the 
work on the dynamics of inflation 
in the black m arket perform ed by 
the LTniversidad de la H abana’s 
Departam ento de Economia Na­
cional, and the work of Jose Luis 
Rodriguez on the consequences of 
“dollarization.” It is not a trivial 
m atter that Rodriguez was recently 
appointed minister of finance and 
that others have been elected to 
the Asamblea Nacional.
As encouraging as the trends 
toward greater research independ­
ence and heterogeneity might be, 
there is a real danger woven right 
into its very texture. The expansion 
of research is taking place in the 
midst of increasing restrictions on 
access, use, and divulgence of social 
and economic data. For the most 
part, as such restrictions respond 
to national security considerations, 
the only way researchers are able to 
continue this ever-increasing diver­
sity of research involvement is by 
exercising maximum discretion in 
their work and dem onstrating clear 
political loyalty to the regim e’s proj­
ect on national survival.
The potential pitfalls for objec­
tive research in this situation are 
quite evident. Decreasing re­
sources—from transportation 
of personnel to data processing 
equipm ent—mean strategic con­
centration of effort into a reduced 
num ber of researchers and re­
search centers and, therefore, of 
more immediate political control. 
The alternative to absolute state 
control is to seek external funding. 
This, however, will require the 
adoption of cannons of academic 
independence and freedom  that, 
given the desperate situation, are 
difficult to reconcile with the 
increasing demands for political 
loyalty.
The recently liberated analytical 
and scientific instincts of the Cuban 
economists and social scientists to 
do independent research might 
just be facing the most formidable 
challenges yet. ■
(Translated by Hemisphere staff)
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Negotiated Autonomy
by Juan M. Garcia Passalacqua
Despite the 1993 plebiscite results, concerns over the costs of federal social 
programs and growing US anxieties about cultural and language differences 
combine with confusing congressional rules of procedure to make a decision 
on the Puerto Rican autonomy issue difficult. There is, however, a simple 
constitutional answer: “mutual determination”
The “Zig-Zag” on the Status Issue
Percentage of Survey Respondents
Source: Juan M. Garcia-Passalacqua
From  January 3, 1989, to February 28, 1991, a his­toric and laborious proc­ess of consultation and negotiation on the issue of political status was con­
ducted between Puerto Rico’s three 
political parties, the US Congress, 
and the White House. It was suc­
cessful in the House of Repre­
sentatives where legislation for 
a referendum  was adopted by a 
unanim ous vote. The two-year ef­
fort died an ignominious death, 
however, in the Senate Energy and 
Natural Resources Committee.
The bill died in the Senate de­
spite intense lobbying by the White 
House. Charles Untermeyer, the 
White House aide directing Presi­
dent George Bush’s campaign for a 
plebiscite in Puerto Rico, stated in 
the San Juan Star that Republican 
senators in the Energy and Natural 
Resources Committee, including
Juan M. Garcia Passalacqua is a politi­
cal analyst for El Nuevo Herald in 
Miami and a professor at the Centro de 
Estudios Avanzados de Puerto Rico y el 
Caribe in San Juan. His most recent 
book is Dignidad y jaiberia: tem er y 
ser puertorriquerios (San Juan: Edi­
torial Cultural, 1993).
those who would have assured the 
required majority, had “a healthy 
am ount of doubt on the effects of 
statehood.” Untermeyer confessed 
he had changed few minds, particu­
larly on the most cited reservations: 
the cost of federal social programs 
and the compatibility of a foreign 
culture within the US. Ironically, 
pro-statehood forces won the 1992 
elections in Puerto Rico, but doubts 
about that option, exercised in a
procedural maneuver more than a 
thousand miles away from the is­
land, denied the people of Puerto 
Rico their right to self-determination.
The chaotic, and therefore of­
fensive, nature of the procedure in 
Washington can be ascertained by 
a veritable barrage of letters among 
the principal actors in the US. This 
flurry of correspondence began 
with a “Dear Colleague” letter (dis­
seminated October 4, 1990) to the
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Status Definitions on the Ballot
A vote for STATEHOOD
is a mandate to demand 
Puerto Rico’s admission 
as a state of the union. 
Statehood:
Is a non-colonial status 
with full political dignity. Will 
allow us to have the same 
rights, benefits and respon­
sibilities as the 50 states.
Is permanent union guar­
anteed and the opportunity 
for economic and political 
progress.
Is the permanent guaran­
tee of all the rights given 
by the Constitution of the 
United States of America— 
including the preservation 
of our culture.
Is the permanent guaran­
tee of American citizenship, 
our two languages, hymns 
and flags.
Is full participation in all 
federal programs.
Is the right to vote for the 
president of the United 
States and to elect no less 
than six Puerto Rican repre­
sentatives and two sena­
tors to Congress.
In the exercise of our 
rights as American citizens 
we will negotiate the terms 
of said admission, which 
will be submitted to the peo­
ple of Puerto Rico for their 
ratification.
A vote for the COMMON­
WEALTH is a mandate in 
favor of: Guaranteeing our 
progress and security as 
well as that of our children 
within a status of equal po­
litical dignity, based on the 
permanent union between 
Puerto Rico and the United 
States, encompassed in a 
bilateral pact that cannot 
be altered except by mu­
tual agreement.
The Commonwealth guar­
antees:
Irrevocable US citizenship;
Common market, common 
currency and common de­
fense with the United States;
Fiscal autonomy for 
Puerto Rico;
Puerto Rican Olympic 
Committee and our own 
international sports repre­
sentation;
Full development of our 
cultural identity: under Com­
monwealth we are Puerto 
Ricans first.
We will develop Common­
wealth through specific pro­
posals to be brought before 
the US Congress. We will 
immediately propose:
Reformulate Section 936, 
ensuring creation of more 
and better jobs;
Extend the Supplemen­
tary Security Insurance 
(SSI) to Puerto Rico;
Obtain Nutritional Assis­
tance Program allocations 
equal to those received by 
the states;
Protect other products of 
our agriculture, in addition 
to coffee.
Any additional change will 
be submitted to the Puerto 
Rican people beforehand 
for their approval.
INDEPENDENCE is the
right of our people to gov­
ern themselves on their 
own land; it is enjoying all 
the powers and attributes 
of sovereignty.
In the exercise of this in­
alienable right that cannot 
be renounced, Puerto Rico 
will be governed by a Con­
stitution that establishes a 
democratic government, 
protects human rights and 
affirms our nationality and 
language.
Independence will give 
Puerto Rico the power 
necessary to achieve de­
velopment and prosperity, 
including the powers to pro­
tect and stimulate our in­
dustry, agriculture and 
commerce, control immi­
gration, and negotiate inter­
national agreements that 
would expand markets and 
promote investments from 
other countries.
A treaty of friendship and 
cooperation with the United 
States and a process of 
transition to independence 
in agreement with legisla­
tion already approved by 
the US House of Repre­
sentatives and Senate 
committees will provide 
for: the continuation of 
acquired Social Security, 
veterans and other bene­
fits; Puerto Rican and, for 
those who want to retain it, 
US citizenship; the right to 
use our own money or the 
dollar; free access to the 
US market; tax incentives 
for North American invest­
ment; federal aid equal to 
the current amount for at 
least a decade; and the 
eventual demilitarization 
of the country.
Source: The San Juan Star, July 22, 1993
members of the House by 30 fellow 
members asking for a favorable 
vote. A letter from President Bush 
to House Interior Affairs Subcom­
mittee chairm an Ron de Lugo 
(October 5, 1990) also supported 
the legislation, and another from 
the three political leaders of the 
island (one from each alternative 
option) was dispatched to Chair­
man J. Bennett Johnston of the 
Senate Energy and Natural Re­
sources Committee on October 
11, 1990, urging him to accept the 
House bill. Finally, a historic and 
brilliant statem ent (October 12,
1990) by the Rev. Jesse L. Jackson, 
Jr., asked Johnston “to allow the 
Puerto Rican referendum  to go 
forward,” and was followed by an 
imploring letter from House com­
mittee chairman Morris K. Udall. 
Johnston shot back an icy reply 
to the island party presidents on 
October 15, 1990, refusing to ap­
prove the House bill. In the after- 
math, a Washington Post editorial 
(October 25, 1990) dem anded that 
Johnston reconsider and approve 
the House version; and, after the 
reintroduction of the House bill 
by de Lugo on January 3, 1991,
Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
“in a m ood of distress and near 
despair,” delivered a scathing and 
totally justified condem nation of 
the Congress (March 21, 1992) for 
its inaction.
It is time for a new m ethod to 
deal with the US-Puerto Rican 
autonomy negotiations. Presiden­
tial executive orders, internal staff 
studies, jo in t metropolitan-insular 
committees, interdepartm ental 
commissions, congressional com­
mittee hearings and reports, and 
test cases in the judicial branch 
have all failed to produce a single, 
coherent policy or procedure. Un­
less, and until, a certain and pre­
dictable procedure is established 
for the consideration of the wishes 
of the insular areas, procedural un­
certainty will again defeat the best 
efforts of both the insular areas 
and the US to negotiate a solution 
to the issues of lack of autonomy 
and final political status.
In essence the issue has a simple 
constitutional answer. Article IV, 
Section III, Clause 2 of the US Con­
stitution states clearly and unequiv­
ocally that Congress shall have the 
power to “dispose” of the territory 
and other property belonging to 
the US. It also says, of course, that
it has the power to make “all need­
ful rules and regulations” respect­
ing such territory and property. 
The power to regulate, which has 
been used for the last 100 years, is 
now anachronistic. At this point in 
history (after the end of the Cold 
War and on the verge of a new
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A Still Useful Call for 
International Observers
. . . Serious consideration should be given to inviting the secretaries 
of both organizations to send plebiscite teams to Puerto Rico. There 
are ample legal precedents for such an invitation. In the last few 
years, political status plebiscites have been observed in three US-ad­
ministered territories: the N orthern Marianas Islands, the Trust Terri­
tory of the Pacific Islands, and the Marshall Islands. A plebiscite to 
determ ine whether Puerto Rico will obtain greater hom e rule as a 
commonwealth, become a state, o r choose independence is a vote 
about change or modification of status, and it is precisely on ques­
tions of changes in the political status of dependent territories that 
the UN has a traditional interest. Many members of the UN or the 
OAS will undoubtedly have deep reservations about the appropriate­
ness o f a plebiscite, one o f whose possible outcomes is the integration 
into the US of a territory that the US acquired as a result of the same 
war that led to the establishment o f a protectorate in Cuba. But it is 
in the US interest to explore the emotional, political, and legal 
depths of these reservations before the plebiscite. . . .
Editor’s Note: Excerpted with permission from Alfred Stepan, “The US and 
Latin America: Vital Interests and the Instruments of Power, ’’Foreign Af­
fairs 58, no. 3 (1980).
world order) the US can and must 
deal peacefully, and by negotiation, 
with its insular areas.
As noted by em inent constitu­
tionalist Edward S. Corwin, the ter­
ritorial clause of the Constitution 
gives the US the power to govern 
territories, but it also gives it the 
power to cede territory to another 
government, as was recognized in 
the transfer of the Philippine Is­
lands to the Philippine Republic. 
More recently Gerald L. Newman 
of Columbia University has ques­
tioned the pertinence of the tradi­
tional territorial theory of the US 
and has called for a new under­
standing of that clause of the Con­
stitution, based on a declaration in 
the US Supreme Court case of Reid 
v. Covert that the territorial doc­
trine should be abandoned. The 
idea is to term inate each and every 
territorial condition by creating a 
new close relationship between all 
the insular areas and the US, based 
on the cession and disposition of
the territories. The cession can, of 
course, ultimately produce a repub­
lic, a state of the union, or a freely 
associated state, but none o f the 
insular areas would remain a US 
territory.
When the goal becomes clear, 
how to achieve it can be discussed. 
With all due respect to the doc­
trine of self-determination, that 
principle cannot continue to be an 
excuse for inaction. “Let’s wait un­
til they all agree down th ere” has 
by now become an insult. What is 
really on the table is the notion of 
“mutual determ ination.”
The first thing that should be 
ended is the old and discredited 
game of “Alphonse and Gaston” 
about who takes the first step. The 
most blatant example of this tradi­
tional ambiguity is the “symbolic” 
m em orandum  issued by President 
Bush on November 30, 1992. It 
leaves the future of Puerto Rico 
open to “a general right of referen­
dum or specific referenda spon­
sored either by the US government 
or the legislature of Puerto Rico,” 
while at the same time states: “If 
any matters arise involving the fun­
damentals of Puerto Rico’s status, 
they shall be referred to the Office 
of the President.” What, in heaven’s 
name, are these “fundamentals?” 
Even the White House does not 
seem to know. It is time for all sides 
to be absolutely clear.
The 1992 Democratic Party plat­
form provides an excellent formula­
tion for resolving the problem, one 
that was certainly transform ed into 
an electoral mandate by the No­
vember elections. Endorsed by all 
three political parties in Puerto 
Rico, it recognizes the right to self- 
determ ination of the insular area 
in a process to be conducted “in 
concert” with the US Congress.
What does “in concert” mean? The 
answer is simply that no one takes 
the first step alone, all concerned 
parties advance on a broad front to 
carry out a jo in t procedural plan of 
action to dispose of all remaining 
US territories and create new forms 
of political relations as we enter 
the twenty-first century.
What should such a jo in t proce­
dural action plan entail? There 
should be six fundamental stages, 
to be agreed on by all three sides 
of the issue (the president, Con­
gress, and the insular areas), be­
fore anybody, anywhere, takes a 
first step. If we achieve such an 
agreem ent before anybody moves, 
all participants can be assured of 
predictability in their endeavor, 
and all involved will be assured of 
action before 1996.
First, we must identify and lo­
cate a single coordinating respon­
sibility in the White House. An 
excellent model is HR 6117 of the 
102d Congress, which provides for 
the self-determined political, so­
cial, and economic development of 
the insular areas. It is a new frame­
work for the development and im­
plem entation of insular policy 
within the executive branch.
Second, we must search for mul­
tipartisan consensus in the political 
process of the insular area on the
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substantive options. The governor 
of Puerto Rico could, by executive 
order, create a commission on 
status, representative of all status 
options and nonaffiliated public in­
terest sectors, to recom m end local 
procedures and definitions leading 
to a vote, as well as determ ining 
the relationship of this local proc­
ess to the US executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches. That, appar­
ently, is the prospect of the adm in­
istration of Pedro Rossello of the 
New Progressive Party in Puerto 
Rico. This would lead to the third 
step, that of approving legislation 
for a referendum  in the insular 
area am ong the options as defined 
by their proponents.
Fourth, we must im plem ent a 
“fast-track” procedure for the exec­
utive branch and Congress to con­
sider the winning option. During 
the 1989-91 process, House speaker 
Thomas Foley made a statem ent 
that should serve as a guideline 
for this stage. He stated unequivo­
cally that the US had a responsi­
bility “to respond” to the will of the 
people of Puerto Rico. That is all 
our insular areas can ask for and all 
that is required by their right to 
self-determination. The Puerto 
Rican people, however, will not 
tolerate being ignored by the US 
Congress.
A good model for the “fast-track” 
procedure is Section 5 of HR 4765 
of the 101st Congress, which would 
require legislation to be developed 
and considered and acted upon in 
both the House and Senate. It 
would provide for a 180-calendar 
day limit on committee considera­
tion, and for consideration by the 
Congress 14 legislative days after, 
with the in tent of voting on the leg­
islation. The expedited procedures 
would obligate committees to act 
and the Congress to vote.
Fifth, we must keep the process 
open if the option favored by the 
insular area electorate fails to win 
approval in the “fast-track” proce­
dure. A good model is Section 7 of 
HR 4765 of the 101st Congress that 
would have required the Commit­
tee of Interior and Insular Affairs
and the Senate Energy and Natural 
Resources Committee to make fur­
ther recom m endations on Puerto 
Rico’s political status development 
if none of the three statuses re­
ceived a majority in the first ref­
erendum , or the im plementing 
legislation was not enacted into 
law, or the implementing law was 
not approved in a second referen­
dum. A requirem ent would be that 
the recom m endations would be 
developed in consultation with 
representatives of Puerto Rico’s 
principal political parties, the 
president, and other appropriate 
groups or persons. Step six would 
reserve final approval of the result­
ing package to a self-determination 
vote by the people in the insular 
area.
If these principles to govern the 
process are agreeable, and if the 
US executive and congressional 
branches agree to this procedure 
beforehand, then this new certainty 
will prevent the effort from becom­
ing, as so many in the past have, 
derailed or fruitless. A procedural 
agreem ent of the kind outlined 
above is an essential prerequisite 
to achieve necessary changes be­
fore 1996. ■
Editor’s Note: Edited version of a paper 
presented at the conference “A Time of 
Change: Relations between the United 
States and American Samoa, Guam, 
the Northern Marianas, Puerto Rico 
and the US Virgin Islands, ’’February 
11,1993, in Washington, DC.
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The Chance to Decolonize
by Manuel Rodriguez-Orellana
T he politics of US-Puerto Rican relations have too often been officially cast in the context of a “suc­cess story.” Gen. Nelson A. Miles’s rhetorical par­
oxysms proclaiming the “blessings,” 
not of a status referendum , but of 
the US military invasion of 1898, 
were usually accompanied by stories 
of friendly natives lining his path, 
welcoming the new rulers with tears 
of grateful affection. Adding praise 
to exultation, the Puerto Ricans, 
spoils of that “splendid little war” 
against Spain, were shortly there­
after baptized in the Holy Waters 
of US citizenship by a Congress 
where, to this day, a Puerto Rican 
resident commissioner can cast a 
vote on legislation that affects our 
island only if it doesn’t affect the 
outcome of the vote.
The 1930s were usually cast in 
the light of the wonders that fed­
eral largess bestowed on our poor, 
little island of brown, barefoot, 
uneducated peasants. The 1940s 
and 1950s reproduced the Horatio 
Alger success story. “Bootstraps” 
were purportedly provided by our 
“partners” up North, who “pro­
tected" us from the devious, god­
less ideologies that might lead us to 
sin through arrogant temptations 
of Puerto Rican sovereignty.
The 1960s announced the boun­
tiful harvest to come. O ur island 
would reap the fruits of regaled citi­
zenship through ever larger federal
Manuel Rodriguez-Orellana is the elec­
toral commissioner of the Partido In- 
dependentista Puertorriqueno. His 
publications include “Legal and His­
torical Aspects of the Puerto Rican Inde­
pendence Movement in the Twentieth 
Century, ’’RevistaJuridica 60 (1991).
welfare transfers and m ounting 
body counts in Vietnam.
In the 1970s and through the 
mid-1980s, Puerto Ricans were at 
the exit gates of Purgatory, safe 
from the Evil Empire and ready 
for the redemptive ecstasy of state­
hood, which, according to our cur­
ren t resident commissioner, would 
be especially “for the Poor.” Only 
the Babel sounds of Spanish kept 
us from Paradise. Because more 
than 75 years after our baptismal 
citizenship, 60% of Puerto Ricans 
admit to speaking no English. Only 
20% allege to speak it. The solution 
in Puerto Rico came in the form of 
a locally legislated “Miracle of the 
Absurd.”
Puerto Rico’s distinct 
identity as a Latin 
American nation 
of the Caribbean 
and its political 
subordination and 
economic dependence 
now pose enormous 
cultural and economic 
problems for the US.
In order to cleverly convey the 
story that all Puerto Ricans speak 
English, the current government of 
Puerto Rico made English an “offi­
cial” language of the island. Now 
go tell that story to Congress, to­
gether with a statehood petition!
(If miracles were this cheap, per­
haps Congress should make Japa­
nese an official language!)
I do not mean to imply that 
there has been no progress, even 
under a subordinate status whereby 
Puerto Ricans are governed through 
federal laws we do not make. Im­
portant changes have taken place 
in Puerto Rico, particularly since 
the end of World War II.
Puerto Rico’s per capita income, 
inflated by ever-increasing welfare 
transfers, is possibly the highest in 
Latin America—although, as 40 
years ago, it is still approximately 
half that of Mississippi. Puerto Rico 
has also developed a class of compe­
tent and prosperous professionals 
in the commercial and financial 
areas, comparable to the elites of 
many industrial nations.
So there has been progress, 
even if at the expense of democ­
racy. But there are o ther factors of 
extreme importance, if we mean to 
break away from the fallacious no­
tion that we Puerto Ricans must 
choose either “security” or free­
dom. For we must recall almost a 
century of federal and Puerto Ri­
can colonial government practices 
of discrimination, repression, perse­
cution, and efforts to exterminate 
our nationality and the independ­
ence movement in particular— 
both when we were a majority or 
more recently as a minority.
Nonetheless, US leaders with 
honesty and vision have taken a 
serious interest in beginning a 
process that would bring about a 
principled solution to Puerto 
Rico’s undem ocratic plight under 
the US flag. Several congressional 
leaders, such as Virgin Islands dele­
gate Ron de Lugo (who must be 
com m ended for his new bill, HR 
6117—the Insular Areas Policy 
Act) and form er representative
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Robert Lagomarsino (whose mis­
taken support for Puerto Rican 
statehood contributed to his recent 
defeat), have made im portant at­
tempts to raise congressional aware­
ness of the responsibility that arises 
as a function of power.
Now, almost 95 years after 
the military invasion by General 
Miles—and followed by the re­
design of our legal system and tra­
ditions to suit the new rulers, the 
unilateral imposition in 1917 of a 
citizenship we expressly did not 
want, and the arrogant disregard 
for the explicit desire for Puerto 
Rican sovereignty through half a 
century sprinkled with repeated at­
tempts to stamp out Spanish and 
unnaturally impose English—Puer­
to Rico still exists, as President Bill 
Clinton graciously recognized in a 
message to the governor-elect, as a 
“distinct identity.” Not a small feat 
for Puerto Rican nationality!
So there is a silver lining. We 
have hope about the intellectual 
honesty of a generation of Ameri­
cans that is striving to develop a 
moral and rational policy towards 
US territories. “Politics as usual” 
has overlooked the underpinnings 
of failure in the present relation­
ship between our two countries.
With the disappearance of com­
munism, however, the dawn of the 
twenty-first century announces a 
radically changed international 
panorama. Nationalities were not 
dead. Their resurgence in the 
form er Soviet Union, in Eastern 
Europe, and the resilience of Q ue­
bec’s distinct society are sufficient 
rem inders of what Sen. Ruben 
Berrio, the president of the Partido 
Independentista Puertorriqueno, 
wrote in the Washington Post (May 
23, 1990): “Minorities and majori­
ties come and go; but nationalities 
rem ain.”
All nationalities now seek an 
even break to govern themselves 
and begin to reap the benefits of 
free trade in a global economy. 
Puerto Rico’s distinct identity as a 
Latin American nation of the Carib­
bean and its political subordination 
and economic dependence now
pose enormous cultural and eco­
nomic problems for the US.
In 1934, 42% of Puerto Ricans 
received welfare relief from the 
US. In 1993, more than 50% of 
Puerto Ricans benefit from the 
Food Stamp Program. About two- 
thirds of the population still lives 
below the federal poverty level.
“Dependency as 
salvation” is a failed 
policy. It is, indeed,
“a time for change. ” 
What direction that 
change zvill take 
depends, as usual, 
on politics.
The “success story” with which 
my generation grew up attempts to 
cover up a failure of historic pro­
portions. The systemic problem 
continues. The underlying policy 
of “dependency as salvation” is a 
failed policy. It is, indeed, “a time 
for change.” W hat direction that 
change will take depends, as usual, 
on politics. Puerto Rico’s pro­
ponents of statehood rely on a 
Hawaiian model that is totally in­
applicable to a different nation like 
Puerto Rico. Congressional Budget 
Office estimates place the cost of 
statehood to US taxpayers at sev­
eral billion dollars a year more than 
the dole economy of our present 
subservient status.
In Puerto Rico, however, pro­
ponents of statehood continue to 
preach a brand of statehood that 
postulates the nonnegotiable 
nature of our Spanish vernacular 
and Puerto Rican culture. They 
have called it “Ji'baro Statehood!” 
Even Puerto Rico’s governor Pedro 
Rossello, who plans to petition for 
statehood after a referendum  this 
year, affirmed in a letter (October 
8, 1990) to US congressional lead­
ers that “All of us agree on the
following: Spanish belongs to all 
Puerto Ricans, it is not negotiable 
under any circumstances or politi­
cal status.”
The LIS is a unitary country, not 
a m ultinational state. As Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., notes, “The his­
toric idea of a unifying American 
identity is now in peril in many are­
nas—in our politics, our voluntary 
organizations, our churches, our 
language.”
In the desire to prom ote change, 
the American people and the US 
government must carefully think 
about Puerto Rico’s statehood 
petition when it arrives in Con­
gress. Schlesinger adds, “The eth­
nic upsurge . . . began as a gesture 
of protest against Anglocentric cul­
ture. It became a cult, and today it 
threatens to become a counter­
revolution against the original the­
ory of America as ’one people,’ a 
common culture, a single nation.” 
For the US, and for a nation like 
Puerto Rico that refuses to re­
nounce its distinct identity, in­
dependence alone provides the 
necessary flexibility to attain m utu­
ally convenient economic arrange­
ments designed to fit the distinct 
needs of Puerto Rico and the US. 
What is needed in this time of 
change is leadership, vision, and 
common sense. It is a golden op­
portunity for the Clinton adminis­
tration.
The US has exercised its power. 
Now it must assume the responsi­
bility of decolonizing. A smooth 
transition towards a mutually bene­
ficial arrangem ent based on sover­
eignty, which respects the cultural 
integrity and inalienable right of 
self-determination of both of our 
nations, must be guaranteed. The 
present state of subordination and 
dependence must be eliminated. ■
Editor’s Note: Edited version of a paper 
presented at the conference “A Time of 
Change: Relations between the United 
States and American Samoa, Guam, 
the Northern Marianas, Puerto Rico 
and the US Virgin Islands, ’’February
11,1993, in Washington, DC.
Hem isphere  •  Sum mer/Fall 1993
Features: Puerto Rico
The Plebiscite: A Time of Change
by Baltasar Corrada del Rio
W e should reflect on how gradually—and, perhaps, im percep­tibly to those who are most closely involved in the de­
velopment of the US-Puerto Rican 
relationship—W ashington’s atti­
tude towards the resolution of 
Puerto Rico’s political status prob­
lem has changed. The perennial 
lack of consensus am ong Puerto 
Rico’s three major political parties 
about the island’s future is no 
longer seen by Congress as suffi­
cient justification for perpetuating 
the current political entity.
Several efforts have been made 
to solve the status problem —the 
latest of which came to an end in
1991. A key elem ent in their failure 
was a lack of focus on the end re­
sult. Great emphasis was placed in 
giving Puerto Ricans the opportu­
nity to determ ine their own politi­
cal destiny but without due regard 
to how the status options were 
formulated. Puerto Ricans should 
be given m ore than an opportunity 
to decide am ong various political 
status alternatives. The status op­
tions presented to the voters must 
be of a perm anent nature in order 
that exercising self-determination 
does not become a fruitless effort.
If the pursuit for a different or en­
hanced political status does not 
come to a conclusion as a result of 
a plebiscite or referendum , then 
we would have accomplished very 
little. The result of the decision­
making process must not only be 
change, but the resulting change 
must be conclusive and final.
Baltasar Corrada del Rio is Puerto 
Rico’s secretary of state.
A corollary to the perm anence 
of any status option is, of course, 
that it be legally effective. And, in 
the case of a status option that en­
tails a continued relationship with 
the federal government under the 
sovereignty of the US, the same 
must be consistent with the US 
Constitution. For instance, legal 
authorities have recognized that 
the 10th Am endm ent of the US 
Constitution, which is reserved for 
the states, embodies the maximum 
degree of autonomy possible for a 
political body under the sovereignty 
of the US and that no formula of 
perm anent association or union 
with the US can claim a higher 
degree of autonomy.
It is clearly understood 
that a decision for 
independence or 
statehood mill be 
final and conclusive 
inasmuch as each 
political status, once 
achieved, will not be 
subject to revocation 
or modification.
In compliance of his campaign 
promise, Gov. Pedro Rossello in­
tends to hold, before the end of his 
first year in office, a plebiscite be­
tween the status alternatives posed 
by the three major political parties. 
The statehood and independence
options require no definition since 
history provides ample dem onstra­
tion of what each of them  entail. It 
is clearly understood that a deci­
sion for independence or state­
hood will be final and conclusive 
inasmuch as each political status, 
once achieved, will not be subject 
to revocation or modification. Inde­
pendence and statehood are, there­
fore, status options of a perm anent 
nature. The Partido Democratico 
Popular will be responsible for de­
fining the freely associated state or 
commonwealth formula included 
in the plebiscite and we urge them 
to do so in such a m anner that the 
above criterion is met.
Once the status options have 
been formulated and the plebiscite 
held, the proponents of the option 
that is favored by the people of 
Puerto Rico will negotiate with 
Congress. The resulting legislation 
would thereupon be submitted to 
the Puerto Rican electorate for 
ratification in a “yes or n o ” refer­
endum.
In some quarters of Congress, 
the issue of Puerto Rico’s political 
status has focused on whether Puer­
to Rico should become a part of 
the US since Puerto Ricans are said 
to have a different culture. This 
view is misguided in two respects: 
first, the inhabitants of Puerto Rico 
are natural-born American citizens. 
Clearly, allowing Puerto Rico to 
become a state would not mean the 
incorporation of an alien people 
into the nation. The insular cases 
notwithstanding, Puerto Rico has 
been a part of this nation for a long 
time. Currently, 2.7 million Puerto 
Ricans reside in the continental US 
and 3.6 million on our island. State­
hood will not bring about a signif­
icant change in the migratory 
patterns of Puerto Ricans.
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In addition to language and 
ethnic background, our political 
system and the exercise of dem o­
cratic liberties are also part of our 
culture. By choice, Puerto Ricans 
are governed internally by a consti­
tution that is republican in form 
and that conforms to that of the 
US and to the principles of the 
Declaration of Independence.
Pluralism and diversity have 
always been key elements in the 
American nation-building process, 
and they have not been at odds with 
the commonly held principles of 
unity, broad citizen participation in 
government and the political proc­
ess, equality of rights, economic 
growth based on free enterprise, 
and respect for individual free­
doms. If we share a belief in the 
principles and values on which the 
political system of this nation has 
been built, we should have no fear 
that ethnic and cultural diversity 
will ever divide it. Quebec, for ex­
ample, represents more than 25% 
of the population and land mass of 
Canada, but Puerto Rico represents 
less than 1.4% of the total US popu­
lation and is not a contiguous part 
of the US.
Like economic development, 
freedom  and democracy cannot be 
imposed from outside; it must ema­
nate from within the people. The 
people of Puerto Rico have dem on­
strated their adherence to those 
nation-building principles in an 
exemplary m anner and in sharp 
contrast with o ther peoples of this 
hem isphere. For instance, Puerto 
Ricans have served alongside their 
fellow citizens from the continental 
US in every arm ed conflict since 
the First World War. And voter par­
ticipation in elections is higher 
than that of any state.
In 1991 the adoption of a law 
that declared Spanish as the only 
official language of Puerto Rico 
caused m uch resentm ent, not only 
in the US, but on the island as well. 
The so-called Spanish Only Act was 
adopted in the face of widespread 
popular opposition in the island, 
and at a time when the national 
news media was referring to the
legislation for the status plebiscite 
under consideration in the Senate 
Energy and Natural Resources 
Committee as “the statehood plebi­
scite.” A poll commissioned by a 
major daily newspaper in San Juan 
showed that two out of three re­
spondents rejected the law that 
made Spanish the only official lan­
guage in Puerto Rico.
Pluralism and 
diversity have always 
been key elements 
in the American 
nation-building process.
If we share a belief in 
the principles and 
values on which the 
political system of this 
nation has been built, 
we should have no 
fear that ethnic and 
cultural diversity will 
ever divide i t
Governor Rossello ran for office 
with the promise that his adminis­
tration would restore English as 
one of the two official languages.
As of January 28, 1993, Spanish and 
English are once again the official 
languages of the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico.
Section 936
Section 936 of the US Internal 
Revenue Code is an elem ent in a 
model or strategy for economic de­
velopment—one that is based on 
providing tax incentives and gov­
ernm ent assistance to attract m anu­
facturing industries and create jobs. 
The effectiveness of Section 936 
has been greatly reduced over the
years. Although Puerto Rico experi­
enced rapid and strong economic 
growth during the 1950s and 1960s, 
it now suffers from unemployment, 
low labor force participation, a 
decaying infrastructure, and a 
bloated public sector resulting 
from an effort to reduce unem ­
ployment. It is widely recognized 
that the so-called Operation Boot­
strap model of economic develop­
m ent is no longer responsive to the 
present economic and financial 
conditions of Puerto Rico and the 
need to develop a broader eco­
nomic model has been anticipated 
regardless of the political status 
chosen by the inhabitants of Puerto 
Rico. But, however ineffective as 
an economic development tool, 
Puerto Rico is still dependent to 
an im portant degree on Section 
936. Therefore, for as long as 
Puerto Rico is considered a US 
possession and until a more com­
prehensive and lasting develop­
m ent strategy is im plemented, the 
government of Puerto Rico will 
stand behind the continuance of 
Section 936 and will vigorously de­
fend it against any further erosion. 
Moreover, in the event of state­
hood, an enterprise zone, along 
with o ther transitional adjustments, 
should be im plem ented so that the 
shift into the new political status 
no t be disruptive.
A planned and orderly phase­
out of Section 936, once we agree 
on statehood, may be better than 
the escalating level of uncertainty 
regarding that section’s future.
Such a phase-out cannot be made, 
however, until we have statehood 
for only statehood can establish the 
preconditions for a more com pre­
hensive and long-term economic 
and social development strategy to 
be effective. Moreover, the political 
stability associated with statehood 
will differentiate Puerto Rico from 
the rest of the Caribbean Basin 
and stimulate the kind of invest­
m ent and reinvestment that allows 
for sustained economic growth that 
would include, am ong its major ele­
ments, a strong development of 
our tourism industry.
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No Half-Measures
The future political status of 
Puerto Rico is ultimately a ques­
tion of whether its 3.6 million in­
habitants will be able to exercise 
the rights and duties of their US 
citizenship in their place of birth 
and residence or whether they will 
become citizens of a separate and 
distinct nation, be it with full sover­
eignty or under some degree of 
association with the US.
Advancing any o ther interm edi­
ate solution would result in that US 
citizenship being degraded. That 
would be advocating that one can 
be a US citizen yet forever banned 
from claiming the full extent of its 
rights, or proposing that US citizen­
ship is not a source of equal rights 
for those who bear it. Therefore, 
the current administration will not 
look favorably to any form of politi­
cal status that would entail US citi­
zenship without the full exercise of 
its duties and the enjoyment of all 
its prerogatives.
Congress and the White House 
should take no moral comfort in 
the fact that there is no consensus 
am ong the three political parties 
about the future political status of 
Puerto Rico. The rights of 3.6 mil­
lion US citizens dem and immedi­
ate attention.
Since Brown v. The Board of Edu­
cation (1954), it has been clear that 
a majority of citizens cannot de­
prive a minority from the full 
exercise of their constitutionally 
protected rights. Therefore, we ask 
the White House, Congress, and 
the people of the US to support 
the right of the people of Puerto 
Rico to self-determination and to 
respond favorably to the will of the 
majority of our people in the plebi­
scite this year. ■
Editor’s Note: Edited version of a paper 
presented at the conference “A Time of 
Change: Relations between the United 
States and American Samoa, Guam, 
the Northern Marianas, Puerto Rico 
and the US Virgin Islands, ’’February
11,1993, in Washington, DC.
Are you interested in 
Central America?
If so, you will want to have a copy of the only media 
directory covering Central America and Panama, the 
1993 Guia de medios centroamericanos de 
comunicacidn. This 220-page pocket-sized book 
contains details on:
• Over 300 media organizations
• More than 200 advertising 
agencies and public 
relations firms
• Nearly 4,000 journalists
• 17 journalism schools and 
their faculties
• Goverment and embassy 
press spokespersons
As well, there is useful 
information, including 
statistics and maps of the countries and major cities.
The price is $45 per copy, postage and handling 
included.
r ----- ---- ------------------------------------ --------- ------ n
; Yes, send m e____copies of the Guia de medios ;
; centroamericanos de comunicacidn \
i N am e :__________________________________________________  i
! Address:________________________________________________  !
[ C ity /S ta te :______________________________________________  [
1 C ountry :________________________________________________  1
Make your check payable to CAJP Endowment Fund 
i and mail along with this coupon to: i
i Central American Journalism Program i
Florida International University 
, 3000 N.E. 145 Street !
[ Miami, Florida 33181-3600 1
L _________________ ________ _ _________________________________________________ J
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Mutual Respect: Congress Must Act
by Marco Antonio Rigau
he inaction and incoher­
ent actions of the US 
Congress are allowing 
US-Puerto Rican relations 
to drift into a critical situ­
ation. Demands on the 
part of Puerto Rico, either to de­
velop the current relationship or to 
exercise its right to self-determina­
tion have been ignored. Congress 
has painted the US and Puerto 
Rico into a corner.
Dependence on the transfer of 
federal funds grows every year, both 
in Puerto Rico’s budget and m en­
tality. Reliance on incentives that 
create investment and jobs in 
Puerto Rico is being unilaterally 
crippled by Congress, as the situa­
tion of Section 936 of the Internal 
Revenue Code illustrates. This sec­
tion offered 100% tax exemption 
to US corporations operating in 
Puerto Rico. Congress has just 
am ended that section to reduce 
the percentage of that tax exemp­
tion. It is a paradox that while US 
leaders are trying to correct the 
budget deficit, nothing is being 
done to assist Puerto Rico in devel­
oping a less dependent and more 
self-sufficient economy, while main­
taining, at least, the present stan­
dard of living in the island.
From 1989 to 1991 the people 
of Puerto Rico, our three political 
parties, the US president, and the 
US House of Representatives acted 
in a timely fashion. We cannot say 
the same for the US Senate. They 
did not deliver. They balked. Sen. 
Daniel Patrick Moyniham, who was 
not a participant in this mishap, ac­
knowledged this in his book Pande-
Marco Antonio Rigau is a senator of 
Puerto Rico and a member of the Par­
tido Democrdtico Popular.
monium (Oxford University Press, 
1993): “. . . The United States Gov­
ernm ent is caught up with this 
seemingly intractable problem  of 
resolving the status of Puerto Rico, 
a prize of colonial war taken from 
Spain in 1898. . . . Despite the urg­
ing of President Bush that Con­
gress provide for a referendum
Luis Munoz Marin (November 1932)
which will enable the citizens of 
Puerto Rico to make such a choice, 
Congress has not been willing to 
do so. Congressional resistance 
arises largely from the question of 
whether the island should have the 
option to choose statehood whilst 
retaining Spanish as an official lan­
guage.” Now a couple of new de­
velopments—a status plebiscite in 
Puerto Rico on November 14, 1993, 
and congressional consideration of 
HR 94— dem and that the Clinton 
administration take a position on 
Puerto Rico’s right to self-determi­
nation and develop a procedure 
for the effective exercise of such 
a right.
President Clinton recently ex­
pressed on national television, “I 
have strongly supported, in the case 
of Puerto Rico, self-determination. 
That is if they have a referendum  
and they vote to continue their 
commonwealth status or to be­
come independent or to become 
a state, whatever they decide, I will 
support.”
Having reaffirmed its commit­
m ent to self-determination, the 
Clinton administration should en­
dorse a “fast-track" procedure in 
Congress to respond to the Novem­
ber 14 vote. With that done, they 
should next recognize the exis­
tence of the Puerto Rican people 
as a unique and distinct people, by 
granting all Puerto Ricans the right 
to participate in this process. Fi­
nally, the administration should 
clarify the legal and political na­
ture of the current relationship.
Concerning the implementation 
of a “fast-track” procedure, we 
strongly believe that HR 94 should 
be am ended to include such a pro­
cedure. It is essential for Congress 
to respond to the petition m ade by 
the people of Puerto Rico in the 
November vote. The “fast-track” 
procedure will reduce the uncer­
tainty period to a minimum, prod 
Congress to face the issue truth­
fully and squarely, and give the 
people of Puerto Rico some solid 
parameters onto what to expect 
from US policy.
What about the more than 2.5 
million Puerto Ricans living out­
side the island? They feel they have 
a right to have a say in the decision 
of their country’s political destiny. 
We in the Partido Democratico 
Popular agree with them and have 
supported their participation in the 
November vote. But the statehood 
government believes otherwise and
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A New Pattern of Freedom
Puerto Rico needs to be “placed” afresh in the US m ind—placed not 
just geographically, bu t economically, culturally, and juridically, so 
that the deeper political m eaning of its relationships can be seen in 
new and correct perspective. Puerto Rican affairs have been moving 
full-steam ahead. The island is no longer a liability but a credit. . . .
To bring the picture into focus, the following facts must be estab­
lished at the start: Puerto Rico is no t asking for statehood. Puerto 
Rico is no t dem anding independence. Puerto Rico is deadset against 
colonialism. In o ther words, Puerto Rico is developing a new pattern 
o f political freed o m .. . .
A political form had to be developed to fit the economic facts, 
the cultural realities, the free and yet non-nationalistic ideals of the 
people. It also had to m eet the legitimate economic and military in­
terests of the US, as well as the broader interests implicit in the rela­
tionship. It had to dem onstrate to the world the significance and the 
sincerity of the attitude of the US in its dealings with this underdevel­
oped, civilized and freedom-loving community of the Latin world in 
the American hemisphere.
. . . Throughout its history Puerto Rico has been neither separatist 
nor assimilist. It was never so in Spanish times; and what it was then 
it is now. It endeavors to keep its own personality, its collective sense 
of itself, and it retains its loyalty to a broader political system, which 
is also, as I have indicated, a way of being loyal to a conception of 
the brotherhood o f man. The position can perhaps be described 
as autonomist, as distinguished from both separatist and federalist. 
O ut of this tradition the commonwealth status evolved.. . .
Editor’s Note: Excerpted with permission from Luis Munoz Marin, “Puerto 
Rico and the US, Their Future Together, ’’Foreign Affairs (July 1954).
defeated the am endm ents we pre­
sented to address their participa­
tion. In response to that, the Puerto 
Rican community in the US organ­
ized a three-day status vote in Octo­
ber 1993. They are doing their part. 
W hen the time comes, Congress 
must do its part to ensure their 
participation in the final vote to 
determ ine political status. Puerto 
Ricans have the right to be recog­
nized by Congress and the inter­
national community as a distinct 
nationality, as a unique people.
Finally, the US must clarify the 
legal nature of the current relation­
ship between it and Puerto Rico. 
The people of Puerto Rico have be­
lieved that the relationship forged 
in 1952 ended their territorial con­
dition. This relationship was said to 
be entered “in the nature of a com­
pact.” Notwithstanding, Section 9 
of the Federal Relations Act be­
tween the US and Puerto Rico 
concedes a generic delegation of 
legislative powers to the Congress. 
Said delegation to Congress is a de­
nial of the agreement. One partner 
cannot have the right to unilater­
ally change the rules of the game.
It is contrary to international law 
and public morality.
The federal courts have issued 
conflicting opinions regarding the 
nature of the commonwealth. In 
Harris v. Rosario (1980), the Su­
preme Court stated that Congress 
can legislate over Puerto Rico un­
der the powers of the Territorial 
Clause. Two years later, however, 
in Rodriguez v. PPD (1982), it went 
on to say that “Puerto Rico like a 
state, is an autonom ous political 
entity, sovereign over matters not 
ruled by the Constitution.” Based 
on that dicta, the Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit in US v. Quino­
nes (1985), stated that . . in 1952 
Puerto Rico ceased being a terri­
tory of the United States subject to 
the plenary powers of Congress as 
provided in the Federal Constitu­
tion.”
Just recently the Eleventh Circuit 
coripluded in US v. Sanchez (June 
1993), that Puerto Rico is still a 
US territory and that the common­
wealth’s creation in 1952 did not 
alter that. This decision stated that 
“With each new organic act, first 
the Foraker Act in 1902, then the 
Jones Act in 1917, and then the 
Federal Relations Act in 1950 and 
later am endm ents, Congress has 
simply delegated more authority to 
Puerto Rico over local matters. But 
this has not changed in any way 
Puerto Rico’s constitutional status 
as a territory, or the source of 
power over Puerto Rico. Congress 
continues to be the ultimate source 
of power pursuant to the Territory 
Clause of the Constitution. . . . Con­
gress may unilaterally repeal the 
Puerto Rican Constitution or the 
Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act
and replace them with any rules or 
regulations of its choice.” As of 
now, therefore, a conflict exists be­
tween the First and Eleventh Cir­
cuits as to the legal nature of the 
commonwealth status. This conflict 
has not yet been resolved by the Su­
prem e Court in a definitive matter.
Interpretations by the executive 
branch regarding the nature of the 
current relationship have been 
equally conflicting. While the 
Kennedy administration issued a 
m em orandum  that recognized the 
“unique relationship” between 
Puerto Rico and the US, the Bush 
administration issued a new memo­
randum  that stated that Puerto 
Rico is still a US territory.
Hem isphere  •  Sum mer/Fall 1993
The legal nature of the current 
commonwealth is unclear. Failure 
of the political branches to act deci­
sively to clarify this situation, one 
way or the other, has com pounded 
the issue. Congress and the presi­
dent must present a clear picture 
to the people of Puerto Rico so 
that we can finally enter into a 
relationship with the US that is 
without a doubt nonterritorial 
in nature.
In our proposed definition for 
the plebiscite, the Partido Demo- 
cratico Popular tackles this issue by 
stating that commonwealth must 
be “consecrated in a bilateral com­
pact which can only be altered by 
mutual consent.” The US govern­
m ent would not be able to uni­
laterally alter the terms of the 
relationship in this freely associ­
ated state or nonterritorial com­
monwealth. As we had stated in 
1989: “The enhancem ents to the 
commonwealth have to be in re­
gards to the nature of the relation-
Congress and the 
president must present 
a clear picture to the 
people of Puerto Rico 
so that we can finally 
enter into a relationship 
with the US that is 
urithout a doubt non­
territorial in nature.
ship. A bilateral compact must 
be established so that neither of 
the two parties, nor Puerto Rico 
nor the U nited States, may am end 
unilaterally. That is the perm anent 
un ion” (El Nuevo Dia, February 23, 
1989).
A bilateral compact would be 
one between equals, which guaran­
tees the nonterritorial condition of 
the commonwealth. U nder US con­
stitutional law, territories cannot es­
tablish bilateral compacts with the 
federal government. The freely 
associated state or commonwealth 
that the Partido Democratico Popu­
lar proposes can.
This definition is the first step in 
the process of developing the non­
territorial commonwealth of Puer­
to Rico or free associated state, an 
association between two countries. 
If favored by our people, it will be 
submitted to Congress and to the 
president. Then, a process of nego­
tiation will begin that will define 
for the US and Puerto Rico the 
real and possible parameters of 
that development. We stand confi­
dent it will comply with US constitu­
tional law, international law, and 
with the aspirations to dignity and 
prosperity held by the Puerto Ri­
can people and the US. ■
A  M AJO R CHARITABLE GIFTOPPORHINITY FOR H E  RIGHT PHILANTHROPIST
The MEDICAL, EYE & DENTAL INTERNATIONAL CARE ORGANIZATION, Inc., an independent 501 (c)3 
organization based in Austin, Texas, has sent 274 volunteers from throughout the United States to 
remote areas of Central America providing free health, dental and vision care to nearly 20,000 
poverty stricken children, men and women. Since being chartered in August of 1990, members of 
twenty M E D.I.C.O. teams have spent one week of their time, sharing their concern and talents at 
their own expense. M.E.D.I.C.O. has been recognized by Honduran government and medical 
authorities as a significant contributor in their nation's health care program. M.E.D.I.C.O. has seven 
teams scheduled for 1993, including two special surgical teams.
To date, M.E.D.I.C.O. has been administered by volunteers. The growth and success of the 
program now requires the services of a full-time administrator and an endowment to  financially 
support this position.
The founders and volunteers of M.E.D.I.C.O. invite contributions from major potential donors to help 
underwrite the operational costs of this much needed and expanding program. With a proven 
track record, the opportunity to be an integral part of a heartwarming successful humanitarian 
foundation is very real.
For More Information, Contact:
Norm Peters, Chairman, Board of Directors 
M.E.D.I.C.O., Inc.
1107 Main Street, Georgetown, Texas 78626 
Telephone (512) 863-8217 or fax (512) 863-8666.
M.E.D.I.C.te
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A New Course in Foreign Affairs?
by Joseph S. Tulchin
Whirlpool: US Foreign Policy 
toward Latin America and 
the Caribbean
by Robert A. Pastor. Princeton Univer­
sity Press, 1992. 338p.
W ith the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union, a de­bate erupted over what the most ap­
propriate role for the US would be 
in the new world and what foreign 
policy it should adopt to play that 
role. As to how the world will be or­
dered in the coming years, much 
remains to be decided. With regard 
to Latin America, several vital ques­
tions cry out for answers: how Latin
Joseph S. Tulchin is the director of the 
Woodrow Wilson Center’s Latin Ameri­
can Program in Washington, DC. He 
is the author of Argentina  and the 
United States: A Conflicted Rela­
tionship (Boston: Twayne, 1990).
America will fit into the new world 
order; whether Latin America can 
sustain the democracies so recently 
restored or established; whether 
the transition from closed econo­
mies to more open economies is 
perm anent or reversible; how the 
weakened states and the shaky 
economies will deal with the grow­
ing social deficits that affront the 
conscience and the populist tradi­
tions of the region; and what will 
be the nature of Latin America’s re­
lationship with the US now that the 
threat from the Soviet Union has 
disappeared.
Robert A. Pastor, form er mem­
ber of the National Security Coun­
cil (NSC) during the Carter 
administration and now professor 
of political science at Emory Uni­
versity and executive secretary of 
the Carter C enter’s Council of 
Freely-Elected Heads of Govern­
ment, offers answers to these ques­
tions and more in the best book on 
hemispheric relations since Fede­
rico G. Gil’s Latin American-United 
States Relations was published nearly 
25 years ago. Pastor’s is the first 
book to rank with Gil’s in com­
bining, with such grace and skill, 
broad erudition and a shrewd 
sense of the policy process, an ap­
preciation of US national interests, 
and an understanding o f Latin 
America.
Into the Whirlpool
Pastor uses the m etaphor of the 
whirlpool to describe the nature 
of US relations with Latin America. 
He suggests that Latin American af­
fairs are like a whirlpool that sucks 
the US into the vortex of Latin 
American problems in an obsessive 
manner. His purpose is “to under­
stand the causes of the periodic
obsessions with that closer region 
[the Caribbean], so that future 
policy reflects a longer term defini­
tion of US interests and a more 
balanced approach to all of Latin 
America and the Caribbean” (p. 25). 
The contours of the whirlpool are 
determ ined by five conditions: dif­
fering interpretations of history; 
the vast disparity in power and 
wealth between the US and the 
nations of Latin America; diver­
gent perceptions of events; Latin 
America’s chronic instability and 
proximity to the US; and the im­
pact of international rivalries on 
local conflicts (p. 204). Pastor ex­
plores with great skill the history of 
US policy toward Latin America so 
that we understand the origins of 
these conditions. Precisely because 
he has read widely and well in the 
historical literature, he sees pat­
terns that most analysts of public 
policy miss and that lead him to 
make what I consider one of his 
most im portant points: that the end 
of the Cold War has not solved— 
and will no t solve—our problems 
in the hemisphere. It is still neces­
sary, then, to learn how to get out 
of the whirlpool.
The first section of the book sets 
the stage for his argum ent by pro­
viding a quick history of US rela­
tions with Latin America in the 
twentieth century. Pastor uses a 
detailed discussion of Panamanian 
strongman O m ar Torrijos as a sym­
bol of the complexities of Latin 
America. It is a discussion that also 
serves to explain why the US has 
so m uch difficulty understanding 
those complexities. It is a subtle 
argum ent that is hard  to summarize 
in few words. Essentially, however, 
Pastor uses Torrijos to explore 
what he considers the major dim en­
sions of Latin America: national­
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ism, autonomy, and dependence; 
the political left and right; and de­
mocracy and development. Despite 
his defects, Torrijos is a hero to Pas­
tor, mainly because he was instru­
mental in securing passage of the 
Panama Canal treaties.
The second section is a series of 
chapters on the policy of the Car­
ter, Reagan, and Bush administra­
tions. This section includes a final 
chapter on the relationship be­
tween the executive—in Pastor’s 
view, clearly the principal actor— 
and the Congress, which he calls 
the “great com pensator” (p. 116).
In the third section, Pastor returns 
to the major elements or problems 
that he described in the opening 
chapter: succession crises, revolu­
tionary regimes, development, and 
democracy. While this is an extra­
ordinarily broad range of issues, 
Pastor demonstrates his virtuosity 
in dealing with economic, political, 
and cultural matters with equal 
ease.
Out of the Whirlpool?
Pastor finishes with a five-chapter 
section in which he offers sugges­
tions on how the US can get out of 
the whirlpool, and how it can for­
mulate a flexible policy that is best 
suited to the post-Cold War period 
and sympathetic to the interests of 
Latin American nations. This sec­
tion is characterized by an even- 
handedness not common to books 
on inter-American relations. He 
gives blame where it is due, em pha­
sizing, as his whirlpool m etaphor 
suggests, that the US and the Latin 
Americans are in this together and 
that it does no good for either to 
blame the o ther without assuming 
a fair share of the responsibility. 
This is no t an obvious point, nor
an easy one, because it gets to the 
heart of ideological debates both 
in this country and in Latin Amer­
ica. Conservatives in the US are too 
quick to assume that the blame for 
Latin American underdevelopm ent 
lies either within the Latin Ameri­
cans themselves or is caused by 
some evil outsider. On the other 
hand, many in Latin America, on 
the left and right, foist the blame 
for their region’s problems on the 
US, as if everything in the region 
would be fine if only the US would 
either go away or behave properly, 
whatever that means. To Pastor’s 
credit, he insists that both the US 
and Latin America share in the re­
sponsibility for getting out of the 
whirlpool.
The end of the 
Cold War has not 
solved—and will not 
solve—our problems 
in the hemisphere. It 
is still necessary, then, 
to learn how to get out 
of the whirlpool.
Pastor’s prescription for US pol­
icy is not remarkably innovative. 
We have heard it before—from 
gringos like Abraham Lowenthal 
and myself, as well as from Latin 
Americans like Carlos Rico, Heral- 
do Munoz, and Luis Guillermo 
Solis, am ong others. He urges the 
US government to be m ore sympa­
thetic to the needs of Latin Amer­
ica, to be more patient with and tol­
erant of their rhetorical flourishes, 
and, most significant, to move 
toward a multilateral approach to 
security issues. Most specifically, he 
calls for multilateral protection of 
democracy and guarantees for 
hum an rights in the hemisphere. 
Pastor’s argum ent is convincing be­
cause he sets it up so well. He dem ­
onstrates that, while the Cold War 
appears to have ended, the pattern 
of external threats to the hem i­
sphere that stimulated US concern 
for its security in the past could re­
cur at any time. Meanwhile, threats 
to our security come from what are 
known as global issues—such as drug 
trafficking, environmental degrada­
tion, illegal migration, arms prolif­
eration, and problems of public 
health. Unlike traditional threats 
to our security, such global threats 
must be confronted not unilater­
ally, but multilaterally (chapter 12).
He uses Nicaragua’s transition 
to democracy to show how the 
rules of the game have changed, 
“redrawing the political boundaries 
of sovereignty,” by legitimizing ex­
ternal multilateral intervention in 
support of democracy. Then, in a 
chapter on the Mexican economic 
restructuring program, he extends 
the argum ent to “renegotiating the 
economic boundaries [of sover­
eignty],” suggesting that we are 
about to overcome Latin American 
nationalism and enter a new stage 
marked by economic collaboration 
and cooperation to the benefit of 
all.
Having set up the argument, 
Pastor pushes hom e the point by 
insisting “that the hem isphere is 
on the verge of a transformation. 
What is needed now are ideas and 
leadership” (p. 278). The goals of 
this new policy will be the security
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of nations in the region through 
collective security, guarantees for 
democracy and hum an rights, the 
prom otion of economic develop­
m ent, and improvement of the 
quality of life. To accomplish these 
goals, Pastor calls for a new system 
of collective obligations and respon­
sibilities (pp. 288-89). In choosing 
his goals, Pastor is right on target; 
and in pointing to the way we can 
accomplish these goals and get out 
o f the whirlpool, he is headed in 
the right direction.
I differ with Pastor on a few 
points. My first is analytical: to ex­
plain the seemingly sudden shifts 
from obsession to disinterest, it is 
necessary to explore the crucial 
link between US foreign policy and 
domestic politics in determ ining 
which events or episodes overseas 
are perceived as crises. For exam­
ple, the civil war in El Salvador be­
came a crisis in US foreign policy 
in the early 1980s because the 
American people thought they saw 
another Vietnam coming, another 
quagmire, and they did not want 
any part of it. As I have argued at 
greater length elsewhere, how the 
Latin American struggle was per­
ceived converted it into a crisis; 
once the American public was con­
vinced the country was not about 
to get bogged down in Central 
America, El Salvador ceased to be a 
crisis and ceased to be news. The 
same can be said about Nicaragua 
10 years later.
The civil war in El Salvador was 
im portant in understanding how 
US foreign policy is formulated be­
cause it marked the em ergence of 
the Congress as a significant actor, 
not ju st as a great compensator. 
Perhaps Pastor’s perception of the 
policy process was skewed by his 
time in the NSC bunker. After 
Watergate and after Vietnam, 
Congress acquired its own, inde­
pendent information-gathering 
capacity. The most telling episode 
came when Secretary of Defense 
Caspar W einberger called a news 
conference to issue a “White Pa­
p e r” detailing the involvement of 
external forces in the Salvadoran
conflict. Within days, the congres­
sional opponents of the adminis­
tration’s policy issued their own 
“White Paper” refuting the adm in­
istration’s claims, with the evening 
news seeming to confirm Con­
gress’s findings, not the adminis­
tration’s.
To explain the 
seemingly sudden 
shifts from obsession 
to disinterest, it is 
necessary to explore 
the crucial link 
between USforeign, 
policy and domestic 
politics in determining 
which events or 
episodes overseas are 
perceived as crises.
Pastor is a bit too optimistic 
about the future. I agree com­
pletely with his evaluation of the 
significance of the Nicaraguan epi­
sode. It did indeed stretch the enve­
lope of sovereignty and open the 
way to community defense of de­
mocracy. But I disagree that Haiti 
is another case that strengthens the 
international community’s push 
for democracy. The rules of the 
game were rewritten with the con­
sensus of the major political actors 
in Nicaragua in agreem ent with the 
international community. That is 
not the case in Haiti and, as of this 
writing, there is little evidence the 
political forces in Haiti are even 
close to complete agreem ent about 
how their country should be ruled. 
My guess is, again, that Pastor’s per­
ception is influenced by where he 
sits—he has observed too many 
elections. He may have become 
convinced that democracy is a
m atter of good elections, and vice 
versa. Clean, well-observed elec­
tions may be a necessary condition 
for a functioning democracy, but 
they are far from being the suffi­
cient condition. Moreover, what is 
to prevent a multilateral interven­
tion from being sucked into local 
politics, as occurred with US in­
volvement in historical cases such 
as Nicaragua or the Dominican Re­
public and as, more recently, the 
UN did in Somalia and the OAS in 
Nicaragua?
In addition, Pastor is too opti­
mistic in seeing the inevitability of 
multilateral action in the hemi­
sphere. The problem  is not merely 
to do things in a multilateral fash­
ion. The key is to empower the 
o ther nations who form part of the 
multilateral community. The move­
m ent for peace in Central America 
was successful precisely because 
the presidents of the subregion 
took matters into their own hands 
despite the US. There is m ounting 
evidence—which provides solid 
grounds for optimism—that the 
nations of Latin America are now 
convinced that they must form a 
community to defend democracy 
and hum an rights. But there is lit­
tle evidence thus far that the US is 
prepared to cede either power or 
part of the responsibility for manag­
ing things in the region to others. 
Until that happens, multilateralism 
will be a hollow concept that will 
only frustrate the nations of Latin 
America.
Finally, I have a tiny quibble.
I wanted to learn m ore about pol­
icy formulation during the Carter 
administration. I realize Pastor 
wanted to establish some balance 
in his chronological treatm ent and 
that a “kiss and tell” book was inap­
propriate given his current position 
at the Carter Center. Nevertheless, 
he could have told us a bit more 
about differences am ong the Car- 
terites than he did.
All in all, however, Pastor’s con­
tribution leads us in the right direc­
tion. Let’s hope his optimism about 
the future of hemispheric relations 
is well- founded. ■
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The US, Cuba, and Puerto Rico
by Marian Goslinga
W ithin the framework of US foreign policy, the Caribbean has always occupied a special niche. The larger islands, in particular, have had a close relationship with their neighbor to the north—a relationship fre­quently mired in ambiguity.
This bibliography focuses on Cuba and Puerto Rico and their respective relationships with the US 
during the last 30 years. The literature on Cuba far outnum bers that on Puerto Rico. This has always 
been the case, but particularly since the 1959 revolution. The “Pearl of the Antilles” continues to have 
an enduring fascination for North American writers—a fascination fueled by controversy and strife. Stable Puerto Rico, 
on the o ther hand, suffers in comparison, in spite of the question of its political status.
American History: A View from 
Cuba. Oscar Zanetti .Journal of 
American History, v. 79, no. 2 (Sep­
tem ber 1992), p. 530-32. [Demon­
strates how the US has influenced 
the course of Cuban history.]
At Arm’s Length, or Closer? [Con­
tinuing Debate over Statehood or 
Independence for Puerto Rico].
The Economist, v. 326 (January 9, 
1993), p. 26-27. [Gov. Pedro 
Rossello believes economic pros­
perity for Puerto Rico depends on 
stronger relations with the US. Polls 
show, however, that 48% of the 
population is against statehood.]
Back from the Brink: The Corre­
spondence between President John 
F. Kennedy and Chairman Nikita S. 
Khrushchev on the Cuban Missile 
Crisis o f Autumn 1962. Problems of 
Communism, v. 41 (Spring 1992), 
p. 1-120. [Special issue with text of 
correspondence and comments.]
The Blockade against Cuba: A 
Strategy Bound to Fail. Mary Mur­
ray. Political Affairs, v. 71, no. 7 (Au­
gust 1992), p. 13-16. [Asserts that 
without international cooperation, 
the embargo has no chance.]
Marian Goslinga is the Latin Ameri­
can and Caribbean librarian at Florida 
International University.
The Caribbean Crisis: A View from 
the Kremlin. Oleg Troyanovski. In­
ternational Affairs (April-May 1992), 
p. 147-57. [A form er assistant to 
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev 
examines the Cuban Missile Crisis.]
Castro under Siege. Samuel Farber. 
World Policy Journal, v. 9 (Spring
1992), p. 329-48. [Assesses the role 
of the US blockade in strengthen­
ing the regim e’s grip over the 
Cuban people.]
Castro’s Scapegoats. Martin 
Arostegui. National Review, v. 44, 
no. 25 (December 28, 1992), p. 33- 
36. [Examines the involvement of 
Fidel Castro’s government in drug 
smuggling.]
Castro: To Fall or Not to Fall?
Wayne S. Smith. SA1S Review, v. 12 
(Sum m er/Fall 1992), p. 97-110. 
[Discusses current socioeconomic 
and political conditions in Cuba 
and lists US policy options.]
Clinton’s Cuba Policy: A Low- 
Priority Dilemma. Saul Landau.
NACLA ’s Report on the Americas, 
v. 26, no. 5 (May 1993), p. 35-37. 
[Discusses the factors influencing 
President Bill C linton’s low-priority 
treatm ent of US-Cuban relations.]
The Correct Line on Castro’s 
Cuba. Irving L. Horowitz. New 
Leader, v. 75, no. 5 (April 6, 1992), 
p. 11-13. [Asserts that US policy
toward Cuba has been marked by 
noninterventionism  based more on 
hesitancy than action.]
Cuba Adrift in a Postcommunist 
World. Edward Gonzalez, David Ron- 
feldt. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand 
Corporation, 1992. 82 p. [Exam­
ines US policy options.]
Cuba after Communism. Eliana 
Cardoso, Ann Helwege. Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1992. 148 p. [Dis­
cusses prospects for the Cuban 
economy and a possible role for 
the US.]
Cuba in Crisis: Will Fidel Share the 
Fate o f Other Communist Leaders?
Rodman D. Griffin. CQ Researcher, 
v. 1 (November 29, 1991), p. 897- 
919. [Analyzes the political alterna­
tives available to Castro and the 
chances for normalizing US-Cuban 
relations.]
Cuba in Transition: Socialist Order 
under Siege. Sahadeo Basdeo. Car­
ibbean Affairs, v. 5, no. 4 (1992), 
p. 91-117. [Suggests that, rather 
than military intervention, the US 
should follow a policy of negotia­
tion in its dealings with Cuba.]
The Cuba Lobby: From Sub-Cabi­
net Appointments to Government 
Broadcasting. George Gedda. For­
eign Service Journal, v. 70, no. 24 
(June 1993), p. 6+. [Discusses the 
pressure exerted by Florida-Cuban
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exile groups, headed by Jorge Mas 
Canosa, to maintain the US eco­
nomic embargo and propaganda 
efforts against the Castro regime.]
Cuba Looks to the Year 2000.
Marc Frank. New York: Interna­
tional Publishers, 1993. 225 p. 
[Analyzes the state of Cuban so­
cialism, including the rectification 
movement.]
Cuba’s Lost Horizon. John  Simp­
son. World Monitor (May 1993), 
p. 38-43. [According to the author, 
despite the US trade embargo, the 
island is not on the brink of col­
lapse.]
Cuba: a la sumision por el hambre.
Ian Williams. Nexos, v. 15, no. 180 
(December 1992), p. 43-45. [Con­
tends that the US intends to starve 
the Cuban people into rebellion.]
Cuba: asimetrias. Jesus Orozco 
Zablah. Este Pat's, no. 23 (February
1993), p. 23-27. [Compares public 
opinion in the US and Mexico con­
cerning Cuba’s political situation.]
Cuba: Implications o f Trade and 
Business with the US. Jam es D. 
Whisenand. Butterworth’s Journal of 
International Banking and Financial 
Law, v. 7, no. 9 (September 1992), 
p. 414-20, and v. 7, no. 10 (October 
1992), p. 476-83. [This two-part 
analysis traces the history of US- 
Cuban trade and examines the le­
gal foundation of the US trade 
embargo.]
Cuba: Moving Back to the Future 
with Tourism. Gerald R. Webster. 
Journal of Geography, v. 91, no. 5 
(September-October 1992), p. 226- 
33. [Discusses the Cuban tourist 
industry and US travel restrictions.]
Cuba: On Their Bikes. Andrew 
W hitehead, Ian Williams. New States­
man Society, v. 5, no. 228 (Novem­
ber 13, 1992), p. 16-18. [Describes 
the daily manifestations of Cuba’s 
severe economic crisis brought on 
largely by the US trade embargo.]
Cuba: The Domino that Refuses to
Fall. Clifford E. Griffin. Caribbean 
Affairs, v. 5, no. 1 (1992), p. 24-42. 
[Asserts that, while there is no 
doubt Cuban socialism is under 
great stress, expectations about an 
im m inent collapse are wishful 
thinking.]
The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited.
James A. Nathan. New York: St. Mar­
tin ’s Press, 1992. 302 p. [Reevalua­
tion of the 1962 crisis in light of 
recently released information by 
the US, Russia, and Cuba.]
Dateline Washington: Cuban- 
American Clout. Carla Anne Rob­
bins. Foreign Policy, no. 88 (Fall 
1992), p. 162-82.
The Disenchanted Island: Puerto 
Rico and the United States in the 
Twentieth Century. Ronald Fernan­
dez.. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992. 
264 p. [Analyzes Puerto Rico’s po­
litical status and aspirations since 
1898 with particular reference to 
the independence movement.]
Foreign Policy Failures in China, 
Cuba, and Nicaragua: A Paradigm.
Ray S. Cline, Roger W. Fontaine. 
Washington, DC: US Global Strat­
egy Council, 1992. 246 p.
Framing the Enemy: New York 
Times Coverage of Cuba in the 
1980’s. Silvo Lenart, Harry R. Targ. 
Peace and Change, v. 17 (July 1992), 
p. 341-62. [Argues that US media
portrayal of Cuba has shifted to 
accommodate the post-Cold War 
structure of international relations 
with greater focus on domestic is­
sues, especially hum an rights.]
Getting Ready for Cuba after Cas­
tro. Rudi Dornbusch. Business Week, 
no. 3320 (May 24, 1993), p. 19. 
[Discusses US policy options to pro­
mote stability in Cuba and to pre­
vent extremist groups from taking 
control. These policies include the 
elimination of trade restrictions 
and the restructuring of the na­
tional debt.]
A Hurricane Heads for Puerto 
Rico: Yanking a Tax Break Called 
936 Could Set O ff an Economic 
Storm. Gail DeGeorge. Business 
Week (June 14, 1993), p. 52+.
The Impact of Global Economic In­
vestment and Commercial Trends 
on Post-Castro Cuba. Antonio Villa- 
mil. North-South, v. 2, no. 6 (April- 
May 1993), p. 29-32. [Comments 
that a post-Castro government will 
need to forge strong ties with the 
US in order to survive in the rap­
idly changing world of the 1990s.]
In Fidel Castro’s Grim Backyard.
John  Simpson. Spectator, v. 270 
(February 27, 1993), p. 11-13. [As­
serts that US press reports of the 
im m inent downfall of Castro are 
unfounded. The people are critical 
of social hardships, but blame the 
US embargo for Cuba’s problems.]
Is Cuba Next? Mark Falcoff. Com­
mentary, v. 94, no. 5 (November 
1992), p. 42-46. [Asserts that anti- 
Americanism, skillfully exploited 
by Fidel Castro, is one of the main 
reasons communism survives in 
Cuba.]
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Knot in US-Cuba Relations Re­
mains Tied. Gao Ping. Beijing Re­
view, v. 35 (September 7, 1992), 
p. 14-16.
The Navy as Social Provider in 
Vieques, Puerto Rico. Sara Grusky. 
Armed Forces and Society, v. 18 (Win­
ter 1992), p. 215-30. [Examines the 
Navy’s role in influencing social, 
political, and economic develop­
m ent on the island of Vieques.]
Now It’s U.S. Policy: Starving Cuba 
into Submission. Ian Williams. The
Nation, v. 255, no. 13 (October 26, 
1992), p. 464-66. [Discusses the im­
pact of the Cuban Democracy Act, 
which aims to tighten the US em­
bargo against Cuba.]
Puerto Rico no quiere ser tan his- 
pano y lo dice bien alto. Claudio 
Alvarez Dunn. Cambio, v. 16 (De­
cem ber 23, 1991), p. 106. [Com­
ments on the December 8, 1991, 
referendum  and the decision to 
continue commonwealth status.]
Puerto Rico’s Cloudy Future. Juan
M. Garcia Passalacqua. World and I, 
v. 7 (November 1992), p. 106-11. 
[Discusses the implications of state­
hood, commonwealth, or inde­
pendence.]
The Radio and TV Marti Contro­
versy: A Re-Examination. Kyu Ho
Youm. Gazette, v. 48, no. 2 (1991), 
p. 95-103. [Considers the interna­
tional legality of US broadcasting 
policy aimed at Cuba.]
Researching United States Rela­
tions with the Cuban Revolution.
Louis A. Perez, Jr. Pacific Historical 
Review, v. 61, no. 1 (1992), p. 115- 
20. [Reviews US-Cuban relations 
during 1958-60.]
Risky Business? The Cuban Democ­
racy Act o f 1992. Susan Kaufman 
Purcell. Hemisphere, v. 4, no. 3 (Sum­
m er 1992), p. 6-7. [Analyzes the 
Cuban Democracy Act, which was 
introduced in the US House of Rep­
resentatives on February 5, 1992, 
by Rep. Robert Torricelli (D-NJ.]
The Secrets o f Castro’s Staying 
Power. Jorge I. Dominguez. Foreign 
Affairs, v. 72, no. 2 (Spring 1993), 
p. 97-107. [Asserts that the Castro 
regime endures in part because of 
US policies.]
Television Marti: Electronic 
Invasion in the Post-Cold War.
Laurien Alexandre. Media, Culture 
&  Society, v. 14 (October 1992), 
p. 523-40.
The Torricelli Bill: Tightening the 
Chokehold on Cuba. Saul Landau. 
The Nation, v. 254, no. 23 (June 15, 
1992), p. 818-20.
UN Vote Condemns US Trade 
Embargo on Cuba. Sara Lobman. 
Militant, v. 56, no. 45, p. 1-12.
United States Economic Measures 
against Cuba: Proceedings in the 
United Nations and International 
Law Issues. Michael Krinsky, David 
Golove. N ortham pton, Mass.: 
Aletheia Press, 1993. 331 p. [Com­
pendium  of docum ents on the US 
trade embargo against Cuba.]
El veto de Washington no importa: 
la apertura de Cuba atrae inversio- 
nistas, sobre todo estadounidenses.
Hom ero Campa. Proceso, v. 15, 
no. 817 (June 29, 1992), p. 40-43. 
[Comments upon the Cuban gov­
ernm ent’s successful drive to at­
tract foreign investment.]
Why Does Castro Survive? J. Rich­
ard Planas. World Affairs, v. 154 
(Winter 1992), p. 87-93.
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